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Executive Summary
Long-term improvement in well-being requires asset accumulation. While saving is not easy for
anyone, it is more difficult for the poor because they have few resources relative to subsistence
requirements, because they lack access to some public-policy mechanisms that subsidize saving,
and because scarce resources and restricted access may push saving out of their world view.
Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) are a new policy proposal designed to address these
constraints and to improve access to savings institutions for the poor. Withdrawals of deposits
by the poor in IDAs are matched if used for home ownership, post-secondary education, or
microenterprise. Participants also receive financial education and support from IDA staff.
Do IDAs work? Data from the American Dream Demonstration (ADD) suggests that the poor
can save and accumulate assets in IDAs:
•

Average monthly net deposits per participant were $25.42.

•

The average participant saved 67 percent of the monthly savings target.

•

The average participant made a deposit in 7 of 12 months.

•

With an average match rate of 2:1, participants accumulated about $900 per year in IDAs.

The American Dream Demonstration
ADD is a demonstration of IDAs in 14 programs across the United States. It is scheduled to run
for four years (1997-2001), with two more years of evaluation through 2003.
The Corporation for Enterprise Development (CFED) in Washington, D.C., designed ADD and
guides it. The Center for Social Development (CSD) at Washington University in St. Louis
designed the evaluation.
The evaluation of ADD is the first major study of IDAs. The Startup Evaluation Report
(Sherraden et al., 1999), monitored the start-up period through June 30, 1998. Saving Patterns in
IDA Programs (Sherraden et al., 2000) covered programs, participants, and saving patterns
through June 30, 1999. This report discusses savings and asset accumulation through June 30,
2000. A final monitoring report will cover ADD through December 31, 2001.
Data come from the Management Information System for Individual Development Accounts
(MIS IDA), a software package created and supported by CSD. MIS IDA offers tools for
program management and evaluation (Johnson, Hinterlong, and Sherraden, 2000). Data in MIS
IDA were collected by program staff and may be the best ever assembled on high-frequency
saving by the poor. In particular, records of cash flows in IDAs come from bank statements and
are very accurate. The report notes carefully possible effects of weaknesses in the data.
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A Theory of “Asset Effects”
IDAs aim to do more than just transfer resources to the poor. Of course, resources are good to
have, if only because they can be converted into consumption. IDAs, however, expect that its
transfers will be saved rather than consumed. But standard welfare transfers can also be saved.
How are IDAs different?
This report develops Sherraden’s (1991) proposed answer in terms of institutional theory. IDAs
are packaged in an institutional structure that explicitly asks and expects participants to save their
transfers in forms (such as homes, human capital, or business assets) unlikely to be quickly
consumed. In contrast, standard welfare is designed to support consumption.
The institutional package matters because people are not the rational, omniscient beings assumed
in economic theory. People are subject to suggestion, and they respond to patterns of choices
worn smooth by public policy because that takes less effort than to imagine choices and then to
weigh possible chances of consequences.
Institutional theory suggests that the structure of IDAs encourages the poor to see saving as an
option with positive consequences:
•

The existence of IDAs forges a social pattern as it sends the message that the poor can save.

•

Matches increase the return on savings, increase asset accumulation from given savings, and
attract people to the program.

•

IDAs are linked to financial education that provides knowledge of how to save.

•

The match cap becomes a goal in the minds of participants.

•

Monthly statements give feedback and show progress toward goals. Furthermore, program
staff and peers provide informal encouragement. The focus on success makes saving easier.

•

IDA programs ask for monthly deposits. This encourages saving to become a habit.

•

IDAs give poor people access to a way to commit to save.

•

Through budgets, goals, and plans, IDAs focus on the future and increase future orientation.

•

IDAs point out goals (such as home ownership or post-secondary education) that people
might not see (or see as worthwhile) on their own.

•

Informal discouragement of unmatched withdrawals helps to curb dissaving.

Sherraden (1991) introduced the concept of asset effects, defined as the impacts of ownership.
Humans are forward-looking, and current well-being depends in part on expected future wellbeing. People with more assets in the present expect to have more resources in the future.
Thus—for purely economic reasons—they expect to be happier. “Asset effects” occur when
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ownership improves expected future well-being and thus, for psychological reasons, improves
current well-being. Not only do owners think differently, but others also treat them differently.
The social and political effects of ownership may matter even more than the individual effects.
Participation in ADD
Enrollment. A participant is defined as someone who enrolled in ADD and who had an account
statement in MIS IDA. As of June 30, 2000, ADD had 2,378 participants in 14 IDA programs.
Graduation. About 13 percent of participants had taken a matched withdrawal. A fourth of
these “graduated” and left the program, and three-fourths are still active.
Exit. About 16 percent of participants had exited without a matched withdrawal. The
cumulative risk of exit in the first 12 months was 11 percent, and it was 16 percent for the first
24 months. As of June 30, 2000, 81 percent of participants were active. These and other
outcomes will change with time.
Savings Outcomes in ADD
Gross deposits. The average participant had participated for 13.3 months and had gross deposits
of $41.43 per month ($552 total).
Unmatched withdrawals. The size and frequency of unmatched withdrawals has been one of
the biggest surprises in ADD. About 37 percent of participants made unmatched withdrawals
from matchable balances, removing 25 percent of all matchable deposits. For participants who
made unmatched withdrawals, the average number was 2.9, and the amount removed was $320.
With an average match rate of 2:1, this implies a loss of potential matches for people who make
unmatched withdrawals from matchable balances of about $640. The high opportunity cost of
unmatched withdrawals, coupled with their size and frequency, highlights the difficulty of asset
accumulation for the poor, even in the supportive institutional context of IDAs.
Net deposits. Net deposits are defined as gross deposits minus unmatched withdrawals minus
balances in excess of the match cap. Aggregate net deposits in ADD were $838,443. Net
deposits per participant were $353 ($420 for non-exits). The average monthly net deposit
(AMND)—defined as net deposits divided by months of participation—was $25.42 (for nonexits, $30.30). Median AMND was $17.96 ($23.35 for non-exits). With an average match rate
of 2:1, the average participant in ADD had accumulated about $75 per month.
The average match rate per dollar of net deposits was 1.96:1, and the match that corresponded to
net deposits was $1,644,508. If all net deposits were used in matched withdrawals, total asset
accumulation in IDAs would be $2,482,951. With exits included, this is $1,044 per participant;
with exits excluded, it is $1,245 per participant. These figures will change as ADD progresses.
Matched withdrawals. Aggregate matched withdrawals in ADD through June 30, 2000 were
$191,601. The average match rate per dollar of matched withdrawals was 1.82:1, and matches
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disbursed were $348,373. The average participant with a matched withdrawal had 2.0
withdrawals for a total of $603. Their total asset accumulation averaged $1,698.
Matched withdrawals became more common as balances were built through time; 9 percent of
participants had a matched withdrawal by their 12th month, and 27 percent had one by their 24th
month.
Matched uses. As of June 30, 2000, 13 percent of participants had a matched withdrawal.
About 24 percent made a home purchase, 24 percent invested in microenterprise, and 21 percent
pursued post-secondary education. The rest used their matched withdrawals for home repair,
retirement, or job training.
About 87 percent of participants had no matched withdrawals. Of these, 57 percent intended to
buy a home, 18 percent intended to spend on microenterprise, and 15 percent planned for postsecondary education. About 10 percent planned for home repair, retirement, or job training.
Net deposits as a percentage of the pro-rated match cap. On average, participants had net
deposits of 67 percent of the monthly savings target (median 49 percent). At this pace, they will
use two-thirds of their total match eligibility.
Deposit frequency. On average and at the median, participants made a deposit in 7.0 months
per year. Non-exits made a deposit in 7.6 months per year. Some evidence suggests that
frequent depositors accumulate more than infrequent depositors.
Savings rate. On average, AMND was 2.2 percent of monthly income (median 1.3 percent).
The savings rate decreased as income increased. Perhaps the institutional effects of IDAs are
stronger than the economic effects of greater income, and perhaps these institutional effects are
somehow stronger for poorer people.
IDAs and EITC. Net deposits increased markedly in tax season. IDA participants save some
chunk of tax refunds or payments from the Earned Income Tax Credit.
Costs
Policy choices require data on both outputs and costs. Cost data in MIS IDA are measured with
error and are probably overstated for many reasons (for example, due to start-up costs, provision
of technical assistance to other IDA programs, and data collection for the evaluation of ADD).
Average program expenses (without matches) were $70.38 per participant-month, or $2.77 per
$1 of net deposits. A study of the first 14 months of the experimental-design program in ADD
also found costs in this range (Schreiner, 2000a). Costs in ADD did decrease with time.
Average program expenses per participant-month through June 30, 1999, were $117.58; in the
next 12 months, they averaged $43.06.
With a 2:1 match, total outlays in IDAs were thus roughly $6 per $1 of net deposits ($1 savings,
$2 match, and $3 program expenses). This is about $2 of total outlay per $1 of asset
accumulation.
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Are these costs high or low? The answer depends on the as-yet-unmeasured benefits of IDAs. A
standard financial benefit-cost analysis is planned for the site of the experimental design
(Schreiner, 2000b). Even without precise knowledge of benefits, however, measurement of costs
highlights trade-offs and sets a benchmark that encourages efficiency.
Qualitative evidence from the evaluation of ADD suggests that participants believe that intensive
service is a key element of program design. A key challenge for IDA programs is then to
provide such services in such a way that benefits can exceed costs. The tension between
intensive service and cost structures that would allow broad access to IDAs may lead to two tiers
of IDA designs, one with fewer services, lower costs, and broader outreach, and another with
greater services, higher costs, and narrower targets (Sherraden, 2000).
New Savings versus Shifted Assets
IDA deposits can come from new savings or from assets converted from other forms. Even if the
poor (or the non-poor) do not explicitly shift liquid assets, they can implicitly shift illiquid assets
if IDAs lead to reduced investment and maintenance in non-IDA assets. High returns on IDAs
may also lead savers to borrow or to repay debts slower than otherwise.
Qualitative evidence from the evaluation of ADD (Moore et al., 2001 and 2000) suggests that
IDA deposits came in some unknown measure from both new savings and from shifted assets.
Program Characteristics and Savings Outcomes
The association between program (institutional) characteristics and savings outcomes matters
because policy can affect program design. The results below are derived from multivariate
regressions that control for a wide range of program and participant characteristics.
Match rates. A central feature of IDAs is the match rate. In regressions, higher match rates
have large, strong associations with reduced risk of unmatched withdrawals and with reduced
risk of exit. Match rates do not, however, have a statistically significant link with AMND.
Qualitative evidence suggests that matches attract people to IDAs; quantitative evidence here
suggests that higher match rates keep people in IDAs and encourage them to maintain their
balances. But higher match rates do not seem to lead to greater deposits. We believe that these
estimated associations result mostly from institutional factors, but economic factors, two-way
causation, and censored data also matter to some unknown extent. The data from ADD do not
allow a sharp test of the effect of match rates on savings outcomes.
Monthly savings target. The monthly savings target is the amount that, if saved each month
and not removed in unmatched withdrawals, would produce net deposits equal to the total match
cap. On average in ADD, AMND was 67 percent of the savings target.
Higher savings targets were strongly linked with large reductions in the risk of unmatched
withdrawals and the risk of exit. Higher savings targets were also strongly linked with higher
AMND.
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At least three forces may drive this. First, participants may change match caps into goals,
leading to greater savings effort when match caps are higher. Second, AMND is cut-off for
participants at the match cap. Third, programs may have assigned higher targets to groups
expected to be high savers. These last two factors may induce a spurious positive correlation
between the match cap and savings.
Financial education. Required financial education is a central feature of IDAs in ADD. The
average participant attended 10.5 hours of general financial education. Each hour up to 12 was
linked with large increases in AMND, but hours after that had little effect.
In broad terms, AMND increases with financial education (whether general or asset-specific),
but only up to a point, probably somewhere between 6 and 12 hours. The content of classes
probably also matters, but we did not measure it.
Participant Characteristics and Savings Outcomes
Participants in ADD are not a random sample of people eligible for IDAs; they are programselected and self-selected. Programs target certain people, and eligibles in the target group who
expect the greatest net benefits are the most likely to enroll. Results in this report pertain only to
eligibles who, if they had the choice, would enroll in IDAs.
Compared with the overall U.S. population at or below 200 percent of the poverty line, IDA
participants are more disadvantaged in that they are more likely to be female, African-American,
or never-married. IDA participants are less disadvantaged, however, in that they are more
educated, more likely to be employed, and more likely to have a bank account. These patterns
likely reflect the explicit targeting of the “working poor” by programs in ADD and the client
base of the host organizations.
Gender. About 80 percent of participants were female. Gender had no link with savings.
Race/ethnicity. About 47 percent of participants in ADD were African-American, 37 percent
were Caucasian, 9 percent Hispanic, 3 percent Native American, 2 percent Asian-American, and
3 percent “Other.” Although average AMND for all groups was at least $19.50, differences
between groups were large. For example, compared with Asian Americans, average AMND was
$10.58 less for “Other,” $11.62 less for Hispanics, $12.77 less for Caucasians, $20.82 less for
African Americans, and $22.30 less for Native Americans.
These differences are not due to race/ethnicity per se but rather to a constellation of socially
produced characteristics correlated with both race/ethnicity and savings. In a perfect model that
controlled for everything, the estimated link between race/ethnicity and savings would be zero.
IDAs aim to increase inclusion in institutions for saving and asset accumulation. We do not
know whether IDAs increase saving or whether they increase saving more for disadvantaged
groups. Although IDAs in ADD did narrow relative racial/ethnic gaps, they are not a panacea.
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Education and employment. Given their income, participants in ADD were highly educated:
24 percent had a college degree of some sort, and 85 percent completed high school. Education
was not linked with the risk of exit. AMND was highest for people with 4-year college degrees.
Participants in ADD also had a high incidence of employment: 78 percent worked full-time or
part-time. Employment status was not significantly associated with any savings outcomes.
Receipt of public assistance. About 50 percent of participants in ADD had received some form
of public assistance at enrollment or before. Current receipt of public assistance was not
associated with any savings outcomes.
Income. Mean income/poverty in ADD was 111 percent (median 100 percent).1 About 21
percent were under 50 percent of the poverty line, and 12 percent were over 200 percent of the
poverty line. The level of income was not associated with the risk of an unmatched withdrawal,
the risk of exit, or AMND, but higher income was associated with a lower savings rate. Possible
explanations include institutional factors, censored data, and measurement error, but we believe
that institutional factors matter most and that they may be strongest for the poorest.
Insurance coverage. About 51 percent of participants in ADD had health insurance, and 31
percent had life insurance. Health insurance did not have a significant association with exit,
unmatched withdrawals, or AMND. Life insurance was not associated with AMND, but it was
correlated with reduced risk of exit and of unmatched withdrawals.
Asset ownership. Participants who owned assets likely had unobserved characteristics that
predisposed them to save more in IDAs. For example, participants with a checking account were
much less likely to exit, they were much less likely to take an unmatched withdrawal, and they
had much higher average AMND. The same pattern holds for home owners and car owners.

Summary
These mid-way results from ADD will raise questions, spark debate, and inform policy. The
goal of this discussion and of future research—in ADD and elsewhere—is to build knowledge
about how programs that aim to encourage saving and asset accumulation can be more inclusive
and generate greater net benefits.

1

These data omit cases for which total income is missing and, like other descriptive statistics
here, come from the most recent record in MIS IDA.
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1. IDAs, Savings, and Asset Accumulation by the Poor
The only way to leave poverty for long is to save and accumulate assets, be they human,
physical, financial, or social. That is why IDAs try to promote asset accumulation by the poor.
If saving were simple and easy, then few people would be poor. But to save means to use less
resources in the present, so, even for the non-poor, saving is difficult. Of course, the sacrifice is
greater for the poor because they have fewer resources relative to subsistence requirements.
Furthermore, the poor lack access to some public-policy mechanisms that, for the non-poor,
decrease the current cost of saving. Finally, scarce resources and restricted access may combine
to remove saving from the world view of the poor.
What is the nature of these impediments, and how might IDAs address them? This chapter
presents background, and later chapters discuss evidence on IDAs, savings, and asset
accumulation by the poor in ADD.

Assets and the Poor
Sawhill, in her 1988 classic “Poverty in the United States: Why Does It Persist?” concluded that
“we still understand very little about the basic causes of poverty” (p. 1113). This lack of
knowledge—and subsequent failure to make a dent in poverty—rests on “a fundamental problem
in the research . . . the lack of a basic structural model of the income-generating process” (p.
1112). This chapter lays out a theory in which poverty persists because of a lack of assets. It
also discusses how IDAs might be one way to start to reverse this.
The model is not new. Asset accumulation has always been a central theme of development
research in non-industrialized countries (e.g., Rutherford, 2000; Attanasio and Székely, 1999;
Lipton and Ravaillon, 1995; Besley, 1992; Deaton, 1992a; Gersovitz, 1988). Likewise, much
research on the non-poor in industrialized countries focuses on saving (Bernheim, 1999;
Browning and Lusardi, 1996; Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes, 1995; Deaton 1992b). Asset
accumulation for the poor in industrialized countries, however, was somehow overlooked
(Sherraden, 1991). Public assistance aimed to fulfill subsistence requirements, but it stopped
short of transfers of enough resources to allow people to break out of a poverty orbit.
In 1988, a movement started in industrial countries to include the poor in policies to promote
asset accumulation. Friedman’s The Safety Net as Ladder proposed changes to the welfare
structure to encourage development beyond subsistence. Haveman’s Starting Even declared that
“transfer payments are necessary but not sufficient” (p. 149) and called for increased investments
in human capital and for publicly funded, restricted-use accounts for youth. Sherraden’s
“Rethinking Social Policy: Towards Assets” critiqued the subsistence paradigm and proposed
IDAs as a step toward a development paradigm.
In the past decade, the movement has gained intellectual momentum (Ackerman and Alstott,
1999; Conley, 1999; Stoesz and Saunders, 1999; Gates, 1998; Oliver and Shapiro, 1995). It has
also attracted support from all points along the political spectrum. For example, Bill Clinton—
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who as governor of Arkansas wrote the foreword to The Safety Net as Ladder—supported IDAs
in his 1992 campaign and later proposed a large matched-savings program (Wayne, 1999). The
Savings for Working Families Act (H.R. 4106 and S. 2023) would budget up to $10 billion for
IDAs (Corporation for Enterprise Development, 2000). Both George W. Bush (Bush, 2000) and
Al Gore (Kessler, 2000) had billion-dollar IDA proposals in their platforms, and both proposed
some form of individual asset accounts for retirement.1 The government of Canada plans to
sponsor an IDA demonstration in 10 cities, and in the United Kingdom, the New Labour
government has proposed accounts that are like IDAs (O’Reilly, 2000).

Why Assets? A Model of Why Poverty Persists
Poverty is a trap of low assets. Income is defined as inflows of resources in a period, and assets
are defined as resources moved through time. The use of assets—human, physical, financial, or
social—produces income. Greater income requires greater production and thus greater assets. If
saving is an increase in resources moved through time and if asset accumulation is a result of
saving, then greater income requires greater saving and asset accumulation.2
Assets are far more than just bank accounts. The chief asset of most people—poor or nonpoor—is human capital, defined as time, effort, and skill. Most people produce most of their
income from the sale of the production of their human capital, that is, their labor. Just as
financial capital accumulated in bank accounts results from saving, human capital accumulated
in people also results from saving. To acquire skill, people allocate time to work (experience) or
to study (education) rather than to leisure. The accumulated skill decreases the time and effort
required for later tasks. Thus, human capital is a resource (time) saved out of leisure in the past
that increases productivity (and potential leisure) in the future. Children—perhaps the biggest
savers—can spend time and effort to learn (invest in human capital) only if someone else
provides resources to meet their subsistence requirements.
Production by assets is far more than just plant and equipment in factories or human capital in
labor markets. Financial assets held as bonds, for example, produce a contracted interest rate;
stocks produce dividends and price changes (production may be negative). Cash stores
resources; one dollar now produces one dollar tomorrow. Non-financial assets also matter for
many types of production in both the market and in the household. Homes produce housing
services, equivalent to the resources that would be exchanged to acquire similar services as a
renter. Refrigerators, mops, and heirlooms are assets that, combined with human capital,
produce household services such as cooked meals, cleaned floors, and memories. Social
capital—defined as networks, norms, and trust—produces information, reduces transaction costs,
buffers shocks, and comforts psyches. In a racist and sexist society, race and gender may also be
assets. Sherraden (1991) presents a typology of assets and their returns.

1

Bush proposed a regressive system of individual accounts within the Social Security system,
and Gore proposed a progressive system outside Social Security.
2
Saving and asset accumulation are distinct because saving, if coupled with dissaving, need not
result in asset accumulation.
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At a point in time, people allocate resources between production (saving) and consumption. The
trade-off is that more consumption now means less saving, less production, and thus less income
to allocate between consumption and production later. The trade-off is sharpest for the poor
because, once they meet subsistence requirements, they have fewer resources available to save.
For the poor, the high cost of foregone consumption depresses saving and thus depresses future
production, income, and consumption. Assets beget assets, so the poor, because they start with
low assets, tend to stay poor.3 The question of how to escape from poverty is, in essence, the
question of how to save and accumulate assets.
A Theory of Asset Effects
So far, this discussion of the role of assets in production and consumption has used an
“economic” (or rational) framework that reduces people to consumers who save only because
saving increases future consumption and who benefit from saving only when they consume its
fruits. Sherraden (1991) introduced the concept of asset effects, which he defined as economic,
social, and psychological effects of assets beyond deferred consumption.
Because economic theory already explains economic effects (changes in rational responses due
to changes in constraints and opportunities), this chapter focuses on a theory of the “noneconomic” (or psychological) effects of ownership. This is not to suggest that psychological
effects overwhelm economic effects; indeed, we believe that economic effects probably matter
more. The theory of economic effects of ownership, however, is already well-developed. In
contrast, no one has explained why or how assets might have psychological effects.
It is important to develop a theory of psychological asset effects because much of the allure of
IDAs comes from the claim that assets spark hope and change how people think and act.4 For
example, the most-quoted statement from Sherraden (1991) is that “while incomes feed people’s
stomachs, assets change their heads” (p. 6).5 IDAs transfer resources; thus, for prosaic economic
reasons, they probably improve the well-being of the poor. The radical claim is that asset effects
go beyond merely economic impacts.
The theory in this chapter describes how assets might affect hope and thought. If IDAs spark
hope (but not false hope), then it must be that poor people are too pessimistic. The theory
explains where this pessimism might come from, how assets might change it, and why the poor
3

For example, someone with low human capital might earn just enough for food and shelter.
The person cannot attend classes to acquire more human capital because attendance incurs
ancillary expenses. If the person could save, then, with time, these resources could cover the
costs of study. With more human capital, earnings might increase, and with it resources
available to be saved. Greater savings would then enable greater investment in further
productive capacity.
4
Sherraden (1991, p. 148) says that “assets have a variety of important social, psychological, and
economic effects. Simply put, people think and behave differently when they are accumulating
assets, and the world responds to them differently as well.”
5
Sherraden (1991, p. 155) says that assets “are hope in concrete form.” Also, “IDA programs are
aiming not merely to create savings but savers” (Sherraden, 2000, p. 6).
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are not to blame. Likewise, if IDAs improve world views, then it must be that the poor had
downwardly skewed world views. The theory explains—without recourse to concepts of
weakness or moral sloth—how the poor might come to have downwardly skewed world views
and how assets might help to align views more closely with the real world.6
From the point of view of advocates for IDAs in a policy arena, the presentation of this theory is
risky. Because the theory suggests that the poor lack hope and/or accurate world views, some
readers see the theory as supportive of the idea that the poor are lazy or stupid. In fact, the
theory derives depressed hope and downwardly skewed world views as a result of luck and limits
on rationality, two factors that the poor share in the same measure as the non-poor. The theory
explains both how the poor can improve and how the room for improvement resulted from forces
beyond their control.
There is also a risk that the presentation of a theory of psychological asset effects will be seen to
suggest that economic effects do not matter or that they matter less than psychological effects.
Such an interpretation would be mistaken. The theory encompasses both economic and
psychological effects and shows how they reinforce each other. Although the theory is not new,
the presentation here also shows the strength of economic effects and how they work.
Psychological Effects
Humans are forward-looking, and current well-being depends in part on expected future wellbeing. People with more assets now expect to have more resources later. Thus—for purely
economic reasons—they expect to be happier. For an individual, “asset effects” are when
ownership improves expected future well-being and thus, for psychological reasons, improves
current well-being. If people have savings to savor, then they fear less and hope more.7
In the economic model, savings, if not consumed before death, serve no purpose. In the
psychological model, the thought of the opportunities enabled by savings provides benefits to the
saver, even if none of these opportunities are realized. In the economic model, assets matter only
in use; in the psychological model, ownership, regardless of use, also matters, because people
look ahead and anticipate the possible economic effects of the use of resources.8

6

The same theory suggests that the non-poor may have upwardly skewed world views.
Asset effects are not about miserliness; they flow from the anticipated use of resources.
8
Although asset effects seem like common sense, scientific evidence is scant. Almost all studies
find that assets are correlated with a wide range of positive outcomes. Few of these studies,
however, distinguish between the economic effects of use and the non-economic effects of
ownership. (Likewise, few studies account for possible correlations between observed assets and
unobserved factors that lead both to more assets and to greater positive outcomes independently
of asset ownership.) The typical paper attributes all of the positive correlation between positive
outcomes and assets to asset ownership, but much of the correlation could be attributed to asset
use or to unobserved factors correlated both with assets and with positive outcomes.
7
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Social and Political Effects
Asset effects may go beyond the psychology of individuals; owners think differently, and others
treat them differently. The social and political effects of ownership are just as real as the
individual effects, and may be more important. Of course, part of the social and political effects
of wealth are due to the use of resources; for example, the non-poor can buy friends and political
allies. Likewise, the non-poor face lower transaction costs and can make larger investments that
yield higher returns. They may also enjoy disproportionate political influence or access to public
services. Some social and political effects, however, come from ownership and from the
potential use of resources. For example, the non-poor may get better treatment because they are
more likely to be able to reciprocate. Furthermore, since the time of the Puritans, some
Americans have taken wealth as a sign of virtue (and poverty as a sign of vice), with the explicit
or implicit implication that the poor deserve worse treatment.9
Feedback Effects
In this model, the non-economic effects of asset ownership depend on the economic effects of
asset use. The converse also holds; the effects of use depend on the effects of ownership. People
make choices and expend effort based on subjective judgements of the chances (probabilities) of
possible consequences. Although luck matters, greater effort improves both chances and
consequences. Effort, however, exacts a psychological cost, and the cost of effort decreases as
expected chances or expected consequences improve.10 More assets improve chances and
consequences because resources—by definition—relax constraints and open opportunities. In
turn, improved chances reduce the cost of effort. This leads to greater effort, improves chances
and consequences, and adds to a virtuous cycle.
For example, most people get most of their income from the production of their human capital in
the labor market. Human capital, in turn, depends in part on investment in formal education. All
else constant, a non-poor person is more likely than a poor person to finish high school or
college. If needed, a non-poor person can buy better books or quit a part-time job to study more.
For the poor, these expected economic effects of asset use increase the cost of the effort required
to finish school. At some point, the cost is so high that they may opt to quit, or diplomas or
degrees may vanish from their world view. The effects of asset use and of asset ownership
reinforce each other to shape investment in human capital and thus potential future income.11

9

The social value of wealth as a signal can encourage conspicuous ownership. Some people
(whether poor or non-poor) may invest too much in assets—such as clothes, cars, or houses—
because, unlike a bank statement, these forms of resources are visible in public.
10
For example, students who expect to do well on a test may find studying easier than students
who expect to do poorly.
11
ADD data analyzed in this report do not permit tests of the effects of use versus ownership.
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Bequests of Wealth and World Views
Some children inherit wealth when their parents die. More important for more children,
however, are bequests from living parents that facilitate investment in human capital. Born
asset-less, children acquire lots of human capital only if someone else provides for their
subsistence and thus releases time and effort for education, training, and experience. Because
shelter is the largest share of most family budgets, poor families gravitate toward low-cost
housing. Because of local-school finance, the children of poor parents tend to go to low-quality
schools and thus build less human capital. In adulthood, low human capital means low income.
This stunts the chances of their children to acquire human capital and adds to a vicious cycle.
Children also, to some extent, inherit world views. A world view is defined as a set of subjective
judgements about which elements of life are subject to choice and about the chances
(probabilities) of possible consequences. Choices, chances, and consequences have objective
reality, but people must base their subjective world views on their imagination, on their own
experience, and on the experience of people they know.
For example, people can choose whether to try to go to college. Some see this as a choice and,
with full knowledge that they have a choice, make a decision. For others, college is not a choice;
they never pictured their world with (or without) it. Among people who believe that college is a
choice, some perceive the chances—given a level of effort—of getting a degree as low and the
consequences of a degree as only mildly positive. Others are more optimistic. These beliefs
affect the psychological cost of effort. The cost of effort then affects the level of effort and thus
the objective chances and consequences.
This theory attempts to show how assets have both economic and psychological effects. The
psychological effects result from luck and limited rationality, not from weakness and sloth, and
apply equally to the poor and non-poor. The theory matters inasmuch as it may explain why and
how IDAs can spark hope or improve world views.

IDAs, Savings, and Asset Accumulation by the Poor
Three impediments stand between the poor and asset accumulation: low resources relative to
subsistence, lack of access to subsidies for assets, and inaccurate views about saving. IDAs
attempt to address all three.
Low Resources Relative to Subsistence
Most poor people have low incomes because of low human capital. Thus, the best way to
increase the amount of resources available to be saved is to improve public schools. School
reform, however, is slow, and for many people it is already too late. Furthermore, even if the
poor go to good grade schools and high schools, they may have difficulties in college which,
although heavily subsidized, still costs a lot.
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The level and swings of the macroeconomy also affect income. Furthermore, when the economy
dips, the poor suffer most; shifts in unemployment drive large changes in their income.
IDAs do not directly affect school quality or the macroeconomy. They do address, however,
some constraints that dampen income in the long term, and they do attempt to create institutions
and incentives for the poor to build enough savings to change their lives.
Matchable uses of IDAs include post-secondary education and job training. Thus, IDAs
subsidize investments in human capital that may, in the long term, increase income and the
ability to save. For these reasons, Curley and Sherraden (2000) suggest that IDAs might be most
powerful for children and youth. Matches for microenterprise might also raise incomes, and
matches for home purchase might decrease shelter expenses and so increase resources available
to be saved.12
Finally, match rates serve three purposes. First, they increase the return on savings. Second,
they attract people to the program and may spark them to start to save or to save more. Third,
they increase the amount of resources accumulated so that a relatively small amount of savings
can become a large asset—such as a house or a college education—that might transform a lifecourse. Given an asset-accumulation goal, a high match rate substitutes for high savings and
thus indirectly substitutes for income from other sources.
IDAs do not, at least in the short-term, increase resources available to save. Once the poor do
save, however, IDAs increase the return. Matched withdrawals may also increase long-term
productive capacity and thus future income and future ability to save.
Access to Subsidies for Assets13
Much asset accumulation in the United States is subsidized (Howard, 1997; Sherraden, 1991).
The largest, most widespread, and most important asset policy is public grade school and high
school. Deductions for mortgage interest subsidize home ownership, the bedrock of the middle
class and the second-most important asset of the poor. Interest deductions and below-marketrate student loans subsidize college. Tax-advantaged retirement accounts such as IRAs or 401(k)
plans are also very common.
The poor, however, benefit less because these subsidies directly or indirectly require existing
assets.14 For example, local-school finance based on property taxes leads to better public schools
in wealthy neighborhoods. Tax-advantaged retirement accounts link subsidies to human capital
through high income and high tax brackets.
Subsidized debt is indirectly linked to existing wealth because loans can finance only part of an
investment package and because lenders often take existing wealth as a signal of
12

Matches for computers or cars might also affect productive capacity in the market.
This section is based on Schreiner et al. (2000).
14
The Homestead Act (Williams, 2000) and the G.I. Bill subsidized assets with less of a tilt
toward the non-poor.
13
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creditworthiness. For example, prospective home buyers must accumulate two types of assets:
financial assets for a down payment, and enough human capital to earn wages to make mortgage
payments. Likewise, student debtors must have savings (or wealthy parents, or time for a parttime job) to pay expenses beyond tuition and books. Finally, even if entrepreneurs could fund
capital goods completely with subsidized debt, at least some savings are required to finance
operating and living expenses until a firm gets off the ground.
Tax breaks for asset accumulation (such as deferments for IRAs and 401(k) plans or deductions
for interest on student loans or home mortgages) are weak incentives for the poor because they
are in low (or zero) tax brackets. Furthermore, bigger loans mean bigger subsidies, so the
poor—who save less for retirement, go to less-expensive colleges, and buy less-expensive
houses—get smaller subsidies. There are good administrative, targeting, and incentive reasons
to link subsidies for assets to current wealth (and thus to previous saving), loans, and the tax
system, but it also means that the current asset-subsidy system does less for the poor than for the
non-poor.
To increase access to asset subsidies for the poor, IDAs decouple the transfer mechanism from
existing wealth, taxes, and loans. People who pass a means test deposit post-tax dollars in
passbook savings accounts.15 Withdrawals are matched if used to buy certain assets. IDAs
resemble Roth IRAs except that the subsidy is a cash match instead of a tax break.16
Views about Saving
Even with resources to save and access to subsidies, the poor must perceive saving as a choice
that they might make, a choice with likely positive consequences. The institutional structure of
IDAs encourages such world views.
Institutions. Institutions are policies or social patterns that shape opportunities, constraints, and
consequences. For example, the institution of income tax affects the return to time and effort in
the labor market. Likewise, the institution of the interest rate on a passbook savings account is
the price of current balances in terms of future balances. Laws against theft are also institutions
that give the consequences of crime. For IDAs, institutional aspects include eligibility
requirements, financial-education requirements, match rates, match caps, time caps, wait periods
between enrollment and matched withdrawals, interest rates and fees on passbook savings
accounts, and patterns of support from staff and peers.
Institutions affect world views—and thus actions—because they expose people to knowledge of
opportunities, choices, constraints, and consequences.17 For example, laws against theft matter
not only because people weigh the benefits and costs of theft but also because people—due to
15

IDAs may means-test assets, but, unlike other savings subsidies, this favors the poor.
IDA participants also receive financial education and encouragement from program staff.
17
In standard economic theory, institutions do not affect world views. Homo economicus is
rational, omniscient (knows all the possible choices and the probability of all consequences), and
has time and energy to make the best choice. In fact, Homo sapiens is seldom rational, is not
omniscient, and must work to make choices (Thaler, 2000).
16
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limited time, effort, knowledge, and cognition—often skip the benefit-cost calculus and assume
from the mere existence of the law that net benefits are negative.
Institutional aspects of culture. Some aspects of culture—shared patterns of beliefs and
choices—can be seen as institutions that shape views of choices and beliefs about probabilities of
possible consequences. Standard economics ignores culture; each choice starts from scratch.
But this takes too much time and effort, so people often infer choices, chances, and consequences
from what they see others do around them (Mischel, 1977).18
Cultural institutions affect asset accumulation. For example, home ownership is part of the
American Dream. People who grow up with home owners may presume that this is the natural
order; they buy a home, perhaps because they never consider not buying one. If they do see
home ownership as a choice, then they may still feel unsuccessful if they choose to rent. People
who grow up with renters may not realize that they can choose to buy a home (or they may
underestimate the probability of positive consequences from such a choice).
Culture shapes world views because imagination is limited; people do not think much about what
they might do but have not yet seen done. Also, choices that break with social patterns require
extra mental effort to explain and to justify, both to the chooser and to others. The road less
traveled is more difficult. Institutions shape rules of thumb and matter for behavior beyond what
economic theory predicts because the process of completely rational choice is too costly.
Institutional aspects of IDAs. Institutions have both “economic” (or rational) effects on
opportunities, constraints, and consequences and “non-economic” (or psychological) effects on
world views.19 Although policy often focuses on economic effects, non-economic effects are
real and may sometimes matter more. The design of the institutional structure of IDAs pays
attention to both types of effects. For example, the match is an economic subsidy for asset
accumulation by the poor; tax breaks would be weaker incentives. Other structural elements of
IDAs aim to nudge world views toward saving and asset accumulation.20
First and foremost, the mere existence of IDAs sends a message that the poor can (and perhaps
should) save (Sherraden, et al., 2000; Bernheim, 1997). The presence of IDAs creates a social
pattern; the poor do not have to work as much to see that they can gain from the choice to save.21

18

Cultures differ from place to place because people can inexpensively observe only those near
them and because variance in physical opportunities and constraints makes different choices
optimal in different places.
19
Economic theory already describes non-psychological effects. Institutional effects is reserved
here to describe psychological effects beyond the realm of economic theory.
20
Some of these insights come from social/psychological and behavioral theories of saving
(Sherraden, et al., 2000; Beverly and Sherraden, 1999; Bernheim, 1997; Caskey, 1997). Madrian
and Shea (2000) also present evidence that norms and suggestions influence saving choices.
21
Current policy already does this for the non-poor (Sherraden, 1991, p. 127): “The middle class
accumulates its wealth, not so much through superior individual investment but through
structured, institutionalized arrangements that are in many respects difficult to miss. . . . This is
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Second, IDAs are linked to financial education. Knowledge of how to save makes it easier.22
For example, a household budget makes people more aware of finance and increases the
likelihood that they will remember to consider saving (in economic models, people never forget).
Exhortations to “pay yourself first” may boost accumulation if people, rather than setting a
consumption target and then saving the residual, set a saving target and consume the residual.
Third, IDAs set targets. Technically, match caps are limits, but psychologically, they may
become goals. A key hypothesis of institutional theory for IDAs is that people try to save up to
targets. The match cap implicitly sets a norm, and higher caps may spark more saving not only
because they allow greater matches but also because people feel better if they meet the norm.
Fourth, IDAs give feedback. Monthly IDA statements show progress toward goals.
Furthermore, program staff and peers may provide informal encouragement. Positive
reinforcement may cause people to focus on positive consequences (Mischel, 1977), which
decreases the cost of effort and thus increases saving. In economics, feedback has no place
because people already know how well they are doing.
Fifth, IDA programs ask for monthly deposits. This may become a norm or habit that decreases
the mental cost of saving.23 It also gives poor people access to a way to commit to save (Maital
and Maital, 1994; Thaler, 1994; Maital, 1986).24 People start an IDA with knowledge of the
norm and thus expect guilt if they make infrequent deposits. Although they may regret this
expectation in months when a deposit requires extra sacrifice or when they feel bad because they
have failed to make a deposit, they nonetheless agree to the arrangement because they recognize
that such constraints on short-term choices encourage asset accumulation and thus may improve
long-term well-being.
Sixth, to budget, to save, and to plan to use savings may increase thought of the future
consequences of current choices, which may increase saving. Likewise, classes in personal
financial planning may expose people to the practice of setting long-term goals. Doing
something once changes behavior because it decreases the cost of doing it again.
Seventh, financial education may offer more accurate views of the chances of the possible
consequences of saving. For example, some people may believe that they cannot save enough to
make a difference, but classes can show how small-but-consistent deposits add up. Classes may
also provide data about how college degrees affect salaries, the likelihood of success in
microenterprise, or the benefits and costs of home ownership.
not a matter of making superior choices. Instead, a priori choices are made by social policy, and
individuals walk into the pattern.”
22
In standard economic theory, financial education is superfluous because people already know
everything.
23
It may also increase saving because it provides participants with a socially accepted excuse to
deny requests for gifts of surplus cash by members of their social networks.
24
The poor often lack access to other common ways to commit to save, for example direct
deposit, home mortgages, and automatic deduction from paychecks.
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Eighth, limits on the use of matched withdrawals may highlight choices that people might not
consider on their own. For example, matches for home purchase may serve to point out that
home ownership is both worthwhile and possible for the poor. Likewise, matches for
microenterprise suggest that the poor can own and run small firms.
Ninth, rules that limit matches to illiquid assets25 (a home, an education, a small business) may
curb temptations to decumulate assets. In principle, a person could make deposits into an IDA,
take a matched withdrawal, sell the asset, and pocket or squander the proceeds. In practice, the
rules send a message that match-eligible assets are worth keeping. Furthermore, matched
withdrawals convert liquid resources to an illiquid form difficult to convert to consumption.
Tenth, informal limits on unmatched withdrawals may curb temptations to dissave.26 Program
staff use exhortations, phone calls after an unmatched withdrawal, and discussions of how, if the
match rate is 2:1, a dollar withdrawal costs two dollars in lost matches. Highlighting these costs
increases awareness of costs by participants and so decreases unmatched withdrawals.
Eleventh, IDA programs ask for “new” saving. Deposits in IDAs may come either from new
savings (increased income and/or decreased consumption) or from shifted resources (assets
already accumulated in another form such as balances in a checking account). For example, IDA
classes may teach ways to eat well for less, or staff may guide participants to sources of ads for
jobs. IDAs also require a wait period between enrollment and matched withdrawals; this allows
time for institutional effects to sink in, and it deters quick matched withdrawals based on shifts
of already-saved (or borrowed) assets. It is difficult to guarantee that IDA deposits come from
new savings; because IDA staff ask participants to save by earning more or consuming less,
however, new savings are more likely than if no one asked in the first place.
In sum, institutional theory suggests that IDAs send a message that the poor can save, increase
financial knowledge, set targets, provide feedback, create norms, boost future orientation,
highlight the choices, chances, and consequences of saving, and discourage dissaving. In
economic theory, institutions have no non-rational effects because people already have all that
they need to make the best choices. In the real world, people are subject to suggestion, and
norms affect mental costs. The suggestions and norms embedded in the institutional structure of
IDAs tend to encourage saving and asset accumulation.

25

With time, effort, and transaction costs (akin to friction), resources can be converted to other
forms of resources or to consumption. Liquid resources are easily converted; illiquid resources
have high conversion costs. Cash is the most-liquid form because it may be converted into
almost any other form (for example, a house). Human capital is probably the most illiquid; it can
be converted to other forms only through time and effort and cannot be completely converted all
at once. Through cash wages, human capital can become a house. In fact, resources might be
defined by their convertibility into desired forms. Wastes lack such convertibility.
26
Because the poor are subject to frequent shocks to income and expenses, unmatched
withdrawals are often extremely valuable to participants, so formal restrictions are ill-advised.
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How Do IDAs Differ from Other Means-tested Transfer Programs?
Sherraden (1991) says that IDAs transfer assets but that means-tested transfer programs (such as
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, TANF) transfer income. The income/asset
distinction, however, hinges on the time frame of measurement, not on the resource transfer
itself. Any resource may be consumed, and any resource may be saved. IDA matches are
income when disbursed (inflows of resources in a time frame), and welfare checks, if saved, are
assets (resources moved through time). How then do IDAs differ from other transfer programs?
TANF transfers liquid cash; IDAs transfer illiquid home equity (for home purchase or repair),
illiquid human capital (for post-secondary education or job training), illiquid business assets (for
microenterprise), or illiquid account balances (for retirement). Illiquid resources can still be
consumed, but the conversion costs are greater than for cash. Thus, people are more likely to
save resources from IDAs than from TANF.27 Standard means-tested transfer programs
encourage resource use; IDAs encourage future resource use and current resource ownership.
Furthermore, means-tested transfer programs are designed to just barely support subsistence, and
their institutional structure sends the message that resource transfers are to be consumed. In
particular, means-tests for assets discourages saving resources from welfare checks.28 Although
this is at least partly a rational response to asset-tests, it may also be partly psychological. For
example, some people may infer from the mere presence of an asset-test (or from the story of
someone who saved and lost benefits) that saving is punished. They may then form a rule-ofthumb not to save, even though they might find, if they worked out the details, that saving would
improve their well-being in the long term.
In contrast, IDA transfers are packaged in an institutional structure that suggests that long-term
well-being depends on asset accumulation. As discussed above, financial education shifts world
views that may underestimate the possibility and consequences of saving. Furthermore, once
resources are deposited, people may simply forget that the resources may be consumed, or
people may assign the resources to a “mental account” that is destined for long-term purposes
(Moore et al., 2000; Thaler, 1990; Shefrin and Thaler, 1988). Most of all, the existence of IDAs
suggests that the poor can and should save.

Why Not Assets?
Development and well-being in the long term depend on assets. All else constant, more
resources are better than less, and few people would oppose asset accumulation. For public
27

Although resources from IDA matches are likely to be saved, IDAs might not increase total
asset accumulation because people might decumulate other forms of assets or increase debt in
response to IDA incentives (Chapter 14). IDAs might even decrease total asset accumulation.
28
Powers (1998) finds that asset-tests reduce saving both by people on welfare and by people
close to being on welfare. Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995) find that asset-tests may explain
why many U.S. households hold no financial assets. Asset limits were relaxed in the 1990s, but
it seems that few poor people realize this (Hogarth and Lee, 2000).
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policy, however, not all else is constant, and the key question is not whether some assets are
better than no assets. The question is how, if assets beget assets, policy might create institutions
that the poor might use to start to build assets, and how to pay for these institutions.
Saving requires current sacrifice through less consumption and/or more work. Some people are
so poor that, once they meet subsistence requirements, they have few resources available to save.
This is why IDAs are voluntary and allow people to skip deposits in some months and to make
unmatched withdrawals.
Although not always acknowledged, saving is risky. Future returns are unknown. For some
people, death comes too soon, and for others, the future will not be what they expected.
Although the United States is uncommonly safe, financial savings may be threatened by
inflation, bank failures, or market declines. Human capital loses value in recessions, and most
microenterprises close quickly. Homes are leveraged, undiversified investments that may
depreciate.29 Saving has a dark side; all owners enjoy ownership effects, but some will also
suffer losses.
The debate on asset subsidies for the non-poor centers on whether they attract new savings.
Likewise, IDAs are best if savings come from increased income or decreased consumption rather
than from shifts of already-accumulated assets. The poor, of course, have less assets to shift, and
IDAs send a strong institutional message that savings should be new. The jury, however, is still
out, and even if a large share of IDA deposits are shifted, IDAs may still be worthwhile.
Some advocates for the poor worry that the development paradigm will squeeze out the
subsistence paradigm; the fear is that people will save themselves to the point of harm. IDAs
increase the return to saving and trust people to judge whether the reward is worth the sacrifice.
IDAs are voluntary, and most participants probably will not save too much. Furthermore, IDAs
aim not to replace subsidies for consumption but to complement them.
Subsidies for assets may have social benefits, but they definitely have social costs. A subsidy for
one person is a tax for someone else. Beyond the cost of the match, program delivery incurs
costs. In the absence of non-economic effects, subsidies distort markets. Of course, everything
has costs; the question is whether costs exceed benefits.30
Like all anti-poverty policies, IDAs redistribute from the non-poor to the poor. Their explicit
transfers expose them to attack; asset subsidies hidden in tax breaks (such as the more than $300
billion that go to the non-poor each year) encounter less flak. Also, some people view taxes as
government theft and tax breaks not as subsidies but as reduced theft. In this view, subsidies for
people who pay little taxes do not make sense. Absent efficiency concerns, however, greater
equality improves social well-being (Atkinson, 1992).

29

Depreciation is more likely as the baby boom ages (Bernheim, 1995) and for people who buy
old, low-cost homes or homes in low-income neighborhoods.
30
The experimental-design component of ADD will measure these (Schreiner, 2000b;
Sherraden, et al., 1995).
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Means-tested subsidies for assets expand welfare and, like all means-tested transfers, decrease
work incentives for people who anticipate that they may receive means-tested transfers (Moffitt,
1986). Furthermore, like all phased-out transfers, reductions in match rates decrease work
incentives for people after they start to receive means-tested transfers. While people have IDAs,
however, work incentives may increase if people maintain consumption levels but increase
saving.
Although IDAs have been free of scandals, fraud and abuse do happen, as in all programs.
Several aspects of institutional design—such as annual match caps, financial education, direct
disbursement of match funds to vendors, and wait periods on matched withdrawals—serve to
deter abuse.
IDAs are not a panacea. They cannot replace cash transfers for subsistence; they are not
costless; they do not attract only new savings; and they are not immune to abuse. They will not
make the poor rich quickly. IDAs are one way to nudge some impoverished people toward a
path that may, with time and effort, improve their long-term well-being. ADD and this report are
among the first attempts to check how well IDAs do this.
The plan of the rest of the report is as follows. After an introduction to IDAs and ADD, we
describe the characteristics of participants and programs. We then document outcomes in terms
of enrollments, deposits, and withdrawals, as well as some measures of program costs.
Multivariate regressions then look at the links between characteristics of programs and
participants and two savings outcomes (the risk that a participant will leave an IDA program and
the level of average monthly net deposits). Four chapters then look in-depth at the links between
these savings outcomes and financial education, income, race/ethnicity, and match rates. We
discuss whether IDA deposits come from new savings or shifted assets. Finally, we summarize
the conclusions of the report and what they mean for policy, programs, and research.
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2. Individual Development Accounts
and the American Dream Demonstration
Individual Development Accounts
Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) are subsidized savings accounts. Unlike other
subsidized savings accounts such as Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) or 401(k) plans,
IDAs are targeted to the poor, provide subsidies through matches rather than through tax breaks,
and require participants to attend financial education. Participants accrue matches as they save
for purposes that build assets that increase long-term well-being and financial self-sufficiency.
Examples of matched uses of withdrawals include home purchase, post-secondary education, and
microenterprise. Accounts can be opened at birth and can remain open for a lifetime. Funds
may come from public or private sources, and funding partnerships are common. IDAs are a
conceptually simple community-development and public-policy tool that may be adapted to a
wide range of applications and circumstances.

American Dream Demonstration
The first large-scale test of IDAs was started by the Corporation for Enterprise Development
(CFED) in September 1997.
The Downpayments on the American Dream Policy
Demonstration—the “American Dream Demonstration” (ADD)—involves 13 host
organizations1 selected through a competitive process to design, implement, and run IDA
programs. Table 2.1 contains a brief description of each host organization and of the groups
targeted by their IDA programs. Appendix C has additional data on each host.
Enrollment in ADD began in July 1997 and was planned to end by December 31, 1999, although
some participants enrolled after the deadline. As of June 30, 2000, ADD had 2,378 participants.
For most participants, matches are possible only for deposits through December 31, 2001,
although some participants have earlier or later time caps. Work on the evaluation of the 19972001 results will continue at least through 2003, and data from the experimental-design
component will be collected through 2003 and analyzed after that.
ADD began with funds from 11 private foundations channeled through CFED. Since then, some
host organizations have been awarded contracts through the Assets for Independence Act (AFIA)
from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. As a result, funds for some
participants in ADD come from both ADD and AFIA. Because AFIA funds came with design
requirements that differed from those that were already in place for ADD,2 records for IDA
1

One host organization, CAPTC, has two IDA programs, so this report refers to 14 “IDA
programs” and 13 “host organizations.” A given program may have more than one “site,” where
different sites represent different funders or different IDA designs.
2
IDA structure in the original sites was less restrictive than in the new sites. For example, the
original sites allowed account ownership to be sole or joint, and they matched withdrawals for a
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participants within each program are grouped into sites, with one site for accounts as designed
originally and another site for accounts with the new designs required by AFIA. This report
looks at data both from the original sites and from the new sites.3

wide range of uses. The new sites require that the program sign off on all withdrawals (matched
or unmatched) and match only withdrawals for home purchase, post-secondary education, or
microenterprise. Furthermore, the new sites require participants to be at or below 150 percent of
the poverty line, not 200 percent as in the original sites. The new sites also require a six-month
wait period between enrollment and matched withdrawals; some original sites had different wait
periods. Finally, most of the new sites have a lifetime match-cap structure, but many of the
original sites have an annual match-cap structure.
3
In addition, some host organizations run IDA sites that are not part of ADD. This report does
not analyze data from non-ADD sites.
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Host Organization

Type of Organization

Table 2.1 The 13 Host Organizations in ADD
Location

IDAS and ADD 17

Targeted Participants for IDAs

Fond du Lac, WI

Small town
and rural area
Small city and
rural area
Urban

Community action agency

Oakland, CA
Urban

Not-for-profit housing organization

Type of
Community

ADVOCAP

Washington, DC
Urban

Collaborative of 13 community-based
organizations
Collaborative of 8 community-based
organizations

Former AFDC/TANF recipients;
working-poor people
Single parents; youth

Austin, TX

Community action agency and
community development corporation
Community-based anti-poverty
organization

Program 1: Working families with
children at or below 200% of
poverty.
Program 2: at or below 150% of
poverty.
Hispanics; African Americans

Heart of America Family
Services
Human Solutions
MACED

Indianapolis, IN

Urban

Community development credit union

Barre, VT

Small towns
and rural areas
Urban

Community-based family-services agency

Near Eastside IDA Program

Chicago, IL

Ithaca, NY

Alternatives Federal Credit
Union
Bay Area IDA Collaborative
(EBALDC)
CAAB Corporation

Tulsa, OK

Urban

Shorebank Corporation

Urban

Rental property residents
African Americans; rental property
residents; working poor people
Neighborhood residents; youth

TANF recipients; youth

Low-income Asian Americans;
African Americans; Hispanics
TANF recipients; youth; African
Americans; Hispanics; Asian
Americans
Rental property residents; youth

Kansas City, MO

Rental property residents; Shorebank
customers
Low-income, self-employed women;
public housing residents
Chicago, IL

Central Texas Mutual Housing
Association
Central Vermont Community
Action Council
Community Action Project of
Tulsa County

Portland, OR
Berea, KY

Urban
Small towns
and rural areas
Urban

Not-for-profit housing organization
Association of community development
organizations
Social-service organization / Community
development credit union
Community development bank with notfor-profit affiliate
Microenterprise-development
organization

Women’s Self-Employment
Project
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3. Program and Administrative Characteristics
This chapter describes program and administrative characteristics in IDA programs in ADD.

Program Characteristics
Organizational Characteristics
Age of organization. The host organization houses the IDA program. All host organizations in
ADD existed before ADD, and they all run programs in addition to IDAs. The mean age of hosts
(as of the year 2000) was 20.93 years, with a low of 3 and a high of 35 (Table 3.1).
Age of program. The months between the opening of the first IDA account in a program and
June 2000. The mean age of programs was 27.5 months, with a low of 17 and a high of 35.
Organizational size. Full-time-equivalent months by salaried employees in the host organization
(not just in the IDA program) per month since the IDA program started. The mean size of the
host was 67.01 (median 24.40), with a low of 0.02 and a high of 314.1.
General financial education required. All programs in ADD require general financial
education. The mean requirement was 12.58 hours, with a low of 6 and a high of 45. Programs
also offer asset-specific financial education. Chapter 10 discusses financial education further.
Account Structure
Time cap. The number of months after opening an account in which a participant may make
matchable deposits. Although deposits after the time cap are not matchable, participants can still
make matched withdrawals after the time cap. In ADD, the mean time cap was 32.36 months,
with a low of 17 and a high of 50 (Table 3.1).
Total match cap. The limit on the amount of matchable deposits possible before the time cap.
Participants can make deposits beyond the match cap, but these excess deposits are not
matchable. The mean total match cap in ADD was $1,465.57, with a low of $240 and a high of
$7,500. ADD has two types of match-cap structures, annual and lifetime.
In an annual match-cap structure, participants face a match cap in each participation-year. The
total match cap is the sum of the annual match caps. For example, suppose an account has a 2year time cap and a $500 annual match cap. In the first twelve months, up to $500 are
matchable, and in the second twelve months, another $500 are matchable. Unused match
eligibility is lost as each year passes. For example, if someone with a 2-year time cap and a $500
annual match cap deposits $200 in the first year and $900 in the second year, $200 is matchable
in the first year, and $500 is matchable in the second year. The $300 of unused match eligibility
in the first year is lost. Balances in excess of an annual match cap, however, are matchable in
following years. For example, if someone with a 2-year time cap and a $500 annual match cap
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Table 3.1 Program Characteristics
Mean

Median

Minimum

Maximum

20.93
27.50
67.01
12.58

21.50
28.00
24.40
10.00

3.00
17.00
0.02
6.00

35.00
35.00
314.10
45.00

32.36
1,465.57
42.97
2.11
18.13

35.00
1,500.00
41.67
2.00
24.00

17.00
240.00
8.64
1.00
0.00

50.00
7,500.00
208.33
7.00
52.00

Program Inputs per Participant-month (Averaged across Participants)
Salaried Staff Hours
2.84
1.94
Volunteer Staff Hours
0.49
0.07
Partner Staff Hours
1.06
0.65
Total Staff Hours
4.39
4.01
Salary Expenses for IDA program ($)
46.31
36.91
Non-salary Expenses for IDA program ($)
24.07
14.54
Total IDA Expenses for IDA program ($)
70.38
66.56
Number of Marketing Activities
3.00
2.58

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

22.63
7.89
12.41
29.56
307.93
197.37
631.25
7.00

32.30

217.80

Organizational Characteristics
Age of Organization (years)
Age of Program (months)
Organizational Size (FTEs per month)
General Financial Education Required (hours)
Account Structure
Time Cap (months)
Total Match Cap ($)
Monthly Savings Target ($)
Average Match Rate ($)
Wait Period (weeks)

Participant Data
Number of Participants

81.72

76.30

deposited $900 in the first year and $200 in the second year, then the $400 that was not
matchable in the first year becomes matchable in the first month of the second year. Only $100
of the $200 deposited in the second year is then matchable.1 In ADD, 56 percent of participants
had an annual match-cap structure.
In a lifetime match-cap structure, all deposits before the time cap are matchable, up to the
lifetime match cap. The total match cap equals the lifetime match cap. For example, if someone
with a 2-year time cap and a $1,000 lifetime match cap deposits $200 in the first year and $900

1

Time caps do not allow many participants with annual match-cap structures in ADD to
complete a full twelve months in their final participation-year. For example, if the time cap is
December 31, 2001, then people who enroll in June of 1999 will end their first participation-year
on June 30, 2000 and their second participation-year on June 30, 2001. They will only complete
six months of their third participation-year before the time cap. Some programs in ADD set the
match cap for these last months equal to the annual match cap; other programs pro-rate.
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in the second year, then $1,000 are matchable.2 In ADD, 44 percent of participants had a
lifetime match-cap structure.3
Monthly savings target. The total match cap divided by the time cap. The monthly savings
target is the amount which, if saved each month and not removed in unmatched withdrawals, will
produce net deposits equal to the total match cap in the last month before the time cap.4 In ADD,
the mean monthly savings target is $42.97, with a low of $8.64 and a high of $208.33.
Match rate. The number of dollars disbursed by the IDA program to a vendor for each dollar
withdrawn in a matched withdrawal. The match rate may vary among participants in a given
program, so the average match rate in Table 3.1 is taken not across programs but across
participants. The mean (and median) is about 2:1, with a low of 1:1 and a high of 7:1.
Wait period. Weeks after enrollment before a matched withdrawal is allowed. In ADD, the
mean across programs is 18.13 weeks, with a low of zero and a high of 52. The median is 24
weeks (six months).
Appendix C discusses details of the account structure at each ADD program. Chapters 8 and 9
discuss the association between elements of the account structure and saving behavior in ADD.
Program Inputs
Salaried-staff hours. Average hours worked by salaried employees of an IDA program in a
month, per participant-month at the participant level.5 Mean hours of salaried staff per
participant-month was 2.84, with a low of zero and a high of 22.63 (Table 3.1).6,7
2

Some programs in ADD have rules meant to restrict large deposits just before the time cap.
ADD has both annual and lifetime match-cap structures. Like current subsidized savings
accounts such as IRAs and 401(k) plans, a broad IDA policy would probably have only an
annual match-cap structure (and no time cap). An annual structure spreads out fiscal costs and
may also discourage abuse; in a lifetime structure, someone could borrow or otherwise shift large
amounts of assets into an IDA and quickly take advantage of an entire lifetime of matcheligibility with little new savings.
4
ADD programs want participants to save the monthly savings target, and some explicitly ask
them to do so.
5
For example, suppose that in month 1 of a program, the number of staff hours is 10 and the
number of participants is 2. In this first month, staff hours per participant is 5. Suppose further
that in month 2, the number of staff hours remains at 10 but the number of participants increases
to 4. In this second month, staff hours per participant is 2.5. If a given participant enrolled in the
first month and dropped out in the second month, then average staff hours per participant-month
for the participant would be the average of 5 and 2.5, or 3.75.
6
This does not mean that the average participant in an average month worked directly with
salaried IDA staff for 2.84 hours.
7
For inputs, minima of zero occur because at least one program ran for at least one month
without a type of input. For example, a program ran for a month without salaried employees,
only volunteers. Maxima are high because, at the start of ADD, some programs had few
participants but yet still had employees and expenses, and some programs provided financial
3
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Volunteer-staff hours. Average hours worked by volunteers in an IDA program in a month, per
participant-month at the participant level. The mean was 0.49, with a low of zero and a high of
7.89.
Partner-staff hours. Average hours worked by staff in a partner organization on matters related
to IDAs in a month, per participant-month at the participant level. Mean hours were 1.06, with a
low of zero and a high of 12.41.
Total staff hours. Average hours worked by salaried staff, volunteers, and staff of partner
organizations in a month, per participant-month at the participant level. Mean total hours were
4.39, with a low of zero and a high of 29.56.
Salary expenses for IDA program. Salary expenses (with benefits) for an IDA program in a
month, divided by the number of participants, and averaged across participant-months. Mean
salary expenses were $46.31 per participant-month, with a low of zero and a high of $307.93.
Non-salary expenses for IDA program. Non-salary, non-match expenses for an IDA program
in a month, divided by the number of participants, and averaged across participant-months. The
mean was $24.07 per participant-month, with a low of zero and a high of $197.37.
Total expenses. The sum of salary and non-salary expenses in a month, divided by the number
of participants, and averaged across participant-months. The mean was $70.38, with a low of
zero and a high of $631.25.
Number of marketing activities. The number of types of marketing activities in a month by a
program, divided by the number of months. The mean was 3, with a low of zero and a high of 7.
The data record whether a type of activity took place, but they do not record its frequency.
Chapter 6 discusses inputs and costs in ADD, and Chapters 8 and 9 discuss the links between
program inputs and saving behavior.
Participants
Number of participants. The sum of the number of participants at the end of each month for a
given program, divided by the number of months. The mean number of participants per month is
81.72, with a low of 32.3 and a high of 217.8 (Table 3.1).

education to people prior to enrollment. If one of the handful of participants exited after a month
or two, then the per-participant level of inputs per month for that participant would be very high.
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Administrative Characteristics
Tables 3.2 through 3.7 present summaries of some administrative characteristics of the 14 ADD
programs as of June 30, 2000. Thirteen host organizations submit data to CSD. One host
organization sponsors two IDA programs; thus, the number of IDA programs in ADD is 14.
All 14 IDA programs in ADD were run by private, not-for-profit organizations. The most
common type is a community development organization (6 programs, Table 3.2).
Table 3.2 Organizational Type
Organization Type
Community Development Organization
Social-service Agency
Bank or Credit Union
Housing-development Organization
Collaborative

Number of Programs
6
2
2
2
2

Table 3.3 shows that all programs in ADD matched home purchase, microenterprise, and postsecondary education. Job training, home repair, and retirement were also matchable uses.
Table 3.3 Matchable Uses
Use
Home Purchase
Microenterprise
Post-secondary Education
Job Training or Technical Education
Home Repair or Remodeling
Retirement

Number of Programs
14
14
14
11
8
4

In MIS IDA, programs list a single type of depository institution that holds IDA accounts,
although some accounts in some programs are in more than one type of depository institution.
The most common place listed was a bank or savings-and-loan institution (9 programs, Table
3.4). Five IDA programs listed a credit union (two IDA programs were run by credit unions).
Table 3.4 Type of Depository Institution
Type
Bank or Savings-and-loan Institution
Credit Union

Number of Programs
9
5
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Table 3.5 Account Structure
Account Ownership
Only Individual
Only Host Organization
Both
Match Funds
Kept in Separate Account
Mingled with Account of Participant
Periodicity of account statements
Monthly
Quarterly8
Return on Account Balances
Pays Interest
Does Not Pay Interest
Wait Period Required
Yes
No
Penalties for Unmatched Withdrawals
Yes
No
Match-cap Structure
Annual
Lifetime
Both

Number of Programs
11
0
3
14
0
14
0
14
0
9
5
9
5
6
5
3

At 11 programs, IDA accounts were held in the name of the participant; at three programs,
accounts were held in the names of both the participant and of the host organization (Table 3.5).
All match funds were kept in a separate account in the name of the host. Participants did not
receive match funds; checks for matches are made out to vendors.
Depository institutions sent monthly account statements to programs. The programs then entered
or imported data on cash flows from the statements into MIS IDA. In turn, MIS IDA produced a
monthly statement that was mailed to participants and that showed the matchable balance, the
match that corresponds, and the matchable balance plus the match (and any excess balance).
IDA accounts in all 14 programs earned interest, sometimes above the standard passbook rate.
Six programs required a wait period between enrollment and matched withdrawals.
Nine programs stipulated penalties for unmatched withdrawals, but they did not enforce them
consistently. All programs enforce an implicit penalty on unmatched withdrawals by not
matching them. The loss of potential match dollars is a way to deter unmatched withdrawals and
yet still allow participants to use their own funds as they judge best.
8

Some participants at WSEP receive quarterly statements.
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The match-cap structure sometimes varied among sites in a given program. Six programs have
only annual match-cap structures, five programs have only lifetime match-cap structures, and
three programs have both structures.
Through CFED, all ADD programs receive funds from 11 private foundations. Programs also
received funds from public, for-profit, or individual sources (Table 3.6). The only change since
June 30, 1999, is that four more programs received funds from public sources. IDAs are unique
among policy proposals in that they invite both public and private funds.
Table 3.6 Types of Funding Partners
Types of Funding Partners
Not-for-profit
Public
For-profit
Individual

Number of Programs
14
12
9
2

All programs use face-to-face presentations to market IDAs to potential participants (Table 3.7).
Most programs also use print-based marketing (newsletters, newspaper ads, and brochures).
Since June 30, 1999, more programs have used lobbying and special committees to market the
concept of IDAs to potential funders and partners.
Table 3.7 Types of Marketing Activities
Types of Marketing
Face-to-face Presentation
Newsletter
Newspaper Ad
Brochure
Lobbying
Special Committee
Media
Telephone
Flyers
Other

Number of Programs
14
12
12
13
11
11
6
3
3
4
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4. Participant Characteristics
This chapter describes characteristics of the 2,378 participants in ADD as of June 30, 2000. It
complements the description of the actual and intended use of matched withdrawals in Chapter 5,
of the hours of financial education attended in Chapter 10, of income in Chapter 11, and of assets
and liabilities in Chapter 14.
A participant is defined as an enrollee with at least one account statement in MIS IDA. This
excludes enrollees who never opened an account and enrollees who opened an account but who
did not have an account statement in MIS IDA by June 30, 2000. It includes enrollees who have
account statements but who have exited without a matched withdrawal.
Participant characteristics are measured at enrollment.1 In addition, some ADD programs update
data that might change with time. This chapter uses the most recent data in MIS IDA because it
has received the most thorough cleaning.
The characteristics of participants in ADD are defined and summarized below and in Table 4.1.
Overall, participants mostly come from the “working poor” because most programs in ADD
target this group. Among the “working poor”, participants are disadvantaged in that they are
disproportionately female, African-American, and never-married.

Participant Characteristics
Demographics
Gender. Female (80 percent) or male (20 percent).
Age. The average age at enrollment was 36, with a low of 13 and a high of 72. About 87
percent of participants were between 20 and 49 years of age.
Race/ethnicity. Whether the participant identified himself or herself as African-American (47
percent), Asian-American or Pacific-Islander (2 percent), Caucasian (37 percent), Latino or
Hispanic (9 percent), Native American (3 percent), or “Other” (3 percent).
Residence. Whether the participant lived in an area with a population of 2,500 or more (87
percent) or with a population of less than 2,500 (13 percent).

1

In this report, these and other descriptions of the characteristics of participants use the most
recent data in MIS IDA. The regression analysis in Chapters 5, 8, and 9 use the participant
characteristics that were recorded at enrollment.
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Household Composition
Marital status. Never-married (49 percent), married (21 percent), divorced or separated (26
percent), or widowed (2 percent).2
Household type. Whether the household had one adult with children (44 percent, and 95
percent of these are single mothers with children), one adult without children (14 percent), two
or more adults with children (31 percent), or two or more adults without children (9 percent).3
Children. Number of people 17 years of age or younger in the household. The average number
of children was 1.7, and most households (76 percent) have at least one child.4
Adults. Number of people 18 years of age or older in the household. The average number of
adults was 1.5, and 58 percent of households have only one adult.5
Multiple participants in household. Whether a participant was in a household that had at least
one other IDA participant (6 percent).6
Education and Employment
Education. Whether the highest grade completed corresponded to less than a high-school
diploma (15 percent), a high-school diploma or GED (24 percent), some college but no degree
(37 percent), a 2-year college degree (6 percent), a college degree with 2-year or 4-year
unspecified (8 percent), or a 4-year college degree or more (10 percent). Most participants (61
percent) attended some college.
Employment status. Whether employed full-time (58 percent), employed part-time (20
percent), unemployed (7 percent), not working (5 percent), a student but not working (5 percent),
or a student and working (5 percent). Not working includes homemakers, the retired, and the
disabled. Unemployed includes people who were laid-off and awaiting a call-back or who were
seeking employment. Almost 90 percent of participants worked or were students.
Self-employed. Whether the participant had a business or self-employment income (19 percent).

Marital status is missing for 2 percent of participants who say that they are married but who
report only one adult in the household.
3
Household type is missing for the less than 1 percent of participants who report the receipt of
child support but who do not report any children in the household.
4
The number of children is missing for the less than 1 percent of participants who report the
receipt of child support but who do not report any children in the household.
5
The number of adults is missing for the 2 percent of participants who say that they are married
but report one adult in the household.
6
MIS IDA does not explicitly record cases of multiple participants in a household; we identified
likely candidates by hand via a combination of last names, addresses, and phone numbers. IDAs
are held by individuals, so there is nothing wrong with multiple accounts in a single household.
2
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Financial
Income/poverty level. On average in ADD, household income divided by the family-sizeadjusted poverty guideline was 111 percent (median 100 percent).7 About 21 percent were under
50 percent of the poverty line, and 12 percent were over 200 percent of the poverty line. Chapter
11 discusses the association between income and saving behavior in ADD.
Welfare status. Whether the participant had formerly received AFDC/TANF (37 percent), or
currently receives TANF (10 percent). All together, 38 percent of participants with non-missing
data had received either AFDC or TANF at some point.
Received SSI/SSDI. Whether the participant received Supplemental Security Income or
Supplemental Security Disability Insurance (10 percent).
Received food stamps. Whether the participant received food stamps (15 percent). All
together, 50 percent of participants with non-missing data had received TANF, SSI/SSDI, and/or
food stamps at enrollment or before.
Passbook savings account. Whether, in addition to the IDA, the participant had a passbook
savings account (52 percent).
Checking account. Whether the participant had a checking account (69 percent). About 40
percent had both a passbook savings account and a checking account. About 80 percent had at
least one of the two types of savings accounts, so 20 percent were “unbanked.”
Direct deposit. Whether the participant used direct deposit into the IDA (5 percent). Data are
missing for 15 percent of participants.
Health-insurance coverage. Whether the participant had private health insurance or Medicaid
(51 percent). Data are missing for 24 percent of participants.
Life-insurance coverage. Whether the participant had life insurance (31 percent). Data are
missing for 24 percent of participants.
Relationship with Host Organization or Partner Organizations
Employee of host organization. Whether a participant was an employee of the host (2 percent).
Previous relationship with host organization. Whether the participant had received services
from the host before ADD (36 percent). Data are missing for 12 percent of participants.
Referred by partner organization. Whether the participant was referred to the IDA program
by a partner organization (22 percent). Data are missing for 27 percent of participants. For
participants without missing data, 62 percent had a prior relationship either with the host or with
a partner organization.
7

These data omit cases for which total income is missing.
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Table 4.1 Participant Characteristics for ADD (N=2,378)
Demographics
Gender
Female
Male

%
80
20

Age
13 to 19
20s
30s
40s
50s
60 to 72
Race/Ethnicity
African-American
Asian-American or Pacific Islander
Caucasian
Latino or Hispanic
Native-American
Other
Residence
Population 2,500 or more
Population less than 2,500
Household Composition
Marital Status
Never-Married
Married
Divorced or Separated
Widowed
Missing
Household Type
One Adult with Children
One Adult without Children
Two or more Adults with Children
Two or more Adults without Children
Missing
Children in Household
0
1
2
3
4
5 or more

6
27
38
22
6
2
47
2
37
9
3
3
87
13

49
21
26
2
2
44
14
31
9
2
24
25
26
14
7
4

Household Composition continued
Adults in Household
1
2
3
4
5 or more
Missing
Multiple Participants in Household
Yes
No
Education and Employment
Education
Did not Complete High School
Completed High School or GED
Attended College but No Degree
Completed 2-year Degree
Completed Unspecified Degree
Completed 4-year Degree or more
Employment
Employed Full-time
Employed Part-time
Unemployed
Not Working
Student, not Working
Student, also Working
Self-employed
Yes
No
Financial
Income/Poverty (%)
0 to 49
50 to 74
75 to 99
100 to 124
125 to 149
150 to 174
175 to 199
200 to 686
Missing

Financial continued
Receipt of AFDC/TANF

58
32
6
1
1
2

Formerly
Currently

37
10
Received SSI/SSDI

Yes
No
Missing*

10
77
13
Received Food Stamps

6
94

15
24
37
6
8
10
58
20
7
5
5
5
19
80

21
11
15
14
12
9
5
12
2

Yes
No
Missing*
Bank Account
Passbook Savings Account
Checking
Both
Either
Direct Deposit to IDA Account
Yes
No
Missing*
Health-Insurance Coverage
Yes
No
Missing*
Life-Insurance Coverage
Yes
No
Missing*
Relationship with Host or Partner
Organization
Employee of Host Organization
Yes
No
Previous Relationship with Host
Yes
No
Missing*
Referred by Partner Organization
Yes
No
Missing*

*Missing values in the right-most column are due mostly to some early enrollees who were never asked questions that were
added in later versions of MIS IDA. If less than 1 percent of cases were missing, then missing is not listed as a category.

Center for Social Development
Washington University in St. Louis

15
68
17
52
69
40
80
5
81
15
51
25
24
31
45
24

2
98
36
53
12
22
51
27

Participant Characteristics 31

ADD versus the General Low-income Population8
Differences in characteristics between ADD and the general low-income population depend
largely on two factors. First, host organizations in ADD usually target people who work and
who are at or below 200 percent of the poverty line. Within this target group, ADD participants
probably reflect the populations already served by the host organizations, especially given that
about two-thirds had a previous relationship with the host organization or were referred by a
partner organization. These organizations include a wide range of community-development,
social-service, financial-service, housing, and other organizations, all with a communitydevelopment or anti-poverty mission (Chapter 3 and Appendix C).
Second, ADD participants are self-selected; they themselves choose to participate. People who
expect larger benefits from IDAs are more likely to choose to participate. Because people know
their own characteristics and because these characteristics affect saving, the people who choose
to participate in ADD differ systematically from the general low-income population and
probably differ even from the overall populations served by the host organizations. This section
highlights some key observed differences between ADD and the U.S. population at or below
200% of the income-poverty threshold.9
ADD had a greater percentage of females than the general low-income population:
Gender
Female
Male

ADD

General Low-Income

80%
20%

59%
41%

Compared to the general low-income population, ADD had fewer Caucasians, more African
Americans, more Hispanics, and more Asian Americans, Native Americans, and “Others.”
Race/Ethnicity

ADD

African American
Caucasian
Hispanic
Asian American, Native American, Other

47%
37%
9%
8%

8

General Low-Income
16%
64%
16%
4%

This section is based on Sherraden et al. (2000).
Comparison statistics use the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) from the U.S.
Census Bureau. These data come from the ninth wave of the 1993 SIPP panel and refer to
September 1995. The sample includes individuals 18-years-old and older in households with
income at or below 200 percent of the family-size adjusted poverty threshold (not guideline).
Annual income was computed as household income in September multiplied by 12.
Employment status refers to the first week of September 1995. The “bank use” variable
identifies individuals living in households that had a checking account or passbook savings
account in the first quarter of 1995. The data are weighted by person-level weights provided by
the Census Bureau. The steep decline in poverty since 1995 suggests that, all else constant,
participants in ADD are probably more disadvantaged than the general population at or below
200 percent of the poverty line in 1995.
9
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ADD had more people who had never been married and fewer people who were married:
Marital Status
Never-married
Married
Widowed, divorced, or separated

ADD

General Low-Income

49%
21%
28%

28%
42%
30%

The ADD population was more highly educated than the general low-income population:
Education
Did not complete high school
High-school diploma or GED
Attended college but no degree
Graduated college (two-year or four-year)

ADD

General Low-Income

15%
24%
37%
24%

35%
39%
18%
8%

ADD had a higher proportion of people who were employed:
Employment
Employed full-time
Employed part-time
Unemployed
Not working or student

ADD

General Low-Income

58%
20%
7%
15%

31%
11%
6%
52%

ADD had a greater proportion of people with a checking account and/or passbook savings
account (in addition to their IDA):
Bank Use
Checking and/or passbook savings
No bank account

ADD

General Low-Income

81%
19%

67%
33%

Overall, perhaps the best way to describe the ADD population is that it was a “working poor”
population as opposed to a general low-income population. This is by design—most programs in
ADD target the “working poor,” so a high proportion of the participants work. This is probably
a large part of the explanation for the higher level of education in ADD and for the higher
proportion of people who were banked.
In ADD, the higher proportion of women, African Americans, and never-marrieds probably
reflects the populations served by the host organizations. These markers of disadvantage
(female, African-American, and never-married) suggest that, among the “working-poor”
population, somewhat more disadvantaged people are in ADD.
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5. Enrollments, Deposits, and Withdrawals
This chapter presents data from ADD through June 30, 2000, on enrollments, deposits,
unmatched withdrawals, matched withdrawals, and the uses of matched withdrawals. These
aggregate outcomes matter not only because they suggest how people save in IDAs but also
because they would inform efforts to expand access to IDAs. For example, financial
intermediaries that might hold IDAs would want to know the likely number, frequency, and size
of deposits and withdrawals. Likewise, new IDA programs can use the figures to plan and to set
benchmarks.
As of June 30, 2000, ADD had enrolled 2,378 participants. Average monthly net deposits were
$25.42, and 13 percent of participants had made matched withdrawals. About 37 percent of
participants had made unmatched withdrawals from matchable balances.

Enrollments
In the first year of ADD, the pace of enrollment was slow, but it picked up to 70 to 90
enrollments per month after June 1998 (Figure 5.1). The pace peaked in the months before
December 31, 1999 (the planned deadline for enrollment).

Figure 5.1 Enrollments in ADD (Monthly)
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Figure 5.2 Enrollments in ADD (Cumulative)
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In cumulative terms, ADD had 848 enrollments as of December 31, 1998 (Figure 5.2). By the
planned deadline of December 31, 1999, ADD had 2,060 enrollees, 60 more than its goal. As of
June 30, 2000, cumulative enrollment was 2,378.

Deposits
Net deposits in IDAs result from a number of types of cash flows, both deposits and withdrawals.
Figure 5.3 depicts cumulative deposits and withdrawals in ADD through June 30, 2000.
Gross deposits are defined as cash flows into an IDA, including interest net of bank fees. As of
June 30, 2000, cumulative gross deposits by the 2,378 participants in ADD were $1,312,643
(Figure 5.3 and Table 5.1). More than 99 percent of participants had made a deposit, and the
gross deposit per participant was $552. The average length of participation was 13.3 months,
and the average number of months per year with a deposit was 7.0 (deposit frequency was 58
percent). Gross deposits per month in all months were $41.43 (median $14.80). Excluding
months without deposits, gross deposits per month were $70.90 (median $40.00).
Total unmatched withdrawals are defined as cash flows out of an IDA back to a participant that
are not matched. As of June 30, 2000, cumulative unmatched withdrawals in ADD were
$409,273 (Table 5.1).
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Figure 5.3 Deposits and Withdrawals (Cumulative Dollars)
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Table 5.1 Deposits, Withdrawals, and Matches (Cumulative Dollars)
Type of cash flow

Amount

Gross deposits

Amount plus
Match

1,312,643

Unmatched withdrawals of excess deposits
Unmatched withdrawals of matchable deposits
Total unmatched withdrawals

126,799
282,474
(409,273)

Excess balances
Net deposits
Matchable balances
Matched withdrawals

Match

(64,927)
838,443
646,842
191,601
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1,644,508
1,296,135
348,373

2,482,951
1,942,977
539,974
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Total unmatched withdrawals have two components: unmatched withdrawals of excess
balances, and unmatched withdrawals of matchable balances.
Unmatched withdrawals of excess balances are defined as withdrawals of balances in excess of
the match cap. There is no loss of a potential match because excess balances are not matchable.
Through June 30, 2000, cumulative unmatched withdrawals of excess balances in ADD were
$126,799 (Figure 5.3 and Table 5.1). About 9 percent of participants made, on average, 1.61
withdrawals of this type, and the average withdrawal was worth $362 (total $584).
Unmatched withdrawals of matchable balances are defined as withdrawals of deposits that could
have been matched but were withdrawn for a non-matchable use. There is a loss of a potential
match.1 Through June 30, 2000, cumulative unmatched withdrawals of matchable balances in
ADD were $282,474 (Figure 5.3 and Table 5.1). About 37 percent of participants made these
withdrawals. This group averaged 2.9 withdrawals, each with an average value of $111 (total
$320).
Excess balances are defined as balances in excess of the match cap.2 As of June 30, 2000,
excess balances in ADD were $64,927 (Figure 5.3 and Table 5.1). About 10.5 percent of
participants had excess balances, and the average value for this group was $261.
Net deposits are defined as matchable balances, that is, gross deposits minus total unmatched
withdrawals minus excess balances. As of June 30, 2000, cumulative net deposits in ADD were
$838,443 (Figure 5.3 and Table 5.1). Average net deposits for all participants were $353.3 The
average monthly net deposit—defined as net deposits divided by months of participation—was
$25.42 per participant, or 67 percent of the monthly savings target.4
The average match rate per dollar of net deposits was 1.96:1, so the match that corresponded to
net deposits was $1,644,508 (Table 5.1). If all net deposits were used in matched withdrawals,
total asset accumulation would be $2,482,951. With exits included, this was $1,044 per
participant; with exits excluded, it was $1,245 per participant.5
Net deposits have two components: match-eligible balances, and matched withdrawals.
Match-eligible balances are defined as balances under the match cap (adjusted for previous
matched withdrawals) that may be matched. In ADD as of June 30, 2000, the match-eligible
balance was $646,842 (Figure 5.3 and Table 5.1). The average match rate per dollar of these

1

Of course, future deposits before the time cap may use the newly released match eligibility.
For participants with annual match-cap structures, the total match cap increases with each year
of participation, so excess balances in month 12 or 24 may become matchable in month 13 or 25.
3
For the 82 percent of participants with positive net deposits, the average was $429.
4
For those with positive net deposits, average monthly net deposit per participant was $30.90
(82 percent of the monthly savings target). Their average deposit frequency was 63 percent.
5
Participants will make more deposits and more unmatched withdrawals before the end of ADD,
so this figure is not a good estimate of the asset accumulation that will take place in ADD.
2
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Figure 5.4 Deposits and Withdrawals (Monthly Dollars)
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balances was 2.00:1, so the potential match was $1,296,135, for a total potential asset
accumulation of $1,942,977.
Matched withdrawals are defined as withdrawals for matchable uses. Cumulative matched
withdrawals in ADD through June 30, 2000 were $191,601 (Figure 5.3 and Table 5.1). The
average match rate per dollar of matched withdrawals was 1.82:1, so the match disbursed was
$348,373. Cumulative actual asset accumulation through matched withdrawals was $539,974.
Seasonal Cash Flows
Cash flows varied by season (Figure 5.4). Net deposits increased in tax season, with a peak in
March. Excess balances and unmatched withdrawals of all kinds were also higher in tax season.
Perhaps some participants deposited into IDAs all or part of their tax refund and Earned Income
Tax Credit.6 Some theory and evidence (Beverly, Moore, and Schreiner, 2001; Beverly,
Tescher, and Marzahl, 2000; Smeeding, 2000; Souleles, 1999) support this possibility.
6

Some IDA programs in ADD explicitly encourage this saving technique.
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Figure 5.5 Cash Flows per Participant by Month
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The growth of cumulative figures due to growth in enrollment might confound the use of Figure
5.4 to detect seasonal patterns in cash flows. Figure 5.5 controls for this; for each month, it
depicts per-participant gross deposits, net deposits, and total unmatched withdrawals. Gross
deposits and net deposits increase markedly in February, March, and April. Total unmatched
withdrawals do not spike in these months in the same way, although unmatched withdrawals do
increase a month or two after tax season. Thus, deposits did increase in tax season, although
some small share of the increase may have been removed as unmatched withdrawals a few
months later.7

Matched Withdrawals
About 13 percent of participants in ADD had a matched withdrawal as of June 30, 2000 (Table
5.2). ADVOCAP had the highest percentage (40 percent); CAAB had the lowest (3 percent).
Differences among programs are due at least in part to differences in participant characteristics,
length of participation, and institutional structure. For example, matched withdrawals may be
affected by the wait period, the time cap, the match cap, the match rate, and financial education.
As of June 30, 2000, the average participant with a matched withdrawal had 2.0 withdrawals
with an average value of $304 (total $603, Table 5.2). Matches were $1,095 (average match rate
1.82:1), and average total asset accumulation in IDAs for matched uses was $1,698.

7

Total unmatched withdrawals per participant per month have trended up, so it is possible that
much of the above-average part of deposits in tax season are removed as unmatched withdrawals
in the long term. We do not test here whether unmatched withdrawals are more likely by people
who make unusually large deposits during tax season.
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Table 5.2 Matched Withdrawals
Item
Number of Matched Withdrawals
Number of Participants with a Matched Withdrawal
Average Value of a Matched Withdrawal
Percentage of Participants with a Matched Withdrawal
Number of Matched Withdrawals per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal
Value of Matched Withdrawals per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal
Value of Matched Withdrawals plus Match per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal

Value
631
318
$304
13
2.0
$603
$1,698

Matched withdrawals through time. The lower line in Figure 5.6 shows that the percentage of
participants with a matched withdrawal increased with the length of participation at an increasing
rate. For example, among participants who reached 12 months of participation before June 30,
2000, 9 percent had a matched withdrawal. Among participants who reached 24 months of
participation, 27 percent had a matched withdrawal.8
The incidence of matched withdrawals increases as participation lengthens, probably because it
takes time to build balances for a given planned use. Also, participants with annual (rather than
lifetime) match-cap structures must wait to take full advantage of all of their match eligibility.
Because their match eligibility increases with each year, they are probably more likely to wait
longer to make matched withdrawals.
The lower line of Figure 5.7 shows the same pattern of increase at an increasing rate for the
number of matched withdrawals per participant. The average participant had 0.16 matched
withdrawals at 12 months and 0.60 at 24 months. As time passes and balances grow, people are
more likely to take more matched withdrawals.
Together, Figures 5.6 and 5.7 suggest that the 9 percent of participants who had a matched
withdrawal by month 12 averaged 1.8 withdrawals. By month 24, the 27 percent of participants
with a matched withdrawal average 2.2 matched withdrawals.
Uses of matched withdrawals. Matches are restricted to withdrawals used to purchase certain
assets. All ADD programs match for home purchase, post-secondary education, and
microenterprise. Some also match for home repair, retirement, or job training. Some non-ADD
IDA programs match purchases of cars or computers, but no ADD programs do.9

8

Although ADD had run for almost three years by June 2000, the average length of participation
was 13.3 months. The likelihood of a matched withdrawal by a given month in Figure 5.6
considers only participants who had participated at least that long. For example, only
participants with at least 24 months of participation contribute to the figure for 24 months.
Percentages after 24 months are not reported because few participants had that much experience,
and their performance is not likely to have been representative of ADD as a whole.
9
Some ADD participants used microenterprise withdrawals to buy a computer. In general,
matched withdrawals for microenterprise encompass a wide range of items.
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Figure 5.6 Percentage of Participants
with a Matched or Unmatched Withdrawal Through Time
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Figure 5.7 Number of Matched or Unmatched Withdrawals
per Participant Through Time
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Table 5.3 Distribution of Intended Use of Matched Withdrawals
for Participants without a Matched Withdrawal
Use

Participants (%)
57
15
18
4
4
2

Home Purchase
Post-secondary Ed.
Microenterprise
Home Repair
Retirement
Job Training

Intended uses. As of June 30, 2000, 87 percent of ADD participants had not made a matched
withdrawal. Of these, 57 percent reported that they intend to buy a home (Table 5.3). About 15
percent intend to use their IDA for post-secondary education, and 18 percent intend to spend on
microenterprise. About 10 percent plan for home repair, retirement, or job training. The three
matched uses proposed in Sherraden (1991) comprise 90 percent of intended uses.10
Actual uses. As of June 30, 2000, 13 percent of participants in ADD had a matched withdrawal.
About 90 percent were for home purchase, post-secondary education, microenterprise, or home
repair (Table 5.4). About 10 percent were for retirement or job training.
Compared to the distribution of participants by intended use, the distribution of participants by
actual use shifts away from home purchase and toward post-secondary education,
microenterprise, and home repair. Home purchase is a one-time event that requires a large lumpsum for a downpayment. Thus, it probably takes longer to build a sufficient balance. In
contrast, purchases for post-secondary education, microenterprise, and home repair are possible
with smaller sums, and so withdrawals can be useful even early in participation. This explains
why the share of the number of participants for a matched use differs from the share of the
number of withdrawals.

10

Of course, actual use may differ from intended use, but data limitations prevent attempts to
detect patterns in these changes. Also, the figures for intended use include participants who have
exited without a matched withdrawal. Finally, the distribution of intended (and actual) uses in
ADD reflects the missions and target groups of the host organizations; a broader IDA policy
would probably have a different distribution of planned matched uses. For example, WSEP
focuses on microenterprise, so a large share of its participants plan to use IDAs for
microenterprise. Other host organizations, such as CTMHA, focus on housing.

Center for Social Development
Washington University in St. Louis

42 Savings and Asset Accumulation in IDAs

Table 5.4 Distribution of Actual Use of Matched Withdrawals
for Participants with Matched Withdrawals
Use

Participants
Number of
Value
Value plus Match
(%)
Withdrawals (%)
(%)
(%)
Home Purchase
24
18
31
33
Post-secondary Ed.
21
22
16
17
Microenterprise
24
30
20
22
Home Repair
20
20
18
17
Retirement
9
8
14
10
Job Training
3
2
1
1
Note: Participants with withdrawals for more than one type of use are counted once for each use.

Home purchase was 31 percent of the value of matched withdrawals (Table 5.4), with
microenterprise 20 percent, home repair 18 percent, post-secondary education 16 percent, and
retirement 14 percent. This and the distribution of the number of matched withdrawals suggests
that withdrawals for home purchase and retirement are larger than for post-secondary education
and microenterprise. Again, this probably reflects the lump-sum required as a downpayment on
a home versus smaller, perhaps on-going purchases for microenterprise and post-secondary
education.
Matched withdrawals per participant with a matched withdrawal. Table 5.5 shows that, on
a per-participant basis, the largest matched withdrawals were for home purchase ($657) and
retirement ($599). For homes, this may reflect lump sums for downpayments. For retirement,
several factors may be at work. Asset shifts (Chapter 14) are one possibility; if someone already
planned to make deposits in some other tax-advantaged account, then they could increase returns
a lot if they put the money first in an IDA and then put the proceeds of a matched withdrawal in
the tax-advantaged account. Matched withdrawals per participant for post-secondary education
were $286, and for microenterprise they were $303. Withdrawals for home repair averaged
$397, and those for job training averaged $182.11
Average match rates vary by use (Table 5.5). The rate is 2.0:1 for home purchase, 2.1:1 for postsecondary education, and 2.2:1 for microenterprise. The rate is 1.7:1 for home repair, 1.2 for
retirement, and 1.8 for job training. These patterns probably reflect idiosyncracies among ADD
programs more than any consistent logic that assigns different match rates to different uses.

11

As ADD progresses, balances will probably grow, so matched withdrawals per participant—
regardless of use—will also increase. This is true both for large, one-time uses and for smaller,
possibly repeated uses. Thus, these figures will differ after ADD ends and all participants have
made whatever matched withdrawals that they will make. Also, because ADD has time caps,
these figures understate matched withdrawals in a broader program without time caps because
some participants who will end ADD without a matched withdrawal would have had one, had
ADD lasted long enough.
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Table 5.5 Matched Withdrawals per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal
Use
Value ($)
Value plus Match ($)
Match Rate
Home Purchase
657
1,952
2.0
Post-secondary Ed.
286
885
2.1
Microenterprise
303
970
2.2
Home Repair
397
1,059
1.7
Retirement
599
1,301
1.2
Job Training
182
511
1.8
Note: This table excludes one matched withdrawal used for the purpose “other.”

# of Withdrawals
1.4
1.9
2.2
1.9
1.6
1.5

On average, participants who buy homes have fewer withdrawals (1.4, Table 5.5) than those who
make withdrawals for post-secondary education (1.9), microenterprise (2.2), home repair (1.9),
or retirement (1.6). This reflects the one-time nature of home purchase and the possibly repeated
nature of the other uses. The differences probably will widen with time, because home buyers
will not buy another home, but others will continue to make matched withdrawals for their uses.

Unmatched Withdrawals
As of June 30, 2000, 40 percent of participants had unmatched withdrawals (3.05 withdrawals
per participant with an unmatched withdrawal). The average unmatched withdrawal was worth
$141 ($431 per participant with an unmatched withdrawal).12 Total unmatched withdrawals in
ADD were $409,273 (Table 5.6).
Total unmatched withdrawals are all funds withdrawn but not matched. This includes funds
withdrawn and not matched upon exit from ADD, balances left in an account upon exit (when
withdrawn, these funds will not be matched), and funds withdrawn but not matched during
participation. On average, participants with unmatched withdrawals had gross deposits of $760
and withdrawals of $431 (57 percent of gross deposits).13
Total unmatched withdrawals have two components: unmatched withdrawals of excess
balances, and unmatched withdrawals of matchable balances.
Unmatched withdrawals of excess balances are withdrawals of balances in excess of the match
cap. There is no loss of a potential match because the balances are not matchable. In ADD
through June 30, 2000, cumulative withdrawals of excess balances were $126,799 (Table 5.6).
About 9 percent of participants had this type of withdrawal, and this group averaged 1.6
12

MACED had the lowest percentage of participants with unmatched withdrawals (5 percent);
CAPTC Small-scale had the highest (64 percent).
13
Do exits leave IDAs because they deposit too little or because they withdraw too much? For
exits, gross deposits (and unmatched withdrawals from matchable balances) average $175. In
contrast, unmatched withdrawals from matchable balances for non-exits who had such a
withdrawal averaged $429. This evidence is far from conclusive (because unmatched
withdrawals may depend on the length of participation and because non-exits participate longer
than exits), but it suggests that people exit because they deposit too little.
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Table 5.6 Unmatched Withdrawals
Item
Value ($)
Number
Percentage of Participants with a Withdrawal
Average Amount Withdrawn
Withdrawals per Participant with a Withdrawal
Value per Participant with a Withdrawal ($)

Total
409,273
2,896
40
141
3.05
431

From Excess
Balances
126,799
350
9
362
1.6
584

From Matchable
Balances
282,474
2,546
37
111
2.9
320

withdrawals, with the average withdrawal worth $362 ($584 total). Withdrawals from excess
balances were 31 percent of the value of total unmatched withdrawals.
From the perspective of subsidized savings, withdrawals of excess balances are not a deep
concern. In many cases, they probably happen because people park funds in IDAs that they
never intend to withdraw for matchable uses. Programs and financial institutions, however, do
care about these withdrawals, if only because the additional transactions increase administrative
costs.14 From a development perspective, these withdrawals might matter if they are likely to be
consumed rather than converted to another asset.
Unmatched withdrawals of matchable balances are defined as cash flows out of an IDA that
could have been matched if used for a matchable purchase. There is a loss of potential match
funds. In ADD through June 30, 2000, cumulative withdrawals of this type were $282,474
(Table 5.6). About 37 percent of participants had this type of unmatched withdrawal, and they
averaged 2.9 withdrawals with an average value of $111 ($320 per participant with an
unmatched withdrawal). Withdrawals from matchable balances are 69 percent of the value of
total unmatched withdrawals.
Unmatched withdrawals from matchable balances were frequent and large; 37 percent of
participants have made them in an average of 13.3 months of participation. Without these
withdrawals and with all else constant, average AMND would increase 35 percent (from $25.42
to $34.30). Given the average match rate of 2:1, the average unmatched withdrawal of $111 cost
$222 in lost potential matches.
From the point of view of a subsidized savings program that aims to improve long-term wellbeing, unmatched withdrawals of matchable balances are a concern. They suggest that
participants forego a high rate of return (and the loss of future ownership of an asset) in
exchange for cash that is likely used for current consumption.15
14

At this point, we know little about these costs or about the potential profitability of IDAs.
Some unknown share of unmatched withdrawals from matchable balances are due to people
being kicked out of IDA programs because they did not save enough to fulfill program rules.
Some unknown share of unmatched withdrawals may also be replaced before the end of ADD;
participants with annual match caps can make deposits in excess of the annual cap in the current
year to the extent to which they have made (in the current year) unmatched withdrawals of
matchable balances from deposits in previous years.
15
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Chapter 1 argues that the structure of IDAs offers strong incentives to make deposits and to
maintain them for use in a matchable purchase. If this is true, then why are unmatched
withdrawals from matchable balances so common? The data do not reveal the answer, but
several explanations are possible. First, some participants may be very close to subsistence and
have highly variable income and/or highly variable subsistence expenses. If income drops (or
expenses spike, for example, due to job loss or illness), then the short-term need may outweigh
the long-term cost of unmatched withdrawals.16 Second, some participants may be short-sighted
or unwise; to the detriment of their long-term well-being, they may make unmatched
withdrawals in response to short-term consumption opportunities.17
Replacement of unmatched withdrawals from matchable balances. Do people who make
unmatched withdrawals from matchable balances replace them, so that net deposits do not
decrease in the long term? Regression results (available on request) suggest that gross deposits
after an unmatched withdrawal are $10 to $30 higher than otherwise. Thus, there is some
replacement, but it is incomplete; compared to other participants, participants with unmatched
withdrawals from matchable balances have lower average monthly net deposits ($14.55 versus
$31.84), lower average net deposits as a percentage of the pro-rated match cap (40 percent versus
84 percent), and lower average savings rates (1.5 percent versus 3.1 percent).18
Unmatched withdrawals and policy.
Should IDA programs discourage unmatched
withdrawals? If participants expect that they will fail to resist when tempted by short-term
consumption opportunities, then IDA programs would do them a favor to restrict unmatched
withdrawals. This would allow enrollees to commit to protect themselves from their own shortsightedness. Beverly, Moore, and Schreiner (2001), Shefrin and Thaler (1988), and Maital
(1986) describe why people—poor or non-poor—are often short-sighted. Moore et al. (2001)
report that some participants in ADD seem to appreciate the formal and informal institutional
restrictions on unmatched withdrawals because they believe that the restrictions protect against
moments of weakness. Third, people may not be aware of ways to resolve their problems without
resorting to an unmatched withdrawal.
On the other hand, if unmatched withdrawals from matchable balances are tightly restricted and
if some participants expect that they may want to make unmatched withdrawals in an emergency,
then they may choose not to enroll in an IDA program, or they may choose to wait to make
deposits until the time-cap deadline. That way, if they do suffer a shock, they will avoid the
transaction costs of an unmatched withdrawal. Results in Schreiner et al. (2000) lead to the
speculation that this might be the case for some participants in ADD. If restrictions on
withdrawals lead people to save outside of IDAs until a time-cap deadline, however, then net
16

Even if participants themselves do not suffer shocks, members of a social network may ask for
help (and cause unmatched withdrawals) if they suffer shocks (Chiteji and Hamilton, 2000).
17
Participants who graduate (Chapter 8) sometimes made unmatched withdrawals from
matchable balances left over in their accounts after a matched purchase. As of June 30, 2000,
such cases were 3 percent of the value of unmatched withdrawals from matchable balances. For
comparison, exited participants had 19 percent, and active participants had 78 percent.
18
Of course, this simple analysis does not reveal the extent to which the factors that lead to low
net deposits also cause unmatched withdrawals, nor the extent to which the factors that cause
unmatched withdrawals lead to low net deposits.
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deposits may decline because this cash is more likely to be spent, regardless of emergencies or
restrictions on withdrawals (Beverly and Sherraden, 1999; Bernheim, 1997; Caskey, 1997;
Thaler, 1990).
For the poor, emergencies are a fact of life. One of the few ways that IDAs might do harm
would be to put the cash of the poor out of reach. At the same time, some constraints on
withdrawals may help some people to maintain deposits. The current institutional structure for
IDAs in ADD, with informal sanctions for unmatched withdrawals from matchable balances but
no formal restrictions, does not go to either extreme and may capture some of the benefits of
both.
Unmatched withdrawals from matchable balances through time. The upper line of Figure
5.6 shows that the percentage of participants with an unmatched withdrawal from matchable
balances increased with the length of participation at a decreasing rate. For example, 23 percent
had an unmatched withdrawal after 12 months, but 33 percent had one after 24 months.
The upper line of Figure 5.7 shows a similar pattern (increase at a decreasing rate) for the
average number of unmatched withdrawals of matchable balances per participant. Participants
averaged 0.70 of these withdrawals by the 12th month and 1.13 by the 24th month. Together,
Figures 5.6 and 5.7 suggest that the 23 percent of participants with this type of unmatched
withdrawal by month 12 averaged 3.0 withdrawals. By month 24, the 33 percent of participants
with these withdrawals averaged 3.4 withdrawals. Perhaps some new participants try to save but
soon find that they need the cash for some other purpose. As participants gain experience,
unmatched withdrawals slow down. Still, unmatched withdrawals of matchable balances
continue due to people who have small, left-over balances or due to emergencies that strike
participants after the first few months. It may also be that participants who are unlikely to make
unmatched withdrawals from matchable balances tend to participate for a longer time. Or,
perhaps participants who by chance make early unmatched withdrawals become discouraged and
exit sooner. Whatever the causes, the risk of an unmatched withdrawal is higher for participants
in the first few months, and lower for participants who reach later months.19

Participant and Program Characteristics
and Unmatched Withdrawals of Matchable Balances
Knowledge of the factors linked with unmatched withdrawals of matchable balances may help to
improve program design. It may also help to identify participants who, because they are at-risk
of unmatched withdrawals, might benefit from extra attention from staff. To this end, we
analyze how a wide range of program and participant characteristics were associated with
whether a participant had an unmatched withdrawal of matchable balances.

19

This is not to say that longer participation causes fewer unmatched withdrawals. Few
unmatched withdrawals may sustain participation, or maybe they both cause each other.
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Regression Model
A regression model estimates the sign, size, and statistical significance of the association
between an outcome (the presence of an unmatched withdrawal from matchable balances, the
dependent variable) and characteristics assumed to cause the outcome (the independent
variables).20 Estimates of associations from regression are usually closer to the true associations
than are estimates from tabular comparisons because regressions control for correlations among
independent variables.
The dependent variable is dichotomous (someone either has made a matched withdrawal or has
not made one), so a probit model is used (Kennedy, 1998). The model includes a large number of
control variables: 9 institutional characteristics, and 27 participant characteristics.21 Chapter 8
discusses the regression technique further.
The probit regression results are not presented here to save space, but they are available on
request. The independent variables are the same as in the regression in Chapter 8, but the
dependent variable here is the presence of an unmatched withdrawal from matchable balances.
Program Characteristics
Match rate. Given that higher match rates increase the opportunity cost to participants of
unmatched withdrawals of matchable balances,22 it is not a surprise that higher rates were linked
with less risk of unmatched withdrawals. For example, with other factors in the model constant,
the likelihood of an unmatched withdrawal was 12.3 percentage points less with a match rate of
4:1 to 7:1 than with a match rate of 1:1 (84-percent confidence). This is a large effect; the
change would reduce predicted risk from 40 percent to 27 percent. A 2:1 match rate—compared
with a match rate of 4:1 to 7:1—was associated with an increase in risk of 11.3 percentage points
(84-percent confidence). Estimated risk for a match rate of 3:1 is 6.9 percentage points higher
than for a match rate of 4:1 to 7:1, but the difference is not statistically significant.23
Match caps. A higher match cap (and thus a higher monthly savings target) is linked with a
large, statistically significant decrease in the risk of unmatched withdrawals. A $5 increase in
20

Of course, regression does not control for characteristics omitted from the model, and all
regressions omit some characteristics that influence the outcome. As in Chapters 8 and 9, the
regression here uses at-enrollment data, although descriptions of participant characteristics in
other chapters use the most recent data.
21
Characteristics were selected if they were in MIS IDA, were expected to influence the
outcome, had sufficient variation, and were unlikely to be caused by outcome.
22
Participants in 401(k) plans do not face a similar opportunity cost; they keep their matches
even if they take a hardship withdrawal of their own deposits, except if they leave a job before
they are fully vested.
23
Some programs have a single match rate (and/or a single match cap) for all their participants,
but some programs have—within a single program—different groups of participants with
different match rates (and/or different match caps). The estimated effects are derived from those
programs where the match rate (or the match cap) varies among groups of participants.
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the monthly savings target reduces the predicted risk of an unmatched withdrawal by 1.4
percentage points. This may be partly an institutional effect, if a higher match cap leads
participants to believe that greater effort to maintain deposits is worthwhile. It may also be
partly an economic effect, if unmatched withdrawals may lead to being kicked out, because the
opportunity cost of being kicked out is higher as the match cap is higher.
Match-cap structure. Compared with an annual match-cap structure, a lifetime structure is
linked with a decrease in the risk of unmatched withdrawals from matchable balances of 13.4
percentage points.24 This is a huge effect; this element of institutional structure can change the
likelihood of unmatched withdrawals by one-fourth.25 We do not know for certain why this
would be, but three speculative explanations are possible. First, people with annual match caps
must wait longer to take advantage of their full match-eligibility. The longer wait increases the
likelihood of an emergency that would require an unmatched withdrawal. Second, people with
annual match caps lose match eligibility if they do not save up to the match cap in each year.
This loss could lead to discouragement, exit, and/or unmatched withdrawals. Third, people with
annual structures may push themselves to deposit as much as they can before the end of a
participation-year so as not to lose any eligibility. They may thus make some deposits that they
cannot afford and that soon become unmatched withdrawals.26 In contrast, participants with
lifetime structures do not lose match-eligibility if they do not make deposits each year, so they
can wait to make deposits until they know that they will not have to make an unmatched
withdrawal.27
Program inputs. The links between program inputs per participant-month (hours of volunteer
staff, hours of partner staff, and dollars of salary and non-salary expense, averaged across all
months of participation for each participant) were not statistically different from zero. The only
program input with a statistically significant link was hours of salary staff; an additional dollar
increased the risk of unmatched withdrawals by 6.8 percentage points. These results are a
puzzle; institutional and economic theory both suggest that more program inputs in terms of
hours (or higher quality hours) from staff should decrease the risk of unmatched withdrawals.
Unobserved program characteristics. Unobserved factors28 correlated with a given program
were also correlated with the risk of unmatched withdrawals from matchable balances. The
24

The link is statistically significant with 96-percent confidence.
Unfortunately, this finding is policy irrelevant—at least for large, publicly funded IDA
programs—because annual match-cap structures are inevitable.
26
Although no instances have been observed, participants in ADD can circumvent the limits of
an annual match-cap structure with deposits late in the participation-year up to the match cap,
followed by unmatched withdrawals early in the next year. For example, with a $500 annual
match-cap structure, a deposit of $500 in month 12 followed by an unmatched withdrawal of
$500 in month 13 would leave the person eligible for matches on deposits of up to $1,000 by the
end of month 24. Given the high returns in IDAs, even cash-strapped people might choose to
finance such a scheme with short-term loans from pawn shops, check-cashing outlets, or friends.
27
Results in Chapters 8 and 9 are consistent with these last two points; people in annual
structures are more likely to exit, but, if they do not exit, they have higher AMND.
28
All unmeasured factors not in MIS IDA and/or in the regression model are “unobserved”.
25
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effects were large and statistically significant; unmatched withdrawals may depend on
institutional elements omitted from the regression.29
We do know something about some program characteristics omitted from the regression due to
lack of quantitative data or insufficient variation. For example, formal rules for unmatched
withdrawals vary widely across programs. Participants in some programs may withdraw funds at
will. In other programs, unmatched withdrawals require a signature from the program, and
requests for the signature trigger counseling from staff. In still other programs, participants
make withdrawals at will but receive gentle phone calls from staff in subsequent months. To
avoid these calls, participants may try to avoid unmatched withdrawals. Finally, the rules in
some programs make unmatched withdrawals grounds for dismissal.
Programs do not consistently enforce formal sanctions for unmatched withdrawals from
matchable balances. Qualitative inspection of the regression results does not suggest a strong
link between the likelihood of an unmatched withdrawal and the presence of formal sanctions.
In sum, rules meant to discourage unmatched withdrawals may or may not be effective; the
nature of the data from ADD preclude strong statements about the exact size of possible effects.
Participant Characteristics
Demographics. All else constant, the risk of an unmatched withdrawal from matchable balances
had no statistically significant link with gender, residence, the number of adults or children in the
household, or the number of IDA participants in the household. Risk increased at a rate of 0.62
percentage points per year until 40 years of age, after which additional years had no effect.
Widowed people were 9 percentage points more likely to make unmatched withdrawals than
married people, and people who never married or who were divorced or separated were about 5
percentage points less likely to take an unmatched withdrawal than married people.
With regard to race/ethnicity, the likelihood of an unmatched withdrawal from matchable
balances was statistically the same (with other factors in the model constant) for African
Americans, Native Americans, and Caucasians. Compared with these three groups, Hispanics,
Asian Americans and “Other” were 12 to 17 percentage points less at-risk, and the differences
were statistically significant.30 AMND was about $8 lower for African-Americans and for
Native Americans than for Caucasians (Chapter 12); the results here suggest that this difference
was probably not due to a higher risk of unmatched withdrawals.
Education and employment. People who completed high school or who attended college but
did not get a degree were more at-risk of an unmatched withdrawal than people with any other
education status. The result that people who did not complete high school are nonetheless good

29

Unobserved participant characteristics that vary between programs may also matter. Both
sources of unobserved systematic correlation are probably present to some degree.
30
As discussed in Chapter 12, race/ethnicity is likely correlated with a wide range of unobserved
factors that are also correlated with the risk of unmatched withdrawals, so these associations
should not be attributed to inherent differences between groups.
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IDA savers appears in several analyses in this report. We do not have a good explanation for it
unless it is related to links between lack of education, EITC payments, and IDA deposits.31
Employment status had no statistically significant effect on the risk of an unmatched withdrawal.
Likewise, the self-employed were no more likely to have an unmatched withdrawal than were
the non-self-employed.
Compared with other participants, employees of a host organization who were also IDA
participants we about 15 percentage points more likely to have had an unmatched withdrawal.
This is a surprise, because employees should be subject to greater institutional forces that
encourage the maintenance of balances. Perhaps IDA staff convince fellow employees to enroll,
but the employees never commit themselves on their own to IDAs. Perhaps for similar reasons,
people referred to IDAs by partner organizations also were more at-risk of unmatched
withdrawals.32
Income and public assistance. None of the measures of income or of receipt of public
assistance had statistically significant links with the risk of an unmatched withdrawal from
matchable balances. This is consistent with the speculation in Chapter 11 that the effects of
institutional factors are both greater than the effects of income and are stronger for the very poor.
Assets, liabilities, and insurance. Compared with non-owners, owners were much less likely to
make unmatched withdrawals.
For example, an additional $100 in a passbook account was linked with a decrease in risk of 0.23
percentage points.33 Ownership of a checking account—regardless of balance—was linked with
a decrease in risk of 11 percentage points; furthermore, each $100 of additional balance was
linked with a decrease of 0.5 percentage points. Home ownership was linked with a very large
reduction (almost 13 percentage points), and car ownership is linked with a 6.8-percentage-point
reduction. The total measured value of assets had no effect, and liabilities also had no effect,
perhaps because both assets and liabilities contain measurement error.
Asset ownership may be correlated with reduced unmatched withdrawals for several reasons.
First, ownership may proxy for unobserved skills in financial management and resource
allocation that reduce the need to make unmatched withdrawals. Second, ownership may proxy
for unobserved preferences for saving (or future orientation) that increase the mental cost of
unmatched withdrawals. Third, ownership signals the presence of resources that, in case of
emergency, might be used instead of unmatched withdrawals. Fourth, ownership may have a
31

People who did not complete high school may earn less and get larger EITC checks. If so, and
if participants save more, dollar-for-dollar, from EITC than from other sources, then low
education may proxy for this link between IDAs and EITC.
32
It is also possible that referrals were more likely than non-referrals to receive some IDA
services (such as financial education) from the partner organization rather than from the IDA
program itself. If so, and if the IDA program provided better services, then this might explain
the correlation observed in the data.
33
Mere ownership of a passbook savings account had no statistical effect on risk.
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wide range of psychological, social, and political effects (Chapter 1) that decrease the need to
draw down assets to cope with an emergency.
Health insurance (including Medicaid) was linked with an 8-percentage-point increase in
unmatched withdrawals. This is a puzzle because health insurance should dampen the financial
shock of illness and thus reduce the need for unmatched withdrawals. People with life insurance,
however, were 7 percentage points less at-risk (77-percent confidence). Perhaps life insurance is
correlated with unobserved factors—such as future orientation—that also decrease the risk of
unmatched withdrawals. This, however, is speculative.
Other factors. A previous relationship with the host organization had no statistically significant
association with the risk of an unmatched withdrawal from matchable balances. This seems odd
because the institutional connection would be expected to increase success in IDAs. It is
consistent, however, with the observed higher risk for participants who are also employees of the
host organizations. It also fits the result that participants referred by partner organizations were
12 percentage points more likely than people without an institutional referral to have unmatched
withdrawals. Perhaps people who are nudged to join an IDA program do not do as well as those
who choose to come on their own.
Finally, people who use direct deposit to an IDA account had the same risk of an unmatched
withdrawal as people who do not use this institutional pre-commitment mechanism. Also,
people with more than one IDA were 33 percentage points more likely to make an unmatched
withdrawal.

Summary
A summary of the key points in this chapter follows.
•

As of June 30, 2000, ADD had 2,378 participants.

•

Average AMND was $25.42, an average of 67 percent of the monthly savings target. At this
rate and with an average time cap of 33 months and with an average match rate of 2:1, the
typical participant in ADD will save about $840 and accumulate about $2,500.

•

Deposits peaked in tax season, probably because of tax refunds and EITC payments.

•

As of June 30, 2000, 13 percent of participants had made matched withdrawals. The average
participant with a matched withdrawal had 2.0 withdrawals of $304 each (total $603).

•

Of participants who had not made a matched withdrawal, 57 percent planned for home
purchase, 15 percent for post-secondary education, and 18 percent for microenterprise.

•

Unmatched withdrawals were surprisingly frequent and large. The 37 percent of participants
with an unmatched withdrawal from matchable balances averaged 2.9 withdrawals of $111
each (total $320). In the absence of unmatched withdrawals, average monthly net deposits
would have been 35 percent higher. The average unmatched withdrawal cost $222 in lost
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potential matches. The presence of these withdrawals, in spite of their high opportunity
costs, may reflect the difficulty of saving, even within the supportive structure of IDAs, for
people who, due to their closeness to subsistence, have frequent emergencies.
•

In a regression, higher match rates and higher monthly savings targets were linked with
lower risk of an unmatched withdrawals from matchable balances.

•

The risk of an unmatched withdrawal had no statistically significant link with gender,
income, or the receipt of public assistance.

•

The risk of an unmatched withdrawal was lower for owners of homes, cars, and bank
accounts.
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6. Inputs and Costs
The social worth of IDAs depends on their benefits and costs. Measurement of benefits must
wait for data from the experimental-design component of ADD. Even without knowledge of
benefits, however, knowledge of costs is still useful.
This chapter discusses inputs and costs and what they may mean for IDA policy.1 In ADD,
program costs (without matches) were $70.38 per participant-month ($2.77 per dollar of net
deposits). Although data are imperfect (and the biases push measured costs up) and although
costs may decrease as programs grow and learn, these figures highlight the importance of
continued commitment to efficiency and the importance of research on the effectiveness of
different elements of the bundle of services in IDAs.

Why Measure Costs?
Wise allocation of scarce resources requires some knowledge of costs. All resources have
opportunity costs; a dollar used in an IDA is removed (at least implicitly) from some other use.
What matters is not that IDAs have positive net benefits for participants nor that IDAs have
positive net benefits for society as a whole. Rather, what matters is that the social net benefits
due to the use of resources in IDAs exceed the social net benefits of those resources in their best
alternative use.2
The measurement of the benefits of IDAs awaits data from the experimental-design component.3
In the meantime, cost measurement can inform policy and program choices. Cost measurement
sets a benchmark for performance and may prompt greater efforts to improve efficiency
(Schreiner and Yaron, forthcoming; Devarajan, Squire, and Suthiwart-Narueput, 1997).
Policy debate sometimes lacks an explicit concern for costs.4 CSD, however, has supported
careful cost assessment for IDAs. For CSD in its role as an evaluator, cost assessment is
essential for informed judgements.5
1

This chapter draws on Schreiner (2000b) and Sherraden (2000).
Governments may be concerned more with fiscal impact than with social impact. Of course,
fiscal impacts matter, but only inasmuch as they affect social impacts.
3
Clones et al. (1995) presents a pro forma benefit-cost analysis for IDAs. Schreiner (2000b)
describes the design of the financial benefit-cost analysis for ADD.
4
Proponents of policies have incentives to over-report benefits and under-report costs. For
example, most literature on IDAs ignores costs and focuses on potential positive impacts and
testimonials from successful participants. Of course, the measurement of benefits is extremely
difficult—much more difficult than the measurement of costs—especially because many
important benefits are subtle, long-term, non-financial, and diffuse. For example, the most
important impact of IDAs may be to shift the asset-policy paradigm from exclusion to inclusion
(Sherraden, 1991).
This potential benefit, however, is not amenable to quantitative
measurement.
2
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Inputs and Costs in ADD
Inputs and productivity. Productivity is defined as inputs per output. Inputs differ from costs
in that inputs are not in financial terms. An example of an input is an hour of work by salaried
staff of an IDA program.6 MIS IDA records inputs in terms of hours worked by salaried staff of
the IDA program, by staff of partner organizations, and by volunteers.
Examples of outputs for IDAs include enrollments, participant-months, or dollars of net deposits.
Although outcomes and benefits derive from outputs, outcomes are not outputs, and outputs are
not benefits. For example, the outcome of a participant-month (and the benefit of an outcome)
varies across participant-months.
Like most processes, IDAs produce a bundle of outputs (for example, asset accumulation with
financial knowledge). The units of enrollments or participant-months capture the aspects of this
bundle better than narrower units such as dollars of net deposits.
Inputs in ADD. Salaried staff worked 2.84 hours per participant-month. Production also used
partner staff (0.49 hours per participant-month) and volunteers (1.06 hours). In total for ADD,
the average participant-month used 4.39 hours of all types of staff.
Productivity does not tell the whole story because production uses more than one type of input
and because inputs are substitutable. For example, an IDA program might improve productivity
in terms of salaried staff hours per participant-month if it replaced lower-quality, lower-paid staff
with volunteers or with higher-quality, higher-paid staff.
Costs and efficiency. Efficiency is defined as costs per output. Absolute efficiency means
minimum costs for a given output; relative efficiency means lower costs than an alternative.
Efficiency tells a more complete story than productivity because efficiency converts inputs in
different units to financial values in a single unit. For example, this helps to check whether it
takes more resources to produce a given output with many hours by lower-quality, lower-paid
staff or with fewer hours by higher-quality, higher-paid staff.
Costs in ADD. In addition to salaries, MIS IDA records non-salary expenses such as consultant
fees, rent or mortgage, equipment, utilities, supplies, travel, and miscellaneous. These data put
costs in ADD at $70.38 per participant-month ($46.31 in salary expenses, and $24.07 in nonsalary expenses). With an average length of participation of 13.3 months, each enrollment costs

Two other papers on IDAs discuss costs. Sherraden (1991) assumes that program costs
will be low and focuses on costs to the government for transfers of match funds. For society as a
whole, however, matches are not costs. Clones et al. (1995) assume that program costs will be
about 10 percent of matches. In ADD so far, however, program costs exceed matches.
5
Sherraden (2000, p. 2) says that “In the short term, cost data can be discomfiting, but ultimately
knowledge of costs leads to better policies and programs.”
6
The cost of this input is the wage paid to the worker.
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about $940.7 Given AMND of $25.42, each dollar of net deposits costs $2.77. For comparison, a
detailed assessment at the experimental-design program in ADD found costs of $84 per
participant-month, $506 per enrollment, and $2.31 per dollar of net deposits (Schreiner, 2000a).8
With a 2:1 match, total cash outlays in IDAs in ADD by society as a whole were thus roughly $6
per $1 of net deposits ($1 savings, $2 match, and $3 program expenses). This is $2 of total
outlays per $1 of asset accumulation.
Are costs in ADD high or low? We have no good benchmark against which to judge whether
costs in ADD are high or low. The ultimate criterion is whether benefits exceed costs, but we
have not measured benefits yet. Furthermore, we do not know how low costs can go; the
possible efficiency of an IDA program is unknown. IDAs are young, and although some current
practices are better than others, best practices continue to evolve.
We do know that these short-term cost estimates for ADD overstate long-term costs. Programs
in ADD were among the first IDA programs in the world, and they incurred large start-up costs
to do things that they (and perhaps other IDA programs) will build on in the future. For
example, they had to establish relationships with banks and funders, and they had to develop
financial-education materials, sometimes in more than one language (Sherraden et al., 1999).9
Time and growth—both of individual programs and of the IDA field—should reduce these costs.
ADD does suggest that costs decrease with time. Program expenses (salary and non-salary) per
participant-month through June 30, 1999, were $117.58; in the next 12 months, costs averaged
$43.06. Likewise, costs per dollar of net deposits through June 30, 1999, were $3.66, but they
were $2.20 for the next 12 months.10 Costs in ADD decreased through time.11
Cost data are biased upwards to some unknown extent because they do not exclude the cost to
programs of participation in the evaluation of ADD. For example, some programs used large

7

Of course, this figure depends on the length of participation.
This excludes costs borne voluntarily by private entities (Schreiner, 1997). These cost figures
exclude displacement costs, non-financial costs, and all indirect costs. Schreiner (2000a) and
Sherraden (2000) discuss cost measurement at the experimental-design program further.
9
Because the number of IDA programs has exploded since ADD started and because programs
in ADD were among the first IDA programs, staff at ADD programs often did work that directly
helped other IDA programs or the field as a whole. Examples included involvement in federal
and state policy development, technical assistance to other IDA programs, and occasional media
attention. Our data on inputs and costs do not adjust for this, and this imparts an upward bias to
the cost estimates.
10
AMND as of June 30, 1999, was $33.24. In the next 12 months, it was $20.89. This sharp
decline fits the $7.43 decrease (Chapter 7) in AMND from June 30, 1999 to June 30, 2000. For
the average over the lifetime of ADD to fall more than $7 in one year, AMND in that year had to
fall by even more than $7.
11
We do not know how much more costs may decrease in the future.
8
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amounts of resources to update participant socio-economic data.12 Data cleaning also consumed
staff time, as did semi-annual ADD conferences.
In general, the data on costs and inputs for ADD are measured with a large amount of error.13 In
particular, host organizations in ADD did not track their IDA programs as distinct cost centers,
and we had no way to do cross-checks. MIS IDA asked programs to provide data on inputs and
costs used for IDAs, but the programs themselves had to figure out how to allocate staff time and
expenses across multiple programs. Some programs allocated some costs to IDAs that should
have been allocated elsewhere, and this imparts an upward bias to cost estimates.
The number of participant-months is understated. Some programs—in particular CAPTC—
provide financial education before enrollment. The costs of these classes are included here, but
the outputs are not.
Some programs in ADD are very small (for example, MACED, ADVOCAP, Heart of America,
and Alternatives FCU all have less than 100 participants). It is difficult for these programs to
take advantage of economies of scale. A broad, permanent IDA policy would likely work
through a few large organizations rather than through many small ones.
Most programs have costs within $10 of the ADD average, but the range is wide. The leastcostly program (Alternatives FCU) spent $31.50 per participant-month through June 30, 2000,
and most-costly program spent $126.09. Cost structures in ADD vary widely across programs,
and there are cost structures below the average of $70.38 per participant-month.
IDAs versus cash transfers. Rather than spend $70.38 per month on program expenses to
produce $25.42 in net deposits, why not send each participant a check for $70.38 and dispense
with the IDA program and the need to save? For several reasons, the comparison is not this
straightforward. First, IDAs require some saving effort from participants. Thus, IDAs are selftargeted to those people able and willing to sacrifice today for a better tomorrow. Cash transfers
are not as precisely targeted, and cash transfers also have non-trivial administration costs.
Second, IDAs delay cash disbursement for matches, and this may prompt participants to think
about how best to use their expected matches. IDA participants may think about their resources
in ways that cash-transfer recipients do not, and this may lead to non-economic changes in
patterns of thought and behavior (Chapter 1).
Third, IDAs attempt to restrict the use of transfers to the purchase of assets that generally
improve both individual and social well-being in the long term. In fact, it might be said that
IDAs attempt to transfer not cash but rather homes, human capital, and microenterprises.
12

The cost assessment of the experimental-design program (Schreiner, 2000a) adjusted for costs
due to evaluation, but we have no way to do this for the MIS IDA data.
13
Costs and inputs in this report omit MACED because large changes in its costs through time
signalled inaccuracies. The figures also omit the two collaboratives (CAAB and EBALDC)
because they could not be expected to gather accurate data from all of their member
organizations (CAAB and EBALDC).
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Fourth, IDAs are coupled with financial education that attempts to transfer knowledge and world
views conducive to long-term wealth and well-being.
Fifth and finally, social support and encouragement from IDA staff and from peers seem to help
people to save (Moore et al., 2001).
In short, IDAs are not just savings accounts; they are a bundle of services and institutional
structures designed to make it easier for the poor to save and accumulate assets. Thus, they are
difficult to compare directly to cash transfers.

Discussion
A concern for costs need not be a call to cut services. Efficiency is defined for a given level of
service. Cuts in services can curtail costs, but they need not increase efficiency and may even
decrease it. What matters for policy is that costs are explicit, and what matters for programs is
that there are benchmarks against which to track progress.
IDAs are a complex package of services, constraints, and opportunities; the benefits of
participation are not yet measured and so cannot be compared with the costs discussed here.
Furthermore, although some inefficiencies are inevitable, measured costs are biased upwards for
a variety of reasons. Even without these biases, however, IDAs would be costly. Even if costs
fell to $1 per dollar of net deposits (a decrease of more than 50 percent), it would be difficult for
funders to support a long, broad IDA program with the current bundle of services and
decentralized structure, even if social benefits exceed costs.14
Qualitative evidence from the evaluation of ADD suggests that participants highly value close
contact with staff. A key challenge for IDA programs is to provide such labor-intensive (and
costly) services efficiently. The tension between intensive services and the types of cost
structures that would allow broad access to IDAs may lead to two tiers of IDA designs, the first
with broad access, simple services, and lower costs, and the second with targeted access,
intensive services, and higher costs (Sherraden, 2000).

14

For example, federal support would likely follow terms similar to those of the Assets for
Independence Act. AFIA allows 15 percent of its grants to go for program expenses; 85 percent
must go to matches. Thus, if AFIA expected to be the sole funder of a program, then it would
presume a ratio of matches to program expenses of about 5.7:1; the ratio in ADD is much
smaller. ADD programs receive $25,000 each year through CFED for program costs. Like
AFIA programs, ADD programs make up the shortfall between costs and funds from CFED
and/or AFIA with funds from other sources.
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7. Savings Outcomes
Saving and asset accumulation in IDAs are built up from several elements. Deposits and interest
increase balances; fees and withdrawals (matched or unmatched) decrease balances. Match rates
affect total accumulation, and income affects the level of resources available to be saved.
No single number captures everything about each element. We define six measures to
summarize the combined effects of different elements on savings outcomes in ADD:
•

Net deposits were, for the average participant, $353.

•

Net deposits plus match per participant was $1,054.

•

Average monthly net deposits (AMND) per participant were $25.42.

•

Deposit frequency per participant was 58 percent (7 months per year).

•

Net deposits as a percentage of the pro-rated match cap per participant were 67 percent.

•

The savings rate for the average participant was 2.2 percent.

Net Deposits
Net deposits are defined as deposits plus interest (net of fees) minus unmatched withdrawals.
The measure includes matched withdrawals, but it excludes deposits in excess of the match cap
or after the time cap. Excess deposits, late deposits, and unmatched withdrawals from matchable
balances are savings in an IDA account. They cannot be matched, however, so they are not
counted as net deposits.1
Net deposits measure assets accumulated in an IDA up to a point in time. Greater net deposits
imply greater asset accumulation. The measure does not account, however, for differences in the
length of participation, match caps, time caps, or the timing of cash flows. The definition of net
deposits also ignores the possibility of future unmatched withdrawals from current balances.
The box on the next page illustrates savings outcomes (including net deposits) for a hypothetical
IDA.

1

For the same reason, net deposits are zero for participants who exit without a matched
withdrawal, even if their account has a balance on exit.
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Savings Outcomes for a Hypothetical IDA
To illustrate the measures of savings outcomes, Table 7.1 shows cash flows for a hypothetical
IDA account. Figure 7.1 depicts the evolution of the balance.
The example participant opened the account on January 1. The match rate was 2:1, the matchcap structure was annual, the annual match cap was $300, the time cap was 12 months, the total
match cap was $300, and there were no fees. The first deposit of $100 was on February 1. On
March 1, $1.00 of interest (a monthly rate of 1 percent) was credited. (The unrealistically high
interest rate of one percent per month is used here only for illustration. The hypothetical example
is not meant to represent the typical experience in ADD in any way.) On April 1, there was an
unmatched withdrawal of $25 and an interest credit of $1.01. On May 1, the participant
deposited $50, and $0.77 in interest was credited. Finally, on June 1, five months after the
account was opened, interest of $1.28 was credited, and the participant closed the account with a
matched withdrawal of $129.06.
In this example, net deposits were $129.06. This is the sum of deposits ($100 + $50 = $150) and
interest ($1.00 + $1.01 + $0.77 + $1.28 = $4.06), minus unmatched withdrawals ($25).
Table 7.1 Cash Flows in a Hypothetical IDA in Dollars
Date

Deposit

Jan. 1
Feb. 1
March 1
April 1
May 1
June 1

0.00
100.00
0.00
0.00
50.00
0.00

Interest
0.00
0.00
1.00
1.01
0.77
1.28

Matched withdrawal
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
129.06

Unmatched withdrawal
0.00
0.00
0.00
25.00
0.00
0.00

Balance
0.00
100.00
101.00
77.01
127.78
0.00

Total

150.00

4.06

129.06

25.00

N/A

Monthly interest is 1 percent, the match rate is 2:1, the total match cap is $300, and the time cap is 12 months.

No activity,
first 31 days

Feb. 1

Mar. 1

$1.01 interest

Apr. 1
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May 1

$129.06 matched withdrawal

50

0
Jan. 1

$0.77 interest
$50 deposit

100

$25 unmatched
withdrawal

$100 deposit

Account Balance ($)

150

$1.00 interest

200

$1.28 interest

Figure 7.1 Evolution of the Balance of a Hypothetical IDA

June 1
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Table 7.2 Average Net Deposits by Program
Program
ADVOCAP
CAAB
CVCAC
Near Eastside
Heart of America
Human Solutions
MACED
CAPTC Small-scale
Shorebank
WSEP
Alternatives FCU
CTMHA
EBALDC
CAPTC Large-scale
All ADD

N
82
153
155
191
91
122
58
161
205
235
93
128
245
459
2,378

Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($)
Max. ($)
518
499
0
1,000
357
166
0
2,799
384
289
0
1,309
171
91
0
660
483
447
0
1,134
379
299
0
1,500
194
229
0
360
728
514
0
2,250
205
100
0
1,000
143
101
0
600
604
619
0
1,500
408
223
0
3,000
416
410
0
1,920
315
131
-3
1,500
353

195

-3

3,000

Table 7.2 shows average, median, minimum, and maximum net deposits for ADD as a whole and
for each of the 14 programs as of June 30, 2000. (The order of the programs is arbitrary.) About
16 percent of participants had exited without a matched withdrawal (and so had zero net
deposits), and 1.6 percent had zero net deposits but had not exited.2
For ADD as a whole, average net deposits were $353. The median was $195.3 The smallest net
deposit was -$3 (some participants overdrew their accounts), and the largest net deposit was
$3,000. The average ranged from $143 (WSEP) to $728 (CAPTC Small-scale); the median
ranged from $91 (Near Eastside) to $619 (Alternatives FCU).
This analysis does not control for differences across programs (for example, participant or
institutional characteristics, or start date), so cross-program comparisons are inappropriate. In
fact, net deposits is not a very useful measure because it does not control for length of
participation; all else constant, participants who started sooner will have higher net deposits.

Net Deposits plus Match
Net deposits plus match is defined as net deposits plus the corresponding match.4 Net deposits
includes any previous matched withdrawals. This measure tells the asset accumulation that
would take place through IDAs if all net deposits were removed in matched withdrawals.

2

All of these cases had made deposits but then had removed them in unmatched withdrawals.
The median has the same number of participants above it as below it.
4
Of course, some current balances may eventually be removed as unmatched withdrawals.
3
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Table 7.3 Net Deposits plus Match by Program
Program
ADVOCAP
CAAB
CVCAC
Near Eastside
Heart of America
Human Solutions
MACED
CAPTC Small-scale
Shorebank
WSEP
Alternatives FCU
CTMHA
EBALDC
CAPTC Large-scale

N
82
149
155
189
90
122
49
161
204
234
93
128
241
458

All ADD

2,355

Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($)
Max. ($)
1,553
1,497
0
3,000
1,513
764
0
8,396
997
844
0
3,871
710
402
0
2,638
1,466
1,491
0
3,403
758
598
0
3,000
1,462
1,910
30
2,520
1,704
1,273
0
6,750
514
222
0
2,000
497
353
0
3,000
2,416
2,476
0
5,998
1,232
668
0
9,000
1,249
1,231
0
5,760
800
331
-8
4,500
1,054

607

-8

9,000

Like net deposits, the measure of net deposits plus match has some drawbacks. It does not
control for length of participation, and it depends on the match rate, which is not an outcome of
participant behavior but rather an element of the institutional structure set by the program.
Example: Net Deposits plus Match
In the hypothetical example, net deposits were $129.06, and the match rate was 2:1. Net deposits
plus match were thus $387.18, found as $129.06 + 2·$129.06.
For ADD as a whole, average net deposits plus match were $1,054 (median $607, Table 7.3).5
Ranges across programs are wide, but cross-program comparisons are not meaningful.

Average Monthly Net Deposit
Average monthly net deposit (AMND) is defined as net deposits per month of participation for a
participant. AMND is the key measure of savings outcomes in this report. Unlike net deposits,
AMND controls for the length of time that a participant has had the opportunity to save. All else
constant, greater AMND implies greater asset accumulation.
Example: Average Monthly Net Deposit
The example participant was in the IDA program for 5 months. Net deposits were $129.06, so
the average monthly net deposit for this example participant was $25.81, found as $129.06 / 5.

5

The figure here differs from the $1,055 figure in Chapter 5 because the figure here excludes a
few participants with missing match rates.
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Table 7.4 Average Monthly Net Deposit by Program
Program
ADVOCAP
CAAB
CVCAC
Near Eastside
Heart of America
Human Solutions
MACED
CAPTC Small-scale
Shorebank
WSEP
Alternatives FCU
CTMHA
EBALDC
CAPTC Large-scale
All ADD

N
82
153
155
191
91
122
58
161
205
235
93
128
245
459
2,378

Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($)
Max. ($)
46.43
40.63
0.00
250.00
33.34
23.54
0.00
250.00
22.58
24.16
0.00
62.50
13.22
7.00
0.00
62.50
19.46
21.29
0.00
36.03
22.44
20.03
0.00
76.92
10.50
13.73
0.00
16.05
28.72
21.53
0.00
125.56
15.30
7.36
0.00
71.43
13.19
12.62
0.00
100.00
29.63
34.69
0.00
55.54
26.35
18.71
0.00
142.86
34.00
31.58
0.00
213.33
32.85
20.01
-0.22
187.50
25.42

17.96

-0.22

250.00

For ADD as a whole as of June 30, 2000, average AMND was $25.42 (median $17.96, Table
7.4). Thus, a year of participation produced net deposits of $305.04. If these patterns hold, then
the average participant in ADD—with an average match rate of 2:1 and an average time cap of
33 months—will deposit about $840 and accumulate about $2,500.
Average AMND ranged from $10.50 (MACED) to $46.43 (ADVOCAP). The median ranged
from $7.00 (Near Eastside) to $40.63 (ADVOCAP). As usual, cross-program comparisons mean
little unless they control for cross-program differences. The regression in Chapter 9 does this.
Sherraden et al. (2000) reported AMND as of June 30, 1999 as $32.85.6 What caused AMND to
fall to $25.42 (a change of –$7.43) as of June 30, 2000? Changes in AMND stem from changes
in four factors: changes in observed characteristics for new enrollees, changes in unobserved
characteristics for new enrollees, changes in average length of participation for all participants,
and changes in non-participant unobserved factors.
Regression results in Chapters 8 and 9 imply that shifts in observed characteristics for post-June
1999 enrollees decrease average AMND for all of ADD by $5.43. For example, new enrollees
were more likely to have debt (a factor that decreases AMND) than were pre-June 1999
enrollees. Also, enrollees in new ADD sites funded in part under the Assets for Independence

6

They report average AMND as $33.29, but they do not exclude ineligibles, and they do not
subtract bank fees, excess deposits, or balances left in accounts at exit. Their data also include
some months for 30 people who exited before June 30, 1999 but were not marked as such by the
program until after June 30, 1999. Their data also omit 38 participants who opened an account
before June 30, 1999 but were not entered in MIS IDA until later. (The current data set may also
omit some participants for these same reasons.) On net, refinements to data and formulae change
average AMND as of June 30, 1999 to $32.85 (a change of $0.44).
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Table 7.5 Factors in the Decrease in AMND in the Year After June 30, 1999
Factor that Changed
Observed characteristics for post-June 1999 enrollees
Unobserved characteristics for post-June 1999 enrollees
Average length of participation for all participants
Non-participant unobserved factors
Total Change in Average AMND

Effect ($ of Ave. AMND)
–5.43
–1.19
–2.33
+1.52
–7.43

Act—all of which started after June, 1999—had an income/poverty cap of 150 percent, whereas
the original ADD sites had a cap of 200 percent (Chapter 2).
Regression results also imply that a shift in unobserved participant characteristics decreased
AMND by $1.19. Enrollees after June 1999 were predisposed to save less. The push to meet
ADD enrollment targets before the end of 1999 may have loosened the enrollment process,
admitting savers who were less-able and less-committed in unobserved ways.
In the year after June 30, 1999, average months of participation increased from 8.9 to 13.3.
Because AMND varies with length of participation (Chapters 8 and 9), the increase in the
experience of participants in the 12 months after June 30, 1999, decreased AMND by $2.33.
In sum, these three effects decreased AMND by $8.95. These three effects plus the effect of
changes in non-participant unobserved characteristics is the total decrease of $7.43, so changes
in non-participant unobserved factors increased AMND by $1.52 (Table 7.5). Non-participant
unobserved factors include unobserved program characteristics (such as learning by staff) and
factors outside of participants and programs (such as the strong economy).

Deposit Frequency
Deposit frequency is defined as the number of months with a deposit divided by the number of
months of participation. It shows how steadily a participant saves through time. A participant
with a deposit each month has a deposit frequency of 100 percent. As a participant misses
months, the measure gets smaller; someone with no deposits at all has a frequency of zero.
Deposits of accrued interest are ignored; if not, frequency would be 100 percent for most
participants.
Example: Deposit Frequency
The example participant made deposits in 2 of 5 months, so deposit frequency was 40 percent.
For ADD as a whole, mean deposit frequency was 58 percent (median 57 percent, Table 7.6); the
typical IDA participant made a deposit in seven of twelve months. Frequency declined after
June 30, 1999, when the mean was 66 percent (median 70 percent).
The highest mean frequency was 77 percent (Alternatives FCU and CAPTC Large-scale); the
lowest is 36 percent (Shorebank).
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Table 7.6 Deposit Frequency by Program
(Months with a Deposit/Months of Participation)
Program
ADVOCAP
CAAB
CVCAC
Near Eastside
Heart of America
Human Solutions
MACED
CAPTC Small-scale
Shorebank
WSEP
Alternatives FCU
CTMHA
EBALDC
CAPTC Large-scale
All ADD

N
82
153
155
191
91
122
58
161
205
235
93
128
245
459
2,378

Mean (%) Median (%) Min. (%) Max. (%)
57
56
7
100
50
44
5
100
51
50
0
100
53
50
0
100
64
68
13
100
56
53
10
100
48
46
17
100
68
74
7
100
36
30
6
100
49
50
0
100
77
79
25
100
49
49
5
100
52
50
8
100
77
83
6
100
58

57

0

100

Greater deposit frequency may lead to higher AMND; Chapter 9 suggests that a move from the
25th percentile in frequency (33 percent) to the 75th percentile (83 percent) was linked to an
increase in AMND of $21.50. This is not a strong result, however, because saving may cause
frequency, even if frequency also causes saving.

Net Deposits as a Percentage of the Pro-rated Match Cap
Net deposits as a percentage of the pro-rated match cap is defined as the ratio of the average
monthly net deposits to the monthly savings target. The monthly savings target is the total match
cap divided by the time cap, that is, the amount that, if deposited each month and not removed as
an unmatched withdrawal, would lead to net deposits equal to the lifetime match cap in the
month of the time cap.
The measure of net deposits as a percentage of the pro-rated match cap indicates the closeness of
actual saving behavior to that which would take full advantage of match incentives. A measure
of 100 percent indicates that a participant is on track to use all match eligibility. Measures above
100 percent are possible if deposits are on a pace to exceed the total match cap or if a participant
has an annual match-cap structure and has deposited more than would be matched if participation
were to end after the current participation-year.
For ADD as a whole, net deposits were, on average, 67 percent of the pro-rated match cap
(median 49 percent, Table 7.7). That is, the average participant saved 67 cents for every dollar
of match eligibility. The low was 46 percent (CAPTC Small-scale), and the high is 148 percent
(EBALDC).
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Table 7.7 Net Deposit as a Percentage
of the Pro-rated Match Cap by Program
Program
ADVOCAP
CAAB
CVCAC
Near Eastside
Heart of America
Human Solutions
MACED
CAPTC Small-scale
Shorebank
WSEP
Alternatives FCU
CTMHA
EBALDC
CAPTC Large-scale
All ADD

N
82
153
155
191
91
122
58
161
205
235
93
128
245
459
2,378

Mean (%) Median (%) Min. (%) Max. (%)
111
98
0
600
72
50
0
600
48
43
0
203
63
32
0
325
57
62
0
104
54
48
0
185
70
92
0
107
46
34
0
201
55
24
0
243
54
50
0
480
71
83
0
133
49
41
0
185
148
168
0
511
53
32
0
300
67

49

0

600

Example: Net Deposits as a Percentage of the Pro-rated Match Cap
For the example participant, the monthly savings target is $25, found as the match cap of $300
divided by the time cap of twelve months. Because the average monthly net deposit was $25.81,
the proportion of savings goal was 103 percent, found as $25.81 / $25. The participant was
slightly ahead of the pace required to use all match eligibility before the 12-month time cap.
One of the strongest hypotheses of institutional theory for IDAs is that higher savings targets
(that is, higher match caps) will cause higher saving because participants change caps into targets
in their minds. Indeed, results in Chapter 9 suggest that a dollar increase in the match cap was
linked to a $0.36 increase in AMND.
This result, however, should be taken with a grain of salt. First, the test does not distinguish
between psychological versus economic effects of a higher savings target. For example, if a
participant, given a match rate, wants to save more than the savings target, then an increase in the
target would be accompanied by an increase in net deposits. But the change in the target does
not cause the change in deposits; it merely relaxes a constraint that had been binding.7 Second,
some programs may have set the match cap—and thus the savings target—based partly on their
expectations about how much participants would save. For example, programs that expected
lower savings might have set lower targets. If expectations were at least somewhat correct, then

7

To control for this economic effect would require two models. The first model would look at
“desired” net deposits, observed only when match caps do not bind. The model would then be
used to estimate desired net deposits when the match cap does bind. The second model would
link desired net deposits to variation in the match cap across participants, other factors held
constant. The effect probably would be greater than zero but less than the $0.36 found here.
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Table 7.8 Savings Rate by Program
Program
ADVOCAP
CAAB
CVCAC
Near Eastside
Heart of America
Human Solutions
MACED
CAPTC Small-scale
Shorebank
WSEP
Alternatives FCU
CTMHA
EBALDC
CAPTC Large-scale
All ADD

N
82
153
151
191
84
121
55
158
204
230
87
128
241
436
2,321

Mean (%) Median (%) Min. (%) Max. (%)
3.1
2.5
0.0
18
2.5
1.5
0.0
36
2.6
2.0
0.0
18
1.4
0.7
0.0
12
1.5
1.3
0.0
5
2.2
1.1
0.0
68
1.3
1.0
0.0
15
2.1
1.3
0.0
24
1.5
0.5
0.0
71
1.2
0.8
0.0
11
2.9
2.2
0.0
36
1.8
1.1
0.0
9
3.7
2.4
0.0
107
2.7
1.5
0.0
60
2.2

1.3

0.0

107

higher targets were assigned to people who would have saved more anyway, so higher targets
would (falsely) seem to cause higher deposits. Third, some programs may change the match cap
in response to observed deposit behavior. This induces interdependence between the match cap
and net deposits. Fourth, some participants may not have known their savings targets; the data
cannot say much about the effects of targets if participants did not know the targets in the first
place. Because some sources of future funds are uncertain, some programs have not yet
established total match caps for all of their participants.

The Savings Rate
The savings rate is defined as the ratio of the average monthly net deposit to gross monthly
household income. It measures the rate at which inflows of resources are converted into IDA
deposits.
Example: Savings Rate
If the example participant had monthly household income of $1,250, then net deposits as a
percentage of income would be about 2.1 percent, found as $25.81 / $1,250.
For ADD as a whole, the average savings rate was 2.2 percent (median 1.3 percent, Table 7.8).
The lowest rate was 1.2 percent (WSEP), and the highest was 3.7 percent (EBALDC). Chapter
11 discusses the relationship between net deposits and income.
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8. Exits
Exits are participants who leave a program without having taken a matched withdrawal. Exits
have zero net deposits in IDAs; balances are removed as unmatched withdrawals or become
unmatchable once the participant leaves the program.1
Exits matter for IDA policy because they are costly; programs lose their investment in
participants, and participants lose potential match funds. Participants may also become
discouraged with saving in general. How common is exit, and what institutional and participant
characteristics are associated with it?
In the context of ADD, answers might serve three purposes. First, they set a benchmark and give
programs an idea of the rate of exit that they can expect through time. Second, they suggest how
institutional features are linked with exit; programs might then fine-tune these features. Third,
they suggest how participant characteristics are linked with exit; programs might then target
extra help to the participants who are most at-risk.
This chapter discusses the concept of exit, exit in ADD, and links between exit and the
characteristics of programs and participants. About 16 percent of enrollees in ADD had exited as
of June 30, 2000. The cumulative risk of exit was 11 percent in the first 12 months and 16
percent in the first 24 months. Among program characteristics, higher match rates and higher
match caps were linked with a reduced risk of exit. Among participant characteristics, the risk of
exit was about the same for African Americans, Asian Americans, Caucasians, and Hispanics,
and income and receipt of public assistance were not correlated with the risk of exit. Owners of
checking accounts and owners of cars had a lower risk of exit, and debtors had a higher risk.
Finally, participants who used direct deposit with their IDA had a lower risk of exit.

Exit in Subsidized-savings Programs
We know little about exit (by the poor or non-poor) from subsidized-savings programs. In IRAs
or 401(k) plans, exit might be seen as withdrawals of all balances before retirement. Although
some people in 401(k) plans take hardship withdrawals or loans, complete exit is rare, except for
those who do not rollover their account balance when they switch jobs.2

1

Exits still saved and maintained assets for a time, but they also dissaved or became ineligible
for matches, so net IDA deposits are zero.
2
See Bassett, Fleming, and Rodrigues (1998); Chang (1996); and Poterba, Venti, and Wise
(1995). Samwick and Skinner (1996) report that about half of the $50 billion pre-retirement
distributions in 1990 from defined contribution plans was not rolled into subsidized accounts.
They surmise that the other $25 billion was consumed or converted into consumer durables
(especially houses). Because aggregate personal saving in 1990 was about $175 billion, the
potential reduction in saving due to this type of exit is large.

Center for Social Development
Washington University in St. Louis

70 Savings and Asset Accumulation in IDAs

When access to subsidized savings is permanent—as for IRAs and 401(k) plans—then the
concept of exit is not very useful. People with zero balances could just as well be seen as
inactive or at-rest. Likewise, if access to IDAs were permanent, then exit would not be relevant.
From the perspective of long-term improvement in the well-being of the poor, the best IDA
policy would involve permanent access (Schreiner et al., 2000). Then the poor could save in
IDAs at their own pace; access would not depend on minimum deposits in a limited time frame.
Permanent access would also increase the sums that people could accumulate, and this could
only boost the developmental impact of IDAs.
As it is, access to IDAs is not permanent, and so exit is possible. There are time caps because
funds are limited; the private sources and public programs that provide funds have not committed
to permanent support. In practice, the only possible source of permanent funds for a broad IDA
program is the government.

Exits, Graduates, Actives, Kick-outs, and Ineligibles3
Definitions
Exits are defined as people who leave an IDA program without having taken a matched
withdrawal.4 For exits, net deposits are zero by definition. In ADD as of June 30, 2000, 16
percent of enrollees had exited.
Graduates are defined as participants who leave an IDA program sometime after having taken a
matched withdrawal. Graduates have positive net deposits. In ADD as of June 30, 2000, about
one-fourth of the 13 percent of participants with a matched withdrawal (3 percent of enrollees)
had graduated.
Actives are defined as people who have an IDA open. In ADD as of June 30, 2000, 81 percent of
enrollees were active. About 98 percent of actives had positive net deposits (2 percent made
deposits and removed all of them in unmatched withdrawals but yet did not exit).
Kick-outs break rules and are forced out of IDA programs.5 Even if kick-outs save something
and leave with a balance in their account, they have zero net deposits because they cannot make
3

This section draws from Schreiner et al. (2000) and Schreiner (2000c).
Exits might also be called drop-outs.
5
For example, kick-outs might miss classes, fail to meet a minimum deposit frequency, exceed a
maximum number of unmatched withdrawals, or fail to save a minimum amount. Most programs
in ADD state that they will kick participants out for at least one of these reasons, and, although
the programs do not enforce their rules consistently, they have kicked some people out. These
rules intend to encourage frequent deposits, to discourage unmatched withdrawals, and to free up
funds for people who follow the rules. With enough time, however, kick-outs might have
fulfilled requirements and made small deposits and matched withdrawals; once kicked-out, they
cannot succeed in IDAs.
4
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matched withdrawals. An unknown share of participants treated as exits in this report are kickouts.
Ineligibles open an IDA and then leave because it was discovered that they failed to meet
eligibility requirements. In the analysis of ADD here, people who died or who moved are also
counted as ineligible because they left for reasons unrelated to saving behavior. Ineligibles have
zero net deposits by constraint; the 68 known ineligibles in ADD are excluded from the 2,378
participants analyzed in this report.
Exits and IDA Design
The original proposal for IDAs calls for accounts for all, opened at birth, with greater subsidies
for the poor (Sherraden, 1991). Everyone is always a participant; just as people are not “on” or
“off” IRAs, people would not be “on” or “off” IDAs. Even people with zero balances or no
recent deposits would have an IDA. Of course, not everyone would use their IDA at all times,
but if the goal is long-term development, then permanent incentives to build assets are better than
time-limited ones.
IDAs in ADD have time caps because funds are limited in time and amount. Prudence dictates
that programs reserve funds for each participant equal to the match rate multiplied by the lifetime
match cap. This creates an incentive to count as exited those participants who fail to make
deposits, who fail to fulfill other requirements in a set time frame, or who tell programs that they
want to quit. Once such participants are exited, funds reserved for them are freed for others.
Furthermore, exits do not get support from staff, so exits reduce program costs. Although
permanent access to IDAs is best for long-term development, funds for ADD are non-permanent,
so participants who leave without matched withdrawals are viewed as exited rather than as
inactive or at-rest.
Data Issues
Exits leave ADD, and some programs (but not all) also allow them to return.6 Kick-outs break
rules and leave ADD. Of course, in a program without deadlines (other than that requirements
must be met before a matched withdrawal), some kick-outs would likely have remained.
The source of the constraints that lead to the termination of participation—whether on the side of
the participant or on the side of the program—matters because we ask about participant behavior.
If program constraints force participants to leave, then the data say little about saving behavior
by participants. Of course, we also ask about the effects of institutions on participant behavior,
and some institutional rules can be seen as constraints. If there are data on constraints—as there

6

In ADD through June 30, 2000, 8 participants had exited and then returned. It is likely that
some programs in ADD do not allow return after exit, so ADD reveals little about the potential
for return by people who withdraw all their balances.
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are, for example, for the match cap and the time cap—then the analysis can attempt to
distinguish between constraints imposed inside and outside the IDA program.7
In the case of exit, the data do not always distinguish the source of constraints. We know that
the status of most exits, graduates, and kick-outs resulted from constraints outside the IDA
program, but we also know that some were the result of some constraints inside the IDA
program. The data may also confuse some ineligibles with kick-outs. We believe that this
matters for only a small share of cases, although we do not know exactly how perfect knowledge
of exit status would affect the nature and precision of the results in this report.
Furthermore, exit status in ADD is censored; some people active on June 30, 2000, will exit
later. Because very few accounts have yet to be opened in ADD and because more people will
exit as time passes (and few will return), the likelihood of exit over the whole course of ADD
will probably be much higher than the rate observed as of June 30, 2000.8 The results here thus
pertain only to ADD so far. They are probably not good predictors of exit by the end of ADD;
they are certainly not good predictors for a permanent program.
Finally, weaknesses of the data mean that the results in this chapter are less precise, more
tentative, and less relevant for a broad IDA policy than it might seem at first glance.
Furthermore—and perhaps more important—the extent of the imprecision is unknown, although
we do not expect it to greatly affect the broad shape of the results here.

Exits in ADD
About 16 percent of enrollees in ADD had exited as of June 30, 2000. Deposit frequency for
exits (33 percent) was about half that of non-exits (62 percent). Average AMND for non-exits
was $30.30; because exits removed all their deposits in unmatched withdrawals, average AMND
for exits was zero by definition. On average, matchable deposits were higher for non-exits
($420) than for exits ($174).
How does the risk of exit change as the length of participation increases? The monthly risk of
exit increases from almost zero in the first month to 1.6 percent in month 6 (Figure 8.1).9 That
is, 1.6 percent of participants who reach month 6 exit in month 6. Risk averages about 1 percent
per month for months 7 through 17, after which it falls to an average of about 0.25 percent for
months 18 to 24. The cumulative risk of exit is 11 percent in the first 12 months, 14 percent in
the first 18 months, and 16 percent in the first 24 months.
7

Of course, programs created rules based in part on how they expected participants to behave.
Also, as ADD has progressed, some programs have changed rules in light of observed behavior.
Both of these factors weaken how well the data can distinguish between the effects of participant
constraints versus institutional constraints.
8
There are other data issues beyond censoring. For example, some exits may be listed as active
even after they stop making deposits if they keep their account open but do not tell the program
that they want to quit. Likewise, some people who broke rules may not be kicked out yet.
9
A Kaplan-Meier hazard function, Figure 8.1 controls for censoring (Kiefer, 1988).
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Figure 8.1 Probability of Exit in a Given Month of Participation
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Exit, Institutional Characteristics, and Participant Characteristics
How are institutional and participant characteristics associated with exit? The results below may
help programs to adjust institutional design and to target support.
Regression Model
Regression estimates the sign (direction), size, and statistical significance of the association
between an outcome (exit, the dependent variable) and characteristics assumed to cause the
outcome (the independent variables).10 Estimates of associations from regression are usually
closer to the true association than are estimates from bivariate comparisons because regressions
control for correlations among independent variables in the model.
The dependent variable (non-exit) is dichotomous (unity for non-exits, zero for exits), so a probit
model is used (Kennedy, 1998). Because the probit estimates do not have a direct interpretation,
we convert them to units of percentage points (one percentage point is 1/100, or 0.01) of change
in the predicted risk of non-exit given a unit change in an independent variable.11 If the
estimated change linked to a unit increase in an independent variable is positive, then the
likelihood of non-exit increases (decreases in the likelihood of exit). Negative estimates imply
decreases in the likelihood of non-exit (increases in the likelihood of exit).

10

Of course, regression does not control for characteristics omitted from the model, and all
regressions omit some characteristics that influence the outcome.
11
The percentage-point changes are computed at the means of the independent variables.
Standard errors are computed with the delta method (Greene, 1993).
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The probit model includes an unusually large number of control variables: 9 institutional
characteristics, and 27 participant characteristics.12 Because some characteristics are categorical
and because some continuous characteristics are specified as piece-wise linear splines (Suits,
Mason, and Chan, 1978), 99 parameters are estimated.13
Tables 8.1 through 8.8 contain the means of the characteristics in the model, the estimated
percentage-point changes in the likelihood of non-exit given a unit increase in a given
characteristic, and the p-value of the estimated change.14 Although these results are in 8 tables,
they all come from one regression.
The model uses 2,338 observations (40 were omitted due to missing values) and had a good fit.
It was statistically different from a model with only an intercept with 99-percent confidence. In
comparisons between pairs in which one was an exit and one a non-exit, the predicted likelihood
of non-exit was higher for the non-exit than for the exit more than 95 percent of the time.15
Institutional Characteristics
The estimates of the associations between institutional characteristics and non-exit presented
below are less precise than they might appear. Institutional designs were not randomly assigned
to programs in ADD; rather, each program made its own rules, and staff probably molded
designs based at least in part on how they expected participants to behave. If staff were at least
partly correct, then not only does program design cause participant behavior but also participant
behavior causes program design. The model assumes one-way causation from design to
behavior, so two-way causation leads to bias.16
12

Characteristics were selected if they were in MIS IDA, were expected to influence exit, had
sufficient variation, and were unlikely to be caused by exit. The regression analysis here and in
Chapters 5 and 9 use the at-enrollment data on participant characteristics. The descriptions
elsewhere use the most recent data.
13
All but 12 participants have missing values for at least one of 22 characteristics in the model.
The standard practice that omits participants with any missing characteristics would make
regression impossible. Instead, we use a set of dummy variables to cleanse the estimates of the
effects of missing values (Orme and Reis, 1991). If a characteristic is not missing, then the
“missing” dummy that corresponds to the characteristic is set to zero. If the characteristic is
missing, then the “missing” dummy is set to unity and the characteristic is set to zero. The
estimate for the characteristic reflects only non-missing values. Like other simple treatments of
missing data, this assumes that being missing is not correlated with the outcome. This is unlikely
for exits in ADD because missing data is most common for people who exited and then could not
be contacted during data-cleaning. We have not adjusted for this source of bias of unknown
magnitude. The coefficients of the “missing” dummies are available on request.
14
Appendix B discusses p-values and statistical significance.
15
Used at enrollment, this model would identify high-risk cases very well (Hand, 1994).
16
Some programs have a single match rate (or a single match cap) for all participants, but some
programs have—within a single program—different groups of participants with different match
rates (or different match caps). The estimated effects for these two institutional features are
based on those programs where the features vary among groups of participants.
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Table 8.1 Institutional Characteristics and Exit
Change in
% points

p-value

0.24
0.51
0.14
0.06

-4.7
-3.7
-1.6

0.01
0.01
0.14

Match cap
Monthly savings target

43

0.05

0.01

Match-cap structure
Annual
Lifetime

0.56
0.44

1.0

0.27

Program inputs per participant per month
Salaried IDA staff (hours)
Partner staff (hours)
Volunteer staff (hours)

2.8
0.5
1.1

-1.2
0.88
-0.06

0.07
0.16
0.90

46
24

0.02
0.00

0.62
1.00

Institutional Characteristics
Match rate
1:1
2:1
3:1
4:1 to 7:1

Salary expense ($)
Non-salary expense ($)
Means taken over only non-missing observations.

Mean

Note: Means for variables in the tables of regression results are taken across only non-missing cases and so may not
match means in Tables 3.1 and 4.1

Match rate. Higher match rates were linked with lower exit. The column “Change in % points”
in Table 8.1 shows the change in the likelihood of non-exit for a given match rate relative to the
likelihood with match rates of 4:1 to 7:1. For example, a match rate of 1:1 was associated with a
4.7-percentage-point decrease—compared to match rates of 4:1 to 7:1—in the likelihood of nonexit. The p-value is 0.01, so the link is statistically significant with 99-percent confidence.
Likewise, compared with 4:1 to 7:1, a match rate of 2:1 was linked with a 3.7-percentage-point
decrease (99-percent confidence), and a match rate of 3:1 was linked with a 1.6-percentage-point
decrease (86-percent confidence).17
Given a rate of exit in ADD of 16 percent, these are large effects. They are likely understated
because some programs probably set higher match rates if they expect their participants to save
little (which is likely correlated with exit). Chapter 13 discusses match rates further.

17

We have not tested whether the seeming 1-percentage-point increase in the likelihood of nonexit associated with a change in the match rate from 1:1 to 2:1 (or the 2.1-percentage-point
increase associated with a change from 2:1 to 3:1) are statistically significant.
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Monthly savings target. The monthly savings target is defined as the amount which, if saved
each month and not removed in unmatched withdrawals, would produce net deposits equal to the
total match cap in the last month before the time cap.
A higher monthly savings target was associated with a higher likelihood of non-exit with 99percent confidence (Table 8.1). A dollar increase implies a decrease in the likelihood of exit of
0.05 percentage points (a $10 increase would be linked to a decrease of 0.5 percentage points.)
The two-way causation between institutional features and behavior probably means that this
association is overstated. If programs assign high targets to people who would save more
regardless of the target, then high savers will have high targets and low savers will have low
targets. Even if the target had no effect on saving, the regression would detect a positive (and
spurious) correlation with saving (and thus with non-exit).
A central tenant of institutional theory for IDAs is that people save more (and are perhaps less
likely to exit) if they are expected to save more. The results here seem to support this, although
two-way causation probably explains at least some of the positive association.
Match-cap structure. About 56 percent of participants had an annual match-cap structure with
a match cap each participation-year (Table 8.1). The rest had a lifetime match-cap structure with
a single match cap for the length of participation.
Participants with a lifetime match-cap structure were 1 percentage point less likely to exit than
those with an annual structure, but the level of confidence is not very high (73 percent).
Financial education. The regression omits financial education due to two-way causation. For
example, more education should increase saving and decrease exit (Chapter 10). Attendance,
however, takes place through time, so even if education has no link with exit, people who exit
will attend fewer hours than non-exits if only because they exit sooner and so have fewer
opportunities to attend. This would induce a spurious correlation between education and exit.
Program inputs. Observed program inputs include hours by salaried staff of the IDA program,
hours by staff at partner organizations, and hours by volunteers. Other measures of inputs are
salary expenses and non-salary expenses. Both institutional and economic theory—as well as
evidence from the qualitative components of the evaluation of ADD (Moore et al., 2001)—
suggest that staff may help motivate participants to reach their savings goals.
An additional hour of IDA staff time is associated with an increase in the risk of exit of 1.2
percentage points (93-percent confidence, Table 8.1). An additional hour from partner
organizations is associated with a decrease in the risk of exit of 0.88 percentage points (84percent confidence). An additional hour from volunteers had no statistically significant
association.
Why would more hours by IDA staff per participant increase exit? Although we do not know, we
can offer two speculative possibilities. First, data on inputs are measured with error (Chapter 6).
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Second, inputs may respond to participant behavior. If programs add salaried staff when exit
rates are high, it might induce a spurious negative correlation between IDA staff hours and exit.
Additional program inputs per participant per month in terms of salary expense or non-salary
expense were not associated with a statistically significant change in the risk of exit (Table 8.1).
Greater inputs should decrease exit, so the lack of an association is a bit of a surprise.
Unobserved factors correlated with a given program or site. Although the regression
includes a wide range of measures of institutional characteristics, it cannot control for all of
them. The regression controls for the possible effects on exit of unobserved factors correlated
with a given program or site.18 For example, the strictness of rule enforcement is unobserved.
All else constant, a strict program might have higher exit (due to kick-outs), but the model does
not control for strictness directly.
The estimate for CAPTC Large-scale is set to zero and is the base of comparison. For example,
compared with unobserved factors at CAPTC Large-scale, unobserved factors at Human
Solutions were linked with a statistically significant, 11-percentage-point increase in the risk of
exit (Table 8.2). Most of pair-wise comparisons are large and statistically significant.19 For
example, participants at the ADD/AFIA site at CVCAC are 4 percentage points more likely to
exit than participants at CAPTC Large-scale (the reference point at zero) but 11 percentage
points less likely to exit than participants at CAPTC Small-scale. Participants at the ADD/AFIA
WSEP site were 23 percentage points more likely to exit than those at CAPTC Large-scale.
In a sense, these estimates summarize what we do not know. For example, exit at CAPTC
Small-scale is 1 percentage point more likely—factors in the model constant—than exit at
MACED. We know that this is due to omitted factors correlated both with exit and with the
specific program, but we do not know what those omitted factors are. Some omitted factors are
institutional (for example, wait period, strictness with rules, and quality of staff). Some omitted
factors pertain to participants; for example, people at one site may have more experience saving
and thus be less likely to exit. Some omitted factors go beyond programs and participants; for
example, home prices vary by region and may affect the usefulness of IDAs for home purchase
and thus the risk of exit. Likewise, unemployment varies by region and may affect precautionary
motives to save.

18

Participant characteristics may also vary in systematic-but-unobserved ways that are correlated
both with a given program and with exit. For example, if a given program targets people who
have declared bankruptcy, if bankruptcy constricts access to loans, and if constricted access to
loans increases exit because debt cannot buffer shocks (or because IDA balances are seized by
creditors), then exit at this program will be more likely than elsewhere. The estimates in Table
8.2 reflect the effects of such unobserved participant characteristics as well as the effects of
unobserved program characteristics.
19
We have not tested pair-wise comparisons with programs other than CAPTC Large-scale.
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Table 8.2 Unobserved Factors Linked with Programs and Exit
Mean

Change in
% points

p-value

CAPTC Large-scale
CVCAC (ADD/AFIA)
Human Solutions
CAAB (ADD/AFIA)
CVCAC
EBALDC
Heart of America
Shorebank
MACED
CAPTC Small-scale
ADVOCAP
CTMHA
Alternatives FCU
CAAB
Near Eastside
WSEP (ADD/AFIA)
WSEP

0.19
0.02
0.05
0.03
0.07
0.10
0.04
0.09
0.02
0.07
0.03
0.05
0.04
0.04
0.08
0.04
0.06

-4
-11
-13
-13
-13
-14
-14
-14
-15
-15
-15
-16
-17
-19
-22
-23

0.12
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01

Other
Participants who may get extra 1:1 match

0.01

Program or program/site dummies

Participant Demographics
This section describes associations between exit and participant demographics (Table 8.3).
Similar to the program estimates just discussed, some unknown share of these estimates captures
links between exit and unobserved factors correlated with participant demographics. As such,
the characteristics are viewed more as controls than as causes. For example, gender and
race/ethnicity are included not to test for genetic predisposition to save in IDAs but rather to
control the possible correlation of gender and race/ethnicity with unobserved, omitted factors
produced in the social context.
Gender. Females were just as likely to exit as males (Table 8.3).
Age. Until age 40, additional years were linked with an increase in the likelihood of exit of 0.06
percentage points (95-percent confidence, Table 8.3 and Figure 8.2). After 40, each year was
linked with a decrease in risk of 0.11 percentage points (93-percent confidence). A 65-year-old
is 2.6 percentage points less likely to exit than a 40-year-old.
We do not know what causes this pattern. The up-turn at age 40 may partly reflect “humpsaving” in anticipation of retirement. It may also reflect changes in resources available to save
as children age and as households accumulate non-financial assets such as cars, houses, and other
consumer durables.
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Figure 8.2 Age and Likelihood of Non-exit
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Location of residence. Participants in areas with populations of less than 2,500 were 2.5
percentage points less likely to exit (Table 8.3).20 The estimate is statistically significant and
surprisingly large, given that rural residents may face higher transaction costs to make deposits
and attend classes. Perhaps if their neighbors know that they have an IDA, then rural residents
may receive greater peer support (or peer pressure) to save.
Marital status. Compared with those who never married, people who married or who divorced
or separated are 0.83 to 0.9 percentage points less likely to exit (Table 8.3). People who were
widowed have about the same likelihood of exit as people who never married.
Number of adults and children. The number of adults and the number of children have no
statistically significant association with the risk of exit (Table 8.3).
Number of ADD participants in a household. Participants in a household that probably had
another participant had the same risk of exit as others (Table 8.3).21
Race/ethnicity. The risk of exit was statistically the same for African Americans, Asian
Americans, Caucasians, and Hispanics (Table 8.3). This suggests that the large differences in
gross AMND among these groups (Chapter 12) were not due to differences in the risk of exit.
Compared to Caucasians, Native Americans were 2.5 percentage points more at-risk of exit.
“Other” was 4 percentage points less at-risk.
20
21

Most rural residents are in CVCAC, MACED, WSEP, and Alternatives FCU.
This figure excludes households in CTMHA if multiple accounts were purely administrative.
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Table 8.3 Participant Demographics and Exit
Mean

Change in
% points

p-value

0.20
0.80

0.05

0.92

36
33
2

-0.06
0.11

0.05
0.07

Location of residence
Population 2,500 or more
Population less than 2,500

0.87
0.13

2.5

0.02

Marital status
Widowed
Divorced or separated
Never-married
Married

0.02
0.27
0.51
0.20

-0.12
0.9

0.94
0.11

0.83

0.19

Household composition
Adults (18 or older)
Children (17 or younger)

3.2
1.5
1.7

-0.19
0.15

0.51
0.28

Participants in a houshold
One
More than one

0.94
0.06

-0.17

0.81

-2.5
-0.13

0.06
0.81

0.2
1.5
4.0

0.82
0.40
0.02

Participant Demographics
Gender
Male
Female
Age (spline)
0 to 40 years
40 years or more

Race/ethnicity
Native American
African-American
Caucasian
Hispanic
Asian-American
Other
Means taken over only non-missing observations.

0.03
0.47
0.37
0.09
0.02
0.03

Race/ethnicity is a control variable. It reflects how unobserved factors produced in the social
context and that vary systematically with race/ethnicity are associated with exit; they do not
reflect the effects of race/ethnicity per se on exit. If the model could control for all factors that
affect exit, then exit and race/ethnicity would have no estimated association.
Education and Employment
Education. More education might be linked to more saving (and less risk of exit) either because
education increases financial sophistication and/or future orientation or because education—
itself saving in the form of human capital—reveals future orientation.
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Table 8.4 Education, Employment Status, and Exit
Education and Employment Status

Mean

Change in
% points

p-value

-0.8
-0.8

0.18
0.18

-0.7
0.2

0.34
0.85

Education
Did not graduate from high school
Completed high school or earned GED
Attended college but did not graduate
Graduated from 2-year college
Graduated college (2-year/4-year unspecified)
Graduated from 4-year college

1.00
0.15
0.26
0.37
0.03
0.11
0.07

Employment
Unemployed
Employed, full-time (> 35 hours per week)
Employed, part-time (< 35 hours per week)
Not working (homemakers, retired, disabled)
Student, not working
Student, also working

1.00
0.05
0.58
0.24
0.04
0.06
0.03

-0.16
0.62
0.25
0.6
0.21

0.84
0.44
0.82
0.51
0.86

Employee of IDA host organization
No
Yes

0.98
0.02

-0.09

0.94

Self-employment in microenterprise
None
Active
Inactive

0.80
0.07
0.14

1.3
-0.07

0.29
0.91

Compared to people who did not complete high school or who had a 2-year college degree,22
people who completed high school or who attended college but did not graduate were 0.8
percentage points more likely to exit (82-percent confidence, Table 8.4). College graduates
(with 4-year degrees or with unspecified degrees) were just as likely to exit as people who did
not complete high school or who had 2-year college degrees. In sum, education was not strongly
linked with risk of exit in ADD. This unlikely result is probably due to the amalgamation of
those with 2-year degrees those who did not complete high school in the base for comparison.
Employment. Because wages provide resources to save or to buffer shocks, employment may
decrease the risk of exit through increased deposits or through decreased need to make
unmatched withdrawals. Employment and exit, however, had no statistically significant
association (Table 8.4). We are not sure why this would be.23
Participants who worked for host organizations in ADD had about the same likelihood of exit as
others (Table 8.4).
22

For technical reasons—no participants with 2-year college degrees had exited as of June 30,
2000—these two groups together must be the base for comparison.
23
The p-values in Table 8.4 are for the comparisons of a given employment status with the
unemployed. We have not tested for significant differences for other pairs.
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About 20 percent of participants in ADD reported that they owned a business and were selfemployed, and the other 80 percent were not self-employed (Table 8.4). Of the self-employed
about one-third reported income from self-employment and are called “active”; the other twothirds are “inactive.”
Self-employment often comes with volatile income and expenses and thus might cause greater
emergency withdrawals and higher exit. The self-employed, however, may have more
motivation to save, both because they expect volatile cash flows and because, unlike the nonself-employed, they can invest in business assets. It turns out that, on net, self-employment has
no statistically significant link with exit.
Receipt of Public Assistance and Income
The regression controls for receipt of TANF or AFDC before enrollment, TANF at enrollment,
SSI/SSDI at enrollment, or food stamps at enrollment. None of these factors had a strong
association with exit, although people who received food stamps were 1 percentage point less
likely to exit (77-percent confidence), and people who received TANF at enrollment were 0.76
percentage points more likely to exit (73-percent confidence, Table 8.5). On the whole, exit is
not strongly linked with public assistance. Although this does not necessarily mean that IDAs
are a good way to help people who receive public assistance, it does mean participants in ADD
who received public assistance were no more likely to exit than others.
The average participant in ADD reported monthly household income at enrollment of $1,474.
Of this, $1,229 (83 percent) came from “recurrent” sources (wages, retirement benefits, and
public assistance), and $253 (17 percent) came from “intermittent” sources (self-employment,
child support, gifts, investments, and “other”). Regardless of the source, the level of income has
no statistically significant link with the risk of exit (Table 8.5). This is consistent with the broad
message of Chapter 11 that income matters little for the level of saving in ADD.
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Table 8.5 Public Assistance, Income, and Exit
Mean

Change in
% points

p-value

Receipt of public assistance
TANF or AFDC never
TANF or AFDC formerly

0.62
0.38

0.09

0.86

TANF currently

0.10

-0.76

0.27

No SSI/SSDI
Receives SSI/SSDI

0.89
0.11

-0.10

0.91

No food stamps
Receives food stamps

0.79
0.21

1.0

0.23

Household income ($100/month)
Recurrent income (spline)
0 to $799
$800 or more

11.4
4.8
6.6

0.00
-0.05

1.00
0.62

2.2

0.02

0.74

Assistance and Income

Intermittent income
Means taken over only non-missing observations.

Assets, Liabilities, and Insurance
Liquid assets. Besides cash, liquid assets include balances in passbook savings accounts and in
checking accounts. The mere presence of an account may signal some level of financial
sophistication or future orientation. Furthermore, the balance in an account can be shifted into
IDAs or used to buffer shocks.24 Thus, people with passbook and/or checking accounts are
expected to save more and exit less.
The presence of a passbook savings account had no statistically significant association with exit
(Table 8.6). The average balance was $250 ($505 for those with a positive balance).25 An
additional $100 was associated with an increase in the risk of exit of 0.04 percentage points (82percent confidence). This negative effect is unexpected, but it is small.26 Exit had but weak
links with passbook savings.
More than passbook savings, checking accounts mark a greater integration with formal financial
services (Hogarth and Lee, 2000; Dunham, 2000). The average balance in checking accounts for
participants in ADD was $231 ($366 for those with a positive balance). The presence of an
account was associated with a decrease of 0.6 percentage points in the risk of exit (78-percent
24

Chapter 14 discusses the share of IDA deposits from new saving versus shifted assets.
Participants were asked to report individual (not household) assets and liabilities.
26
Furthermore, asset values (in MIS IDA or in any survey) are measured with error. The data on
the presence or absence of an account, however, are probably accurate.
25
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Table 8.6 Assets, Liabilities, Insurance, and Exit
Mean

Change in
% points

p-value

Liquid assets
No passbook savings account
Owned passbook savings account

0.48
0.52

0.23

0.59

Balance in passbook savings account ($100s)

2.36

-0.04

0.18

No checking account
Owned checking account

0.34
0.66

0.6

0.22

Balance in checking account ($100s)

2.11

0.09

0.20

Illiquid assets
Renter
Home owner

0.85
0.15

0.41

0.68

No car
Car owner

0.37
0.63

1.1

0.05

Value of illiquid assets ($100s)

112

0.000

0.99

Liabilities
No debt
Some debt

0.35
0.65

-0.8

0.09

89

0.000

0.99

0.34
0.66

-0.36

0.65

0.68
0.32

1.5

0.14

Assets, Liabilities and Insurance

Value of liabilities ($100s)
Insurance coverage
No health insurance
Had health insurance
No life insurance
Had life insurance
Means taken over only non-missing observations.

confidence). Furthermore, an additional $100 was associated with a decrease in the likelihood of
exit of 0.09 percentage points (80-percent confidence). Although the links are not particularly
large or strong, they suggest that people with checking accounts were less likely to exit from
ADD.
Illiquid assets. Other than human capital, home and cars are the chief illiquid assets of the poor.
Like the presence of liquid assets, the presence of illiquid assets may proxy for unobserved
factors linked with higher savings. For example, people who saved to buy a house or car in the
past are probably likely to save more in IDAs than others. Illiquid assets are more difficult than
liquid assets to shift into IDAs; few people would sell their cars or homes to get cash for IDA
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deposits.27 On average, total illiquid assets (home, car, land or rental property, business assets,
and investments) for participants were $11,222 (16,991 for those with non-zero illiquid assets).
The risk of exit for home owners was not statistically different from the risk for renters (Table
8.6). Compared with others, car owners were 1.1 percentage points less likely to exit (95-percent
confidence), perhaps because they could drive to make deposits. An increase in the value of
illiquid assets did not have a statistically significant association with the risk of exit.28 In sum,
the data mildly suggest that people who already own assets are also less likely to exit.
Liabilities. Debt requires debt service; all else constant, debtors have less resources available to
save and so may exit more.29 MIS IDA recorded home mortgages, car loans, business debt,
mortgages on land or rental property, loans from family or friends, student loans, credit-card
debt, and unpaid household or medical bills. On average, total liabilities were $8,940 ($12,947
for those with non-zero debt).
Like the value of assets, the value of liabilities is measured with error, and this may explain the
lack of association between exit and the value of total liabilities. Even if people do not know
exactly how much they owe, however, they probably know whether they owe something.
Participants who reported some debt were, all else constant, 0.8 percentage points more likely to
exit (91-percent confidence, Table 8.6).
Enrollment Characteristics
The regression includes some factors related to enrollment and length of participation. They are
best seen as controls rather than causes.
Previous relationship with the host organization. On the one hand, the presence of a previous
relationship might proxy for unobserved characteristics that would increase the risk of exit. On
the other hand, the host is likely to refer those participants whom it expects are most likely to
succeed.30 The association between exit and a previous relationship with the host turns out to be
statistically insignificant (Table 8.7).
Referred by a partner organization. Even more than people related to the host, people
referred by partner organizations were probably expected to do well in IDAs. On the other hand,
the use of social services may proxy for unobserved factors linked with exit. People referred by
partners were 1 percentage point more likely to exit (87-percent confidence, Table 8.7).

27

Participants may still make implicit shifts from resources that would have been used for
maintenance or for additional investment in illiquid assets (Chapter 14).
28
Values are subject to more measurement error than is ownership.
29
Of course, debt service requires that income exceeds consumption, but this type of saving does
not increase balances in IDAs.
30
Of course, not all people in ADD with a previous relationship with the host were referred by
the host, but some were.
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Table 8.7 Enrollment Characteristics and Exit
Mean

Change in
% points

p-value

0.59
0.41

-0.34

0.53

Referred by partner organization
No
Yes

0.70
0.30

-1.0

0.13

Date of enrollment
Before June 30, 1999
After June 30, 1999

0.58
0.42

6.4

0.01

Length of participation (months)
1 to 6
7 to 12
13 to 18
19 to 24
24 or more

13.3
5.7
3.8
2.2
1.2
0.4

1.0
0.45
0.7
0.54
0.24

0.01
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.47

Enrollment Characteristics
Previous relationship with host organization
No
Yes

Date of enrollment. The enrollment goal for ADD was 2,000 participants, and the planned
deadline was December 31, 1999. In the last few months of 1999, the pace of enrollment
quickened to meet this goal. In addition, some sites set up after September 1999 had a tighter
cap on income (150 percent of poverty) than the original sites (200 percent of poverty).
Furthermore, the people who expected the most success may have enrolled first. Thus,
compared to pre-June 1999 enrollees, post-June 1999 enrollees may have been lower savers.
The model controls for shifts in unobserved characteristics after June 1999; post-June 1999
enrollees were 6.4 percentage points less likely to exit (99-percent confidence, Table 8.7). This
surprising result occurs even though we control for length of participation, which is shorter on
average for later enrollees. We cannot explain it, although some exits from this late cohort may
not have been inactive long enough as of June 30, 2000, for programs to recognize them as exits.
Length of participation. Like the bivariate analysis in Figure 8.1, the regression suggests that
the likelihood of non-exit increased with months of participation, mostly at a decreasing rate.
The estimated association was statistically significant (Figure 8.3 and Table 8.7). Length of
participation should be viewed not as a cause but as a control. As time passes, exit may slow
because savers have greater potential matches to lose. Survivor bias also plays a role;
participants unlikely to exit, regardless of length of participation, are also likely to have
participated the longest as of June 30, 2000. It is also possible that the likelihood of exit
decreases with time because participants become more hopeful of success as they go longer
without exiting and build larger balances.
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Figure 8.3 Length of Participation and Likelihood of Exit
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Characteristics Determined after Enrollment
The regression controls for several factors determined after enrollment. Although these factors
may influence saving, saving may also influence them. This possible two-way causation
suggests that they be viewed more as controls than as causes.
Number of IDA accounts. For administrative reasons, some participants at CTMHA have more
than one IDA account. The analysis aggregates these into a single account. These people are 4.6
percentage points more likely to exit than others (98-percent confidence, Table 8.8).
Direct deposit. Institutional theory suggests that direct deposit may increase savings because it
removes the need to make recurrent choices to save (Beverly, Moore, and Schreiner, 2001;
Beverly and Sherraden, 1999; Bernheim, 1997; Caskey, 1997; Thaler, 1990). Direct deposit was
linked with a decrease in the risk of exit of 2.7 percentage points (83-percent confidence, Table
8.8).
Table 8.8 Characteristics Determined after Enrollment and Exit
Mean

Change in
% points

p-value

Number of accounts
One
More than one

0.99
0.01

-4.6

0.02

Use of direct deposit to IDA account
No
Yes

0.95
0.05

2.7

0.17

Characteristics
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Summary: Exit and Characteristics of Participants and Programs
About 16 percent of enrollees in ADD had exited as of June 30, 2000. The monthly risk of exit
peaks in month 6 at 1.6 percent, and it runs at 1 percent per month for about a year thereafter.
We highlight key results from a regression that controls for observed factors.
•

Higher match rates were associated with a reduced risk of exit.

•

Higher match caps were associated with a reduced risk of exit.

•

Program inputs did not have a clear, consistent link with the risk of exit.

•

Unobserved factors linked with a given program were highly correlated with the risk of exit.

•

The risk of exit was statistically the same for African Americans, Asian Americans,
Caucasians, and Hispanics.

•

Education and employment had no clear links with the risk of exit.

•

Receipt of public assistance was not correlated with the risk of exit.

•

The risk of exit was not associated with the level of income.

•

Ownership of checking accounts and cars was linked with a lower risk of exit, and debt was
linked with higher risk.

•

Home ownership, passbook-account ownership, and insurance coverage had no association
with the risk of exit.

•

Participants who used direct deposit with their IDA had a lower risk of exit.
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9. Institutional Characteristics,
Participant Characteristics, and Net Deposits
Average monthly net deposits (AMND) are defined as net deposits divided by months of
participation.1 AMND is the key outcome measure in this report; greater AMND implies greater
saving and asset accumulation in IDAs.
For institutional characteristics in ADD, we find that the match rate was not associated with
AMND, more financial education (up to a point) was associated with higher AMND, and higher
match caps were associated with higher AMND. For participant characteristics, we find that
people who owned assets when they joined an IDA program had higher AMND, that
race/ethnicity was correlated with unobserved factors that were also correlated with AMND, and
that income and current receipt of public assistance were not associated with AMND.

Background
A basic question for asset-based policy is whether the poor can save and accumulate assets in
IDAs (Sherraden, 1999a). ADD suggests that they can: as of June 30, 2000, mean AMND across
participants was $25.42 (median $17.96). Net deposits per year were about $300. If this pattern
holds, then the average participant—with an average match rate of 2:1 and an average time cap
of 33 months—will deposit about $840 and accumulate about $2,500. The poor can save in
IDAs.2
For policy, a subsequent question is how do the poor save? In particular, do savings depend only
on preferences and economic incentives? If so, then policy should focus on monetary incentives
such as match rates. Or do savings also depend on institutional structures? If so, then policy
should also focus on, for example, financial education, awareness campaigns, and explicit
expectations that all can save.
Moore et al. (2001) analyze saving strategies in a sample of participants in ADD. This chapter
complements that work; it addresses the links between AMND and the characteristics of
institutions and participants. The intent is to build knowledge that might guide attempts to finetune institutional designs and public policy.

1

Net deposits are gross deposits minus total unmatched withdrawals minus excess balances.
This result is not trivial; the argument that the poor cannot save is common and sometimes
blocks attempts to find ways to give the poor access to institutional saving structures. Of course,
that the poor can save in IDAs does not necessarily mean that they save more with IDAs than
without. Nor does it necessarily mean that IDAs improve well-being; tests for impact must wait
for the second round of data from the experimental-design component of ADD. Even positive
impacts would not necessarily mean that IDAs are worthwhile; that would require that benefits
(financial and non-financial) exceed costs. The evaluation of ADD will offer a judgement on
whether IDAs are worthwhile (Schreiner, 2000b).
2
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Analysis Strategy
Given length of participation, AMND depends on deposits net of withdrawals. In turn, net
deposits depend on a host of factors. The analysis strategy here is to control for many of these
factors through multivariate regression.
Some factors influence net deposits but are not influenced by net deposits. For example, AMND
does not affect age, but age may affect AMND. Other factors both influence net deposits and are
influenced by them. For example, programs may adjust staff in response to saving by
participants, and participant saving may respond to inputs from staff. Such two-way causation
can bias estimates of associations between characteristics and AMND; below, we point out when
this might happen, and, when possible, we speculate about the likely nature of the bias.3
Although the regression includes an unusually large number of controls (11 institutional
characteristics and 31 participant characteristics), no regression can control for everything.4
Unobserved factors omitted from the model, if correlated with both observed factors in the
model and with AMND, can impart a bias to the estimates for factors in the model. When
possible, we control for unobserved factors correlated with observed factors such as the program
or site, gender, race/ethnicity, or asset ownership. For example, the estimated link between
gender and AMND reflects not gender per se but rather unobserved factors linked with gender.
Self-selection and non-exit. All exits have zero AMND by definition, so unobserved factors
that influence exit may also influence AMND. Furthermore, the process that determines exit is
probably distinct from the process that determines AMND, and it is probable that people with
different likelihoods of exit (even if they have not exited as of June 30, 2000) also have
systematically different levels of AMND.
We model exit and take the difference between predicted exit status and observed exit status as a
proxy for unobserved factors that may influence AMND. This is the essence of the technique to
control for self-selection known as the Heckman two-step (Heckman, 1979 and 1976; Greene,
1993). The first step is a probit regression on exit status for all participants, and the second step
is a least-squares regression on AMND for non-exits with a variable to control for unobserved
factors correlated both with exit and with AMND. Here, the Heckman two-step controls for selfselection into exit.5 An advantage of the two-step model is that it allows a given characteristic to
3

As in Chapters 5 and 8, the regression analysis here uses data on participant characteristics atenrollment. Descriptive statistics use the most recent record.
4
Control variables were selected if they were expected to influence AMND, appeared in MIS
IDA, and had sufficient variation. With variables for missing data, for different attributes of a
given characteristic, or for non-linear effects, 124 parameters are estimated. Chapter 8 discusses
the controls for missing data.
5
The data from ADD cannot address self-selection into participation. That is, among people
eligible for ADD, those who chose to join probably expected greater net benefits than did those
who did not choose to join. Thus, AMND for participants probably exceeds what it would be
for non-participants, had they joined. The results here are still meaningful, but they pertain only
to participants, not to eligibles.
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influence exit differently than it influences AMND. Chapter 8 reports the first step, and this
chapter reports the second step.
Model fit. The second-step least-squares regression includes 1,961 observations on AMND for
non-exits as of June 30, 2000.6 Adjusted R2 was 0.41, so variation in observed factors explains
41 percent of the variation in AMND. For a cross-section savings regression, this is quite
respectable. The hypothesis that the model as a whole is statistically insignificant is rejected with
99-percent confidence.7

AMND for Non-exits
Regression Results
Regression estimates the sign (positive or negative), size, and statistical significance of
associations between an outcome (AMND) and characteristics assumed to influence the
outcome. A regression estimate should approach the true association better than bivariate
comparisons because regression controls for correlations with more than one characteristic.
Tables 9.1 to 9.8 contain the means of the characteristics in the model for non-exits, the
estimated changes in AMND (in units of dollars of net deposits per month) given a unit increase
in a given characteristic,8 and the p-value of the estimated change.9 Although the results are
presented in 8 tables, they all come from one regression. The discussion here omits some
caveats and explanations already made in Chapter 8.
Institutional Characteristics
The estimates of the associations between institutional characteristics and AMND presented
below are less precise than they might appear because of possible two-way causation.
Institutional designs were not randomly assigned to programs in ADD; rather, each program
made its own rules, and staff probably based designs partly on expected participant behavior. If
expectations were at least partly accurate, then not only does design cause behavior but also

6

Thirty-four non-exits were omitted due to missing values.
The correlation between prediction errors in the Heckman two-step is –0.14, and the p-value for
the estimated coefficient on the Inverse Mills Ratio in the second step is 0.49. For this
specification, the risk of exit was not correlated with the expected level of AMND.
8
If a given factor is in only the second step, then estimates in Tables 9.1 to 9.8 are the predicted
change in AMND for non-exits. Most factors are in both steps, however, so the change in
AMND also depends on the change in the risk of exit due to the change in a given factor (Tables
8.1 to 8.8). LIMDEP 7.0 computes this total effect (Greene, 1995), but it crashes on this model
with this data. The two-step model was estimated in SAS without estimates of the total effect.
9
Appendix B discusses p-values and confidence levels. The p-values here are based on standard
errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity.
7
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behavior causes design. The model assumes one-way causation from design to behavior, so twoway causation would lead to bias.10
Match rate. None of the estimated associations between match rates and AMND were
statistically significant (Table 9.1). This suggests that the match rate has no effect on AMND.11
This may seem like a surprise, especially because Chapter 5 found that higher match rates are
associated with decreased risk of unmatched withdrawals and because Chapter 8 found that
higher match rates are associated with risk of exit. Research on 401(k) plans, however,
commonly finds that increases in match rates (once past 0.25:1 or so) do not increase
contributions and may even decrease them (Basset, Fleming, and Rodrigues, 1998; Kusko,
Poterba, and Wilcox, 1994; Bernheim and Scholz, 1993).
How can this be? In IDAs, some participants and some programs may respond not to the match
rate but to the match cap and/or to the maximum possible asset accumulation (Sherraden et al.,
2000). Programs may set match rates so that total asset accumulation can reach a given goal.
For example, staff at MACED did not expect their very poor participants to save much; they set a
lifetime match cap of $360 with a match rate at 6:1, so participants can accumulate $2,520.
Some participants at Near Eastside and WSEP can accumulate about the same amount, but they
have a $600 match cap and a 3:1 match rate. In essence, programs may assign higher match
rates if they expect their participants to save less, regardless of the match rate. This would
dampen the estimated association between AMND and the match rate.
Furthermore, participants might “target save” in that, regardless of the match rate, they try to
reach the match cap. This will also dampen estimates of the association of the match rate with
AMND. They may also “target save” with a target below the match cap, in which case higher
match rates will decrease AMND. Chapter 13 discusses match rates further.
Monthly savings target. The monthly savings target is defined as the amount which, if saved
each month and not removed in unmatched withdrawals, would produce net deposits equal to the
total match cap in the last month before the time cap. On average across participants in ADD,
AMND is 67 percent of the target.
A $1 increase in the monthly savings target is linked with an increase in AMND of $0.36 with
99-percent confidence. A $10 increase in the target is thus associated with $3.60 more AMND.
Average AMND is $25.42, so this effect is large.

10

Some programs have a single match rate (or a single match cap) for all participants, but some
programs have—within a single program—different groups of participants with different match
rates (or different match caps). The estimated effects for these two institutional features are
based on those programs where they vary among groups of participants (Appendix C).
11
Up through 3:1, the estimates increase with the match rate (0.8 for 1:1, 1.1 for 2:1, and 2.4 for
3:1). If these estimates were statistically significant (they are not), then it would suggest that
AMND peaks with a match rate of 3:1.
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Table 9.1 Institutional Characteristics and Net Deposits
Mean

Change in $

p-value

0.26
0.51
0.12
0.06

0.8
1.1
2.4

0.83
0.77
0.48

Match cap
Monthly savings target

44

0.36

0.01

Match-cap structure
Annual
Lifetime

0.56
0.44

2.3

0.47

Hours of financial education

21.6

General (spline)
None
1 to 6
7 to 12
13 to 18
19 or more

10.5
0.08
5.7
3.5
0.8
0.4

6.7
1.2
0.56
-0.70
0.54

0.12
0.08
0.10
0.14
0.14

Asset-specific (spline)
1 to 6
7 to 12
13 to 18
19 or more

11.1
4.1
1.8
0.9
4.4

2.5
-1.8
0.29
-0.12

0.01
0.01
0.74
0.20

Program inputs per participant per month
Salaried IDA staff (hours)
Partner staff (hours)
Volunteer staff (hours)

2.7
0.31
0.84

-5.6
0.45
-4.2

0.01
0.85
0.01

44
22

0.67
-0.10

0.01
0.35

Institutional Characteristics
Match rate
1:1
2:1
3:1
4:1 to 7:1

Salary expense ($)
Non-salary expense ($)
Means taken over only non-missing observations.

At least three forces may drive the result. First, institutional theory suggests that participants
may change match caps into goals. Higher goals would lead to more effort and more savings.
Second, AMND is censored for participants who save up to the match cap. This means that even
if the match cap does not affect desired AMND, average observed AMND will be higher for
participants with higher match caps. The regression would pick this up as a positive—but
spurious—correlation between the match cap and AMND.12 Third, programs may have assigned
12

A crude way to control for censoring is to remove the 10 percent of cases at the match cap as
of June 30, 2000. With only non-censored cases, the estimated association between the target
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higher targets if they expected their participants would save more, regardless of the target. If so,
then high savers tend to have high targets and low savers low targets. Even if the target per se
does not affect saving, the regression would still detect a positive (and spurious) correlation
between the target and AMND. Probably all three forces matter to some degree, but the
importance of each is unknown. We can tackle censoring, but precise distinctions between
institutional effects versus bias due to two-way causation are not possible with the data from
ADD.
Match-cap structure. AMND did not have a statistically significant association with the matchcap structure, whether annual or lifetime (Table 9.1).
Financial education. All programs in ADD require financial education. Each additional hour in
the range of 1 to 6 hours was associated with a $1.20 increase in AMND (Table 9.1); all else
constant, the move from 1 hour to 6 hours would change predicted AMND by $6.00. The effect
of each hour in the range of 7 to 12 hours was $0.56. From 13 to 18 hours, each hour was
associated with a decrease in AMND of $0.70, and each hour above 19 was linked with an
increase of $0.54. The estimates are statistically significant with at least 80-percent confidence.
For asset-specific financial education, each hour in the range of 1 to 6 was associated with a
statistically significant increase in AMND of $2.50. Each hour in the range from 7 to 12 was
linked with a decrease in AMND of $1.80. These are large effects. Hours after 12 did not have
large, statistically significant effects.
In broad terms, AMND increases with financial education, but only up to a point. Chapter 10
discusses financial education further.
Program inputs. Increases in the quantity or quality of program inputs should improve savings
outcomes, and qualitative evidence from the evaluation of ADD bears this out. The regression,
however, suggests that an additional hour worked by IDA salaried staff per participant per month
(or an additional hour from volunteers) was associated with a $4.20 to $5.60 decrease in AMND
(99-percent confidence, Table 9.1). An additional hour worked by staff at partner organizations
had no statistically significant link with AMND.
Non-salary expenses had no statistically significant association with AMND (Table 9.1). Each
dollar of program inputs per participant per month in terms of salary expense, however, was
associated with an increase of AMND of $0.67 (99-percent confidence). This is a large effect.
The question for policy is whether a dollar of administrative expense is worth $0.67 of deposits.
and AMND falls from $0.36 to $0.22. Of course, most participants were not at a time cap (either
annual or lifetime) as of June 30, 2000, so many for whom AMND would be censored at the time
cap were not censored, much as many people who would put $2,000 in an IRA by April 15 of
one year would not have done so as of October of the previous year. Given that people with
lifetime match-cap structures may wait until the end of ADD to make their final deposits and
given that about 30 percent of participants with an annual match-cap structure were at the match
cap in their twelfth month, censoring may explain a large share of the observed link between the
monthly savings target and AMND.
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These patterns present a puzzle. We expected that AMND would increase with more time from
staff or with higher expenses. Instead, more time from IDA staff or from volunteers was linked
with lower AMND, and time from partner organizations and expenses for salaries had no link
with AMND. Only non-salary expense was linked with higher AMND. Three speculative
explanations are possible. First, data on inputs (especially from partner organizations) are
measured with error. Second, inputs may respond to participant behavior; if AMND is low,
programs may add staff, inducing a spurious negative correlation between inputs and AMND.
Third, it could just happen that programs that hired more and better-paid staff also had lower
AMND.
Unobserved factors correlated with a given program or site. Although the regression
includes a wide range of characteristics, it cannot control for everything. As a second-best
response, it controls for possible links between AMND and unobserved factors correlated with a
given program or site. Unobserved factors include program characteristics (such as the strictness
of rule enforcement), participant characteristics (such as future orientation), and characteristics
beyond programs or participants (such as the local economy).
The estimate for CAPTC Large-scale is set to zero and is the base of comparison. For example,
compared with unobserved factors at CAPTC Large-scale, unobserved factors at Human
Solutions were associated with a statistically significant increase in AMND of $6.90 (Table 9.2).
Most comparisons with CAPTC Large-scale are likewise large and statistically significant.13
These estimates suggest that unobserved factors correlated with AMND differ systematically
across programs and sites. They are control variables, not tests for which program elicits the
highest AMND. They do not mean that the ADD/AFIA site at CVCAC (where is AMND is $21
less than at CAPTC Large-scale, observed factors constant) causes its participants to have $51
less AMND than they would at the ADD/AFIA site of CAAB (where AMND is $30 more than at
CAPTC Large-scale). The estimates do depend in part on unobserved program factors, but they
also depend on unobserved participant factors and on unobserved factors beyond programs and
participants. We do not know the omitted factors nor how much each one matters.
Participant Demographics
This section describes associations between AMND and participant demographics. These factors
are best seen as controls rather than as causes; they proxy for unobserved factors correlated with
both participant demographics and AMND.
Gender. Gender is included as a control variable, not because we want to test whether there is a
genetic predisposition to save in IDAs that differs between men and women, but because gender
is correlated with unobserved factors produced in the social context that may be correlated with
AMND. It turns out that gender has no statistically significant effect (Table 9.3).

13

We have not tested for the statistical significance of pair-wise comparisons with programs
other than CAPTC Large-scale.
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Table 9.2 Unobserved Factors Linked with Programs and Net Deposits
Mean

Change in $

p-value

Program or program/site dummies
CVCAC (ADD/AFIA)
CAPTC Small-scale
MACED
CAPTC Large-scale
Shorebank
Human Solutions
WSEP
WSEP (ADD/AFIA)
ADVOCAP
Near Eastside
CVCAC
CAAB
CTMHA
Alternatives FCU
EBALDC
Heart of America
CAAB (ADD/AFIA)

0.03
0.07
0.03
0.23
0.10
0.05
0.04
0.04
0.03
0.06
0.07
0.03
0.04
0.04
0.11
0.04
0.03

-21
-3
-1.3

0.01
0.49
0.91

6.8
6.9
9.1
9.3
10
14
15
15
16
20
21
25
30

0.16
0.10
0.39
0.19
0.15
0.01
0.01
0.20
0.01
0.01
0.05
0.01
0.01

Other
Participants who may get extra 1:1 match

0.02

1.5

0.78

Unobserved Factors

Age. Up to 40, AMND increases by 10 cents for each year (72-percent confidence). After that,
it decreases by 15 cents per year (80-percent confidence).
Location of residence. Residence might affect AMND through transaction costs of deposits and
withdrawals. Residence, however, did not have a statistically significant link with AMND.
Marital status. Marital status might proxy for unobserved factors that affect saving. Marital
status, however, had no statistically significant link with AMND.
Number of adults and children. Each adult was linked with a $2.10 increase in AMND (99percent confidence, Table 9.3). With average AMND of $25.42, this is a large effect. The
number of children did not have a statistically significant association with AMND.
Number of ADD participants in a household. In the absence of peer effects and with all else
constant, total household savings would be constant and so per-participant AMND would be
expected to decrease with each additional participant. Thus, an insignificant association, a
significant positive association, or a significant negative association smaller than half of AMND
may be seen as evidence of positive peer effects. On the other hand, households with
unobserved factors that tend to increase saving may be more likely to have two participants. The
regression did not find a statistically significant link between AMND and the number of
participants in a household (Table 9.3). This suggests that household savings in IDAs are twice
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Table 9.3 Participant Demographics and Net Deposits
Mean

Change in $

p-value

0.20
0.80

-0.5

0.69

36
34
3

0.10
-0.15

0.28
0.20

Location of residence
Population 2,500 or more
Population less than 2,500

0.86
0.14

-1.4

0.54

Marital status
Widowed
Divorced or separated
Never-married
Married

0.02
0.28
0.49
0.21

-2.5
-0.35

0.49
0.79

0.44

0.79

Household composition
Adults (18 or older)
Children (17 or younger)

3.2
1.5
1.7

2.1
0.32

0.01
0.42

Participants in a houshold
One
More than one

0.94
0.06

-0.31

0.89

-4.9
-3.4

0.11
0.02

0.66
2.9
7.3

0.83
0.18
0.04

Participant Demographics
Gender
Male
Female
Age (spline)
0 to 40 years
40 years or more

Race/ethnicity
Native American
African-American
Caucasian
Other
Hispanic
Asian-American
Means taken over only non-missing observations.

0.03
0.46
0.38
0.03
0.09
0.02

as high with two participants as with one and is consistent with strong peer effects and/or with
strong unobserved factors.
Race/ethnicity. Like gender, we control for race/ethnicity because of its correlation with
unobserved factors produced in the social context that may be correlated with AMND. Chapter
12 discusses race/ethnicity and saving further.
Compared with Caucasians and with other factors in the model constant, AMND was $4.90 less
for Native Americans (89-percent confidence, Table 9.3) and $3.40 less for African Americans
(98-percent confidence). The difference in AMND between Caucasians and “Other” was not
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statistically significant. Observed factors constant, Hispanics saved $2.90 more than Caucasians
(83-percent confidence), and Asian Americans saved $7.30 more (96-percent confidence).14
It would be wrong to infer from these estimates that race/ethnicity per se affects saving. There is
no gene for saving, although social processes—sometimes through centuries—have led to strong
correlations between race/ethnicity and unobserved factors that affect saving. In a perfect model
that included all factors that influence AMND, race/ethnicity would have no link with saving.
Education and Employment
Education. More education (and thus more human capital) might be linked with higher AMND
either because education increases financial sophistication and future orientation and/or because
education serves as a proxy for these unobserved factors.
Table 9.4 Education, Employment Status, and Net Deposits
Mean

Change in $

p-value

Education
Did not graduate from high school
Completed high school or earned GED
Attended college but did not graduate
Graduated from 2-year college
Graduated college (2-year/4-year unspecified)
Graduated from 4-year college

1.00
0.14
0.24
0.38
0.04
0.11
0.08

-2.9
-1.0
-6.0
-1.1
2.7

0.09
0.56
0.06
0.61
0.24

Employment
Unemployed
Employed, full-time (> 35 hours per week)
Employed, part-time (< 35 hours per week)
Not working (homemakers, retired, diasabled)
Student, not working
Student, also working

1.00
0.05
0.60
0.24
0.04
0.05
0.03

2.6
2.0
2.7
4.1
5.8

0.31
0.44
0.42
0.21
0.13

Employee of IDA host org.
No
Yes

0.97
0.03

-3.9

0.22

Self-employment in microenterprise
None
Active
Inactive

0.78
0.08
0.14

-4.0
-0.3

0.09
0.83

Education and Employment Status

People with a 4-year college degree saved more than others (76-percent confidence, Table 9.4),
but the rest of the results are puzzling. They suggest that people with a 2-year college degree
and people who completed high school saved less than people with less education (people who
14

We did not test statistical significance for pair-wise comparisons beyond Caucasians.
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did not complete high school and people who attended college but did not graduate). People
who graduated college (2-year/4-year unspecified) saved about as much as people who did not
complete high school or who attended college but did not graduate.
We do not know why people who did not finish high school would save more than people who
did finish high school or more than people with 2-year college degrees.15
Employment. Because wages might be saved, employment may increase AMND. Compared to
the unemployed and with other observed factors constant, non-student employment did not have
statistically significant associations with AMND, although all the coefficients are positive (Table
9.4). Students save more than the unemployed, $4.10 if the student did not work (79-percent
confidence) and $5.80 if the student did work (87-percent confidence).16 We do not know why
AMND does not vary much across employment groups nor why students save more.
AMND was $3.90 less for participants who also work for a host organization (78-percent
confidence, Table 9.4). This is a puzzle; perhaps they joined to please co-workers but did not
strongly commit themselves to make the sacrifices required to save, or perhaps they are more
disadvantaged than the average participant in ADD in unobserved ways.
The “actively” self-employed (those who report both business ownership and self-employment
income) had AMND of $4.00 less than the non-self-employed (91-percent confidence, Table
9.4). Again, we do not know why. The volatility of self-employment income and expenses
might lead to erratic deposits or greater emergency withdrawals, but, if people anticipate these
emergencies and plan for them and if IDAs are not too illiquid, then this volatility should prompt
greater deposits. Furthermore, compared to the non-self-employed, the self-employed have one
more type of asset that they could possibly save for (business assets).
The difference in AMND for the non-self-employed and for the “inactive” self-employed (those
who report business ownership but not self-employment income) is statistically insignificant.
Public Assistance and Income
Receipt of TANF or AFDC before enrollment was linked with $1.60 less AMND (81-percent
confidence), but receipt of public assistance at enrollment—whether TANF, SSI/SSDI, or food
stamps—had no statistically significant link (Table 9.5). Other factors in the model constant,
current receipt of welfare is uncorrelated with unobserved factors that reduce saving.17

15

Perhaps people who did not complete high school get larger EITC payments, and perhaps this
increases their deposits. People with 2-year degrees might save less because of student debt.
16
We did not test comparisons for pairs of groups that did not include the unemployed.
17
Perhaps former recipients save less because they are unaware of relaxed asset limits.
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Table 9.5 Public Assistance, Income, and Net Deposits
Mean

Change in $

p-value

Receipt of public assistance
TANF or AFDC never
TANF or AFDC formerly

0.61
0.39

-1.6

0.19

TANF currently

0.10

0.3

0.90

No SSI/SSDI
Receives SSI/SSDI

0.89
0.11

-1.0

0.67

No food stamps
Receives food stamps

0.79
0.21

0.78

0.68

Household income ($100/month)
Recurrent income (spline)
0 to $799
$800 or more

11.5
4.9
6.6

-0.01
0.24

0.94
0.38

2.3

0.32

0.04

Public Assistance and Income

Intermittent income
Means taken over only non-missing observations.

The level of intermittent income—but not the level of recurrent income—had a statistically
significant association with AMND; each $100 of intermittent income was linked to $0.32 more
AMND (96-percent confidence, Table 9.5).18 With an average savings rate in ADD of 2.2
percent, this is a small effect. These results are consistent with the broad conclusion of Chapter
11 that income has little effect on saving behavior in ADD.
Assets, Liabilities, and Insurance
Liquid assets. Balances at enrollment in passbook savings accounts or in checking accounts
may proxy for financial sophistication, future orientation, or other unobserved factors linked with
saving success. Account balances may also be shifted into IDAs. For all these reasons, people
who own an account when they start an IDA are likely to save more.
Ownership of a passbook savings account had no statistically significant link with AMND (Table
9.6). Each $100 of balances, however, was linked with an increase of $0.16 (98-percent
18

Economic theory predicts that savings are more likely from unexpected income (and
dissavings from unexpected income shortfalls) than from expected flows (e.g., Deaton, 1992b).
We do not know, however, how well our definition of recurrent income corresponds with
expected income nor how well our definition of intermittent income corresponds with surprise
income. Furthermore, we measure resource inflows at one point in time; they may or may not
vary through time. Even if what we call “intermittent” income is truly intermittent, then its level
in a given month would not affect average AMND in a cross-section unless people did not expect
it to be intermittent.
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Table 9.6 Assets, Liabilities, Insurance, and Net Deposits
Mean

Change in $

p-value

Liquid assets
No passbook savings account
Owned passbook savings account

0.46
0.54

0.27

0.81

Balance in passbook savings account ($100s)

2.46

0.16

0.02

No checking account
Owned checking account

0.30
0.70

4.0

0.01

Balance in checking account ($100s)

2.36

0.13

0.17

Illiquid assets
Renter
Home owner

0.83
0.17

3.8

0.09

No car
Car owner

0.35
0.65

1.9

0.11

Value of illiquid assets ($100s)

126

-0.002

0.50

Liabilities
No debt
Some debt

0.33
0.67

-3.2

0.01

Value of liabilities ($100s)

100

0.0016

0.66

Insurance coverage
No health insurance
Had health insurance

0.33
0.67

-0.27

0.91

0.66
0.34

0.48

0.84

Assets, Liabilities, and Insurance

No life insurance
Had life insurance
Means taken over only non-missing observations.

confidence, Table 9.6).19 In a year, each $100 of passbook savings was linked with an increase
in net deposits of $1.92.
Owners of checking accounts can bounce checks, so checking accounts require greater financial
sophistication than passbook savings accounts (Caskey, 2000). Also, people with checking
accounts can more easily make deposits by mail and avoid the transaction costs of a trip to the
bank. A checking account may thus proxy for unobserved characteristics—such as having saved
in the past or not ending each month broke—linked with saving success. Ownership was
associated with an increase in AMND of $4.00 (99-percent confidence, Table 9.6). Furthermore,
19

Data on asset values (in MIS IDA or in other data sets) are measured with error. The data on
account ownership, however, are probably accurate.

Center for Social Development
Washington University in St. Louis

102 Savings and Asset Accumulation in IDAs

each $100 of checking balances was linked with an increase in AMND of $0.13 (83-percent
confidence). Together, these are large effects (16 percent of average AMND). The average
participant with a checking account (and a balance of $366) made annual net deposits of about
$50 more than a participant without a checking account. We have no way to know what part of
this is due to shifted assets versus unobserved factors correlated with ownership.
Illiquid assets. Other than human capital, houses and cars are the chief illiquid assets of the
poor. Like liquid assets, illiquid assets may proxy for unobserved factors correlated with higher
saving. Illiquid assets, however, are more difficult than liquid assets to shift into IDAs.20
Other factors in the model constant, AMND was $3.80 higher for home owners than for renters
(91-percent confidence, Table 9.6). Likewise, AMND was $1.90 higher for car owners (89percent confidence). Compared with average AMND, these effects are large. In contrast, the
value of illiquid assets was not associated with AMND.21 In sum, ownership of a car or home
was strongly linked with higher AMND, probably because it proxies for unobserved factors
correlated with higher saving.
Liabilities. Requirements for debt service mean that, all else constant, debtors have less
resources available to save. The presence of debt may also proxy for a lack of future orientation
or for other unobserved characteristics linked with low savings. AMND was $3.20 lower for
participants who reported some debt at enrollment (99-percent confidence, Table 9.6). This is a
large effect. In contrast, the value of liabilities—which, like the value of assets, is always
measured with error—has no statistically significant association with AMND.
To sum up, debtors save less in IDAs. Of course, debt service is a form of saving because it
increases net worth and because it requires that income exceed consumption.
Insurance coverage. The presence of insurance may proxy for future orientation, financial
sophistication, or other unobserved characteristics linked with higher saving.22 On the other
hand, premia (at least for life insurance) would reduce the amount of resources available to save.
Neither health insurance (including coverage by Medicaid or Medicare) nor life insurance had a
statistically significant link with AMND (Table 9.6).
Enrollment Characteristics
The regression includes some factors related to enrollment and the length of participation. They
are best seen as controls rather than causes.
Previous relationship with the host organization. The receipt of services from the host may
proxy for unobserved factors that impede saving. AMND was $1.80 lower for those with a
previous relationship with the host (86-percent confidence, Table 9.7). This is a large effect.
20

Implicit shifts are still possible from resources that would have been used for maintenance or
for additional investment in illiquid assets (Chapter 14).
21
Again, values are likely measured with more error than is ownership.
22
Some people—especially the poor—also save in the form of cash-value life insurance.
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Table 9.7 Enrollment Characteristics and Net Deposits
Mean

Change in $

p-value

0.59
0.41

-1.8

0.14

Referred by partner organization
No
Yes

0.72
0.28

-0.2

0.91

Date of enrollment
Before June 30, 1999
After June 30, 1999

0.46

-7.7

0.01

Length of participation (months)
1 to 6
7 to 12
13 to 18
19 to 24
24 or more

13.8
5.7
3.9
2.4
1.4
0.5

3.2
-1.7
-1.2
-0.6
0.4

0.01
0.01
0.02
0.20
0.45

Enrollment Characteristics
Previous relationship with host org.
No
Yes

Referred by a partner organization. Like people with a previous relationship with the host,
people referred by a partner organization have received some social services, and this may signal
something about their unobserved characteristics. The association between being referred and
AMND, however, was statistically insignificant (Table 9.7).
Date of enrollment. The push to meet enrollment targets seems to have caused a shift in
observed and unobserved participant characteristics. Even with controls for the length of
participation (which is shorter on average for later enrollees), AMND for post-June 1999
enrollees was $7.70 less than for pre-June 1999 enrollees (99-percent confidence, Table 9.7).
This is a large effect. As speculated in Chapter 7, quicker enrollment, tighter income caps, and
getting past the cream of potential participants may have driven this result.
Length of participation. AMND is strongly linked with the length of participation (Table 9.7,
Figure 9.1), increasing by $3.20 per month in the first six months (99-percent confidence). In
months 7 to 12, however, AMND decreases by $1.70 per month (99-percent confidence); in
months 13 to 18, it decreases by $1.20 per month (98-percent confidence). The pattern of
decreases at a decreasing rate continues in months 19 to 24 ($0.60 per month, 80-percent
confidence). These are all large effects. After month 24, the change in AMND is not
statistically significant.
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Figure 9.1 Length of Participation and Net Deposits for Non-exits
25
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Several explanations (not based on data from ADD) might be behind the surge and subsequent
plunge in AMND. First, participants might fund IDA deposits from new savings from increased
time and effort in household production or from reduced consumption. With time, they may get
tired, and new savings may shrink. Second, new participants may shift some assets from cash,
checking accounts, and passbook savings accounts into IDAs. In time, however, liquid assets to
shift may dwindle. Third, participants may be more motivated at first as they learn about IDAs
and attend classes. As the newness wears off, the spark may ebb. Furthermore, IDA staff may
spend more time on new participants. Fourth, it is likely that some participants enroll at a high
point in their financial lives (for example, after they receive a tax refund or an EITC payment).
With time, deposits fall off as inflows regress to a more average state.
Characteristics Determined after Enrollment
The regression controls for several factors determined after enrollment. Although they may
affect saving, saving may also affect them. They are more controls than causes.
Number of IDA accounts. Some participants at CTMHA have more than one account as a way
to increase the match cap. AMND was $17.70 higher for them than for others (99-percent
confidence, Table 9.8). The effects are there even though we control for the increase in the
monthly savings target due to the multiple accounts. Perhaps the presence of multiple accounts
has an institutional effect that serves to increase savings.
Direct deposit. Institutional theory suggests that direct deposit may increase savings because it
removes the need to make recurrent choices to save (Beverly, Moore, and Schreiner, 2001;
Beverly and Sherraden, 1999; Bernheim, 1997; Caskey, 1997; Thaler, 1990). The estimated
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Table 9.8 Characteristics Determined after Enrollment and Net Deposits
Mean

Change in $

p-value

Number of accounts
One
More than one

0.99
0.01

17.7

0.01

Use of direct deposit to IDA account
No
Yes

0.94
0.06

-1.9

0.39

Deposit frequency
Share of months with a deposit

0.62

43

0.01

Planned or actual use of matched withdrawal
Job training
Microenterprise
Home repair
Post-secondary ed.
Home purchase
Retirement

0.02
0.07
0.20
0.52
0.16
0.05

-15.5
-6.3
-5.9
-4.5
-3.4
-1.7

0.06
0.41
0.43
0.54
0.64
0.83

Number of types of uses of matched withdrawals
One
More than one

0.99
0.01

17

0.07

Actual use differs from intended use
No
Yes

0.98
0.02

9.1

0.01

Characteristics

association between direct deposit and AMND was negative and large ($1.90), but it is not
statistically significant (Table 9.8). The small number of people with direct deposit (5 percent of
participants) might explain the statistical insignificance, but not the negative association.
Deposit frequency. Deposit frequency is defined as the number of months with a deposit
divided by the number of months of participation. We suspect that high saving causes frequent
saving, in part because making a deposit has transaction costs and because high savers are more
likely in more months to have deposits large enough to make these costs worthwhile. We also
suspect that frequent saving causes high saving. In months when saving is more difficult, the
person who wants to be a frequent depositor is more likely than otherwise to make a greater
effort. In the long term, people who set a savings target and then consume the residual are
likely—because they will make a greater effort to save in difficult months—to save more than
people who set a consumption target and then save the residual. Furthermore, frequent deposits
may be a pre-commitment device that puts cash out of reach.
A unit increase in deposit frequency was associated with a $43 increase in AMND (99-percent
confidence, Table 9.8). The measure of deposit frequency, however, ranges between zero (no
deposits) and unity (a deposit each month), so a unit change is not relevant. Compared to
someone with deposit frequency in the 25th percentile (33 percent), predicted AMND for
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someone in the 75th percentile (83 percent) would be about $21.50 higher. This is a large
effect,23 although we cannot untangle each side of the two-way causation.
Planned or actual use of matched withdrawals. People who plan to save to buy a house may
save more, all else constant, than people who plan to save for home repair. Thus, planned use
may affect saving. Also, some participants enroll without a clear goal for their matched use. If
they find that they save a lot, then they may make a larger purchase; if they save less, then they
may make a smaller purchase. Thus, saving affects actual use.
The only use with a statistically significant association with AMND was job training (94-percent
confidence, Table 9.8). The 2 percent of participants with this use saved $15.50 less than
others.24
Number of types of uses of matched withdrawals. About 1 percent of participants in ADD
made matched withdrawals for more than one type of use. AMND was $17.00 higher for them
than for others (93-percent confidence, Table 9.8). Probably, high savings led to multiple types
of uses, not the reverse. Most cases involved uses for which small amounts can still be useful
(home repair, post-secondary education, or microenterprise). Participants with multiple uses that
included home purchase typically had home repair as their second use.
Actual use differs from intended use. AMND was $9.10 higher for people whose actual use
differed from their intended use (99-percent confidence, Table 9.8). Probably these people set a
low goal for themselves and then, when they found that they could save more, switched from a
use that required less accumulation to one that required more accumulation.

Summary
The following are key links between AMND and characteristics of programs and participants:
•

The match rate was not associated with AMND.

•

Higher match caps were associated with higher AMND, but we cannot disentangle the forces
of institutional factors, censored data, and two-way causation.

•

Up to a point, more hours of financial education were linked to higher AMND.

•

The program was correlated with unobserved factors that were also correlated with AMND.

•

Race/ethnicity was correlated with unobserved factors that were also correlated with AMND.

•

Income and current receipt of public assistance were not associated with AMND.

•

Asset ownership was linked with higher AMND, and debt was linked with lower AMND.

•

AMND increased in the first six months of participation, but decreased in the next 12.

•

Deposit frequency was positively correlated with AMND.

23
24

Even just a deposit in one more month per year would increase AMND by $3.60.
Participants with more than one actual use were counted once for each use.
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10. Financial Education
IDAs aimed at the poor differ in two main ways from subsidized savings accounts such as IRAs
or 401(k) plans aimed at the non-poor. First, IDA subsidies come exclusively through matches
rather than tax breaks. Second, IDAs come bundled with mandatory financial education.
Indeed, all programs in ADD require participants to complete some financial education.
Does financial education increase savings and asset accumulation? Beverly and Sherraden
(1999) say that “the extent to which an individual understands the process and benefits of asset
accumulation is likely to affect her willingness to save (p. 464).” This chapter discusses
background and evidence from studies outside of ADD, reports on the hours of financial
education attended by ADD participants, and describes evidence of links between savings
outcomes and hours of education in ADD. We find that financial education (up to a point) did
improve savings outcomes.

Background
Financial education aims to increase awareness of saving as a wise choice and to strengthen
future orientation. It conveys the rules of IDAs and practical techniques for how to save. Some
classes discuss how to purchase or manage a large asset. All classes may provide, as a byproduct, an opportunity for participants to give and to receive peer support.
Financial Education in General
Awareness. The goal of financial education is to make people more aware of choices that they
might make and of the probabilities of possible consequences. For example, financial education
might highlight that one can choose to make a budget and then choose to treat monthly deposits
as if they were bills. It might then point out that frequent deposits are more likely to lead to high
asset accumulation than infrequent deposits.
When it comes to saving, people in general—and the poor in particular—probably lack complete
knowledge of choices, chances, and consequences (Bernheim, 1994). The benefits of saving are
long-term, but the costs are short-term. Furthermore, the links between current sacrifice and
future gain are abstract, subtle, and difficult to discern or imagine; even the non-poor, whose
current wealth is ultimately due to saving by someone (perhaps in prior generations) or gifts
from Nature, may not see these links. Of course, the poor have even fewer opportunities to see
how saving might affect long-term well-being. Financial education might move subjective world
views closer to objective reality with discussion, for example, of the long-term costs faced by
home owners versus renters or of the long-term effects of post-secondary education on wages.
An important part of financial education deals with the rules for means-tested public assistance.
For decades, low asset limits sent a message that the poor should not or could not save. Recent
changes in welfare law greatly relaxed asset limits on public assistance—and explicitly exempted
IDA balances from means-tests in some states—but many poor people seem to be unaware of the
changes (Hogarth and Lee, 2000).
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All of this points to the importance of institutions as ways to highlight saving as a choice with
positive outcomes and of ways to remove the constant need to choose to save. If institutions are
in place, then financial education may have a role to help convince people to use them.1 Thus,
non-profit organizations, for-profit firms, and the government offer financial education in the
belief that it helps people to acquire the knowledge of how saving is connected with future
financial well-being.2
Experience from 401(k) plans. Evidence from research on 401(k) plans suggests that financial
education increases saving. In 401(k) plans, financial education may consist of seminars,
newsletters, and/or interactive materials covering topics such as attributes of the plan,
investments and asset allocation, and planning for retirement. More frequent corporatesponsored retirement seminars were associated with both higher participation rates and with
higher levels of contributions to 401(k) plans (Bayer, Bernheim, and Scholz, 1996). The links
were even stronger among non-highly compensated employees.
Bernheim and Garrett (1996) also report positive links between educational offerings and
participation in retirement plans. Participation rates were 12 percentage points higher for
companies that offered financial education. In firms that offered financial education,
participation rates were 20 percentage points higher for employees who chose to attend.
Education increased new savings of all types as a percentage of income by 1.7 percentage points.
This is a large effect. In all cases, effects were greatest for people who saved little before they
received education. People who attended financial education on the job also tended to listen to
friends and family less for financial advice; this may suggest that financial education expands
narrow world views.
Finally, case studies of individual 401(k) plans indicate that increased financial education,
including seminars and newsletters, can greatly increase both participation and the average
percentage of salary deferred by employees (Richardson, 1995; Borleis and Wedell, 1994).
Future orientation. Weak imagination—for all people, poor or non-poor—dampens saving
(Ramsey, 1929).3 The poor may stay poor in part because short-sightedness blinds them to
opportunities to exchange small current costs for large future benefits. Financial education with
IDAs aims not only to make people aware that saving is often a wise choice but also to focus
their attention on the future and to prod them to imagine what they might do and be if they save
1

In this role, financial education resembles informational marketing.
Financial education assumes that people save less than they should. If people can judge what is
best for them, however, then it is wrong—or at least wasteful—to require financial education or
to spend public funds on it. Still, evidence suggests that, after the fact, most people wish that
they had saved more (Lusardi, 2000; Bernheim, 1995). Because increases in the capital stock due
to increased saving have positive social spill-overs, higher saving may benefit society even if it
does not benefit an individual. Although ads bombard Americans with constant appeals to
consume more, some people may worry that public-service campaigns to consume less would
somehow infringe on personal freedom, although few have qualms about government efforts to
increase saving in crises (for example, the “buy bonds” campaign in World War II).
3
At the extreme, people who cannot imagine a tomorrow have no reason to save today.
2
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now. Classes “would be designed to structure people’s thoughts of their own economic life in
the long term” (Sherraden, 1991, p. 204). If people think more about the future, then they may
place greater value on their future well-being. In turn, this decreases the cost of future
consumption in terms of current consumption and thus increases saving.
Although asset ownership may spark greater future orientation because the resources in IDAs
give people something to look forward to (Sherraden, 1991), some degree of future orientation—
as well as beliefs that current choices can affect future outcomes—are required if people are to
save and maintain assets in the first place (Clancy, 1995). One way financial education might
encourage this is through exercises in strategic personal financial planning. To make a plan or to
draw up a budget points thoughts toward the future. Such plans make explicit links between
current choices and future opportunities. Classes might also spark participants to think about the
future simply by asking them to list goals and to describe the requirements to reach them. In
essence, programs that ask participants to think about the future may boost future orientation.
How to save. Even if people know that saving is a wise choice and even if they can imagine its
future benefits, they may still not know how to save effectively. Much financial education in
ADD highlights techniques—whether psychological or behavioral—for how to save.4
Psychological strategies change minds. They are grounded in a conceptual understanding of
resource flows, savings goals, and self-imposed mental constraints. Financial-education classes
may ask participants to set a savings goal, to propose a budget, or to earmark income from some
source (for example, from a second job, or from tax refunds) for saving rather than as “spending
money.” Classes might suggest that participants treat monthly deposits as bills that must be paid
rather than as something done only if money is left over. For example, some programs use
slogans such as “Pay yourself first.” Labels might also set IDA deposits apart from funds seen as
available for consumption (for example, an account might be called a “home buyer’s account”
rather than simply a savings account).
Once minds are changed, behavioral strategies change actions. They aim to make the flesh as
strong as the spirit so as to control consumption, make deposits, and refrain from withdrawals.
Behavioral strategies might include limits on consumption quality (“buy only generic brands”) or
quantity (“buy one coffee a day”). They also include rules to spend more time and effort in
household production (“eat out only once a week” or “clip coupons”). Behavioral strategies also
include commitments that put resources out of reach, for example, to sign up for direct deposit or
automatic transfer, to choose to receive EITC in a lump-sum or to withhold too much income
tax, to cut up ATM cards or credit cards, to wait to cash checks, or to lock funds up in an account
that offers a substantial penalty for early withdrawal.5 Another behavioral strategy is to work
more in the labor market.

4

This paragraph and the next two are based on Beverly, Moore, and Schreiner (2001).
Data from a cross-sectional survey and from case studies suggest that ADD participants believe
that they do learn psychological and behavioral techniques from financial-education classes
(Moore et al., 2000).
5
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Financial Education in IDAs
General Financial Education. In IDAs, general financial education may include topics such as
how to make a budget, how to manage money, and how to repair a tarnished credit record. The
classes may also teach psychological and behavioral strategies meant to help participants to
make deposits and to maintain balances. General financial education may also include individual
sessions to encourage participants to set savings goals.
IDA rules. IDAs are more complex than standard passbook savings accounts. If participants are
to take full advantage of IDA incentives, then they must learn the rules. Some classes explain,
among other things, the wait period, the match cap, the match-cap structure, the time cap, what
uses are matchable, the requirements for financial education, and how IDA balances relate to
asset limits for those who receive public assistance.
Asset-specific education. The general financial education described so far deals with saving in
general and with IDAs in particular. In contrast, asset-specific education deals with the purchase
and management of large assets with the proceeds of IDAs. For example, programs believe that
it would be unwise to help participants to save to buy a house but then cut them loose to househunt and to deal with real-estate agents and loan officers on their own. Likewise, participants
who plan to use IDAs for microenterprise might benefit from advice meant to ensure that they do
not start a business that is likely to fail quickly and make them worse off than if they had not
saved in the first place. Participants who plan for post-secondary education or job training may
want help to choose a school or course of study, and people who plan to make home repairs may
want referrals to contractors. Finally, people who invest IDAs in retirement accounts may want
advice about financial products or the best mix of stocks and bonds.
Asset-specific education may be useful because non-financial assets are more difficult to
purchase, manage, and maintain than financial balances in a bank account. For example, the
process of home ownership does not end but rather starts with the downpayment; buyers usually
commit to monthly mortgage payments (and maintenance costs, and property taxes) for the next
30 years. Thus, education for home purchase often involves one-on-one counseling to ensure
that the participants can demonstrate creditworthiness and potential future income sufficient to
repay debt. Education for microenterprise also has a large preventative component.6 Even
education for post-secondary education aims in part to steer participants clear of diploma mills.
Peer support. Like any group of students, IDA participants can learn a lot from each other.
Because financial education brings participants together, they may produce social capital as a byproduct. Classmates also provide examples, both when they make matched withdrawals and
reach their goals and when they make unmatched withdrawals or drop out. The class becomes a
reference point for a world view in which saving is the norm and at least some people succeed.

6

Schreiner (1999a) and Balkin (1989) argue that microenterprise classes should first ensure that
participants understand the risks that they face and then provide on-call help rather than try to
immunize entrepreneurs against all possible problems up-front.
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Challenges. Financial education has costs both for participants and for programs.7 For example,
time after work is scarce for participants, who may also lack good, inexpensive child care. To
adjust, programs hold classes at night or on weekends, and sometimes provide snacks and
babysitters. Programs might also need to convince some participants that classes can help,
especially if they did not find school useful in the past. Also, some IDA participants may lack
strong skills in math, reading, and/or English. Programs may accommodate, for example with
classes in Spanish or with exercises based on guided discussions of life experiences rather than
on abstract ideas from books or lectures. Lessons must put the obscure, abstract, and complex
language of finance in clear, concrete, and simple terms but yet convey the correct message.
Programs must work to ensure that the message of classes does not get lost in cultural gaps.
Education also has financial costs for programs because it uses a lot of skilled labor. This
matters because—with matches excluded—financial costs in ADD were in the range of $3 per $1
of net deposits (Chapter 6). This level of costs would drown a broad, large-scale IDA program.
We do not know what portion of these costs are due to the supply of education; still, classes may
be at the top of the list of things to cut to contain costs, and if for-profit financial-service firms
house IDAs, then they are unlikely to offer comparable education. Financial education may have
high costs; it may also have large effects on saving behavior. More research and better data are
required to ensure that education is effective and efficient and to check whether the benefits
outweigh the costs.
All ADD programs require some financial education. This presumes that IDA participants are
not already well-informed on the subject matter. This is probably the case for some people, but
one size does not fit all, and participants might gain more if classes were tailored to what they
already know when they enroll (Moore et al., 2001). Unless IDA participants lack crucial
knowledge, it is inconsistent to require them to go to class when savings subsidies for the nonpoor have no such requirements.
Required attendance also short-circuits some forms of feedback that might otherwise signal the
need to improve classes (Schreiner and Morduch, forthcoming). For example, if participants
want matched withdrawals, then they must attend classes; they cannot vote with their feet. The
lack of explicit non-time costs to participants also decreases feedback. This does not encourage
the constant, small adjustments that lead to healthy improvement (Schreiner, 1995). Some
evidence suggests that voluntary attendance and small, symbolic fees help to ensure that
participants do not put up with classes that they find useless (Schor and Alberti, 1999).
Classes may also serve a latent targeting role. They increase the cost of participation in terms of
time, and this may screen out less-poor people who, compared with the very poor, have less time
relative to non-time resources (Besley and Kanbur, 1991). Classes may also have a latent
political role; in exchange for subsidies for IDAs, some taxpayers may want to reform what they
see as the poor habits of the poor.

7

Clancy (1996) makes many of the points in this paragraph.
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Financial Education in ADD
In ADD, financial education has many facets, and curricula vary by program. The framework
includes IDA rules, basic financial education, and a place for peer support. The asset-specific
component aims to help participants to purchase and to manage assets bought with IDAs.
Financial education at the program level. All 14 programs in ADD offer general financial
education and asset-specific classes for home purchase and microenterprise. Ten programs offer
classes for post-secondary education, and five programs offer other asset-specific classes.
All 14 programs require that participants take some general financial education. Some programs
require these classes before an enrollee can open an account, and others require them before a
matched withdrawal. Seven programs require asset-specific classes for home purchase or
microenterprise, and three require asset-specific classes for other types of matched withdrawals.
At the program level, mean required hours of general financial education was 13, with a low of 6
(CAPTC Small-scale) and a high of 45 (HAFS, Table 10.1). Microenterprise (12) had the
highest mean required hours in the asset-specific group with home purchase second (8).8
Table 10.1 Hours of Financial Education Required in ADD
Type
General Financial Education
Asset-specific Education
Homeownership
Microenterprise
Education
Other

Mean
13

Median
10

Min.
6

Max.
45

8
12
2
0.2

6
12
1
0

0
0
0
0

40
33
13
1

ADD programs determined how many hours of financial education they would offer and require.
At least in some cases, these requirements reflect what staff expected of the saving behavior of
members of their particular target group. For example, if staff believed that participants would
enroll with little financial knowledge and/or would save little, then they may have required more
hours of financial education. If these beliefs were somewhat accurate, if these beliefs were based
at least in part on participant characteristics that affect saving and that were observed by staff but
are unobserved in the data set, and if programs enforced their requirements for financial
education, then this could induce a spurious negative correlation between net deposits and hours
of financial education attended by participants. That is, people whose unobserved characteristics
predisposed them to low savings—with or without financial education—might also have been
required to attend more hours. Analyses of the association between net deposits and hours of
financial education could then confuse the effects of education with the effects of unobserved
factors that dampen saving. In this case, the estimated effect of financial education would be

8

The figures for CAAB are rough averages across members in the collaborative.
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biased downward and could even be negative, especially for people who attend many hours of
classes.9
The ADD programs selected or developed their own curricula and chose the form of sessions, for
example, as seminars, workshops, peer-discussion groups, or one-on-one counseling. The ADD
data, however, do not record the form of the class, the student/teacher ratio, the content of
sessions, the types of materials used, or the quality of content or of teaching. Rather, the data
cover only hours required and hours attended. All hours of financial education are not the same,
but the analysis here must assume that they are.
Financial education at the participant level. Before we describe hours of financial education
attended, some notes on the data are in order. Program staff enter the hours attended by
participants on an ad hoc basis. Some programs enter data after each class session; other
programs made one entry for all hours attended by a participant.10 Furthermore, sometimes
partner organizations provide financial education, and the ADD program may not always receive
Also, for some participants (especially those in
a complete attendance record.11
microenterprise), programs counted large numbers of hours of asset-specific education attended
elsewhere, sometimes before enrollment in ADD. In addition, the notes in MIS IDA do not
always clearly mark classes as general-financial or asset-specific. In sum, despite persistent
efforts to ensure complete, clean data, hours were under-reported for some participants and overreported for others.
General financial education. All programs in ADD require some general financial education.
Participants must complete the requirements before they make a matched withdrawal.12 As of
June 30, 2000, 81 percent of the participants had attended general financial-education classes
(Table 10.2). Most participants (65 percent) had one to twelve hours recorded, 16 percent had 13
hours or more, and 14 percent were explicitly recorded as having no hours. About five percent
had no records in MIS IDA and were counted as missing.13 Mean attendance was 10.4 hours,
with a low of zero and a high of 35.

9

Bernheim and Garrett (1996) discuss a similar two-way causation problem in the context the
effects of financial education in the workplace. In a sample of ADD participants, Moore et al.
(2001) find that those who said that they liked financial-education classes saved less than others.
That paper speculates that those who liked classes may have started with the most to learn, and
that the others found the classes remedial. Even if classes shrunk the gap in pre-enrollment
financial knowledge, liking classes could seem to decrease saving.
10
We asked the programs to provide complete data on hours and to distinguish explicitly
between cases with zero hours and cases with unknown hours.
11
This is particularly true for CAAB, one of the two collaborative programs. (EBALDC, the
other collaborative, does all general financial education itself.)
12
Participants at both programs at CAPTC and some participants at CAAB must complete some
requirements before they open an account.
13
Participants without recorded hours were counted as missing (rather than as zero) because
some hours attended may not have been recorded.
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Table 10.2 Hours of General Financial Education Attended
Hours
Zero
1 to 6
7 to 12
13 to 18
19 to 35
Missing

Percentage
13
20
45
11
5
5

If all programs in ADD require general financial education, how can 14 percent of participants
have zero hours? First, for most participants, participation is not over. The analysis here
assumes that all participants took all hours of financial education at the moment of enrollment,
but in fact attendance takes place over time, and some participants have not taken all the classes
that they will take. Second, most participants with zero hours (52 percent) have exited without a
matched withdrawal. For them, zero hours is valid. Third, 98 percent of the 48 percent of active
participants with zero hours as of June 30, 2000, had not made a matched withdrawal. Thus,
zero hours is possible for them. Four participants had a matched withdrawal and zero hours; for
them, programs either did not record hours properly or did not enforce requirements.
About 39 percent of participants active as of June 30, 2000, had not yet completed their
requirements for general financial education. On average, these participants were 9.4 hours short
of the 11.4 hours required. The shortfall does not appear to be due to lack of opportunity to take
classes; mean length of participation for this group was about 12 months.
Asset-specific education. Some ADD programs require asset-specific education before a
matched withdrawal. As of June 30, 2000, 22 percent of participants had some asset-specific
classes recorded (Table 10.3). Most of these had attended 1 to 6 hours. Asset-specific hours
were low in part because participants usually take general financial education first and in part
because they may not have participated long enough to take much asset-specific education.
Mean hours (conditional on not being missing) was 10.7, with a low of zero and a high of 90.
Table 10.3 Hours of Asset-specific Financial Education
Hours
Zero
1 to 6
7 to 12
13 to 18
19 to 90
Missing

Percentage
0
14
4
1
3
77

Most participants (77 percent) had no record of asset-specific hours and were counted as
missing. Most of these participants probably had zero hours; they were counted as missing
because some of these cases may have had positive hours that had not been recorded.
It seems that some asset-specific hours had not been recorded. For example, 92 percent of
participants with matched withdrawals for home purchase at sites that require some asset-specific
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hours had missing hours or too-few hours. For post-secondary education, the figure is 92
percent; for microenterprise, 95 percent; and for other uses, 53 percent. In addition, the
requirements for asset-specific education reported in MIS IDA may be inaccurate, and/or
programs may not have enforced requirements. The data on general financial education are
better than the data on asset-specific education.

The Association of Financial Education with Saving
As stated at the beginning of the chapter, financial education might increase saving in several
ways. Even if financial education does not help, it probably does no harm.14 Financial education
has costs, however, so the mere presence of positive effects is not enough to justify it. How
much does an hour of financial education help? And how many hours are optimal?
Effects in bivariate comparisons. Tables 10.4 through 10.7 describe the relationship between
hours of general financial education and average monthly net deposits (AMND), deposit
frequency, net deposits as a percentage of the pro-rated match cap, and the savings rate. The
analyses focus only on general financial education because asset-specific data are probably
incomplete and because asset-specific education deals with the use of savings rather than with
saving itself. We do not present statistical tests because these bivariate comparisons do not
control for other factors that might be correlated both with hours of financial education and with
savings outcomes; we present statistical tests later when we control for other factors.
Table 10.4 shows that average monthly net deposits were lower for people with zero hours
($8.01) than for people with 1 to 6 hours ($20.38). People with 7 to 12 hours had even higher
AMND ($32.55). More hours after that were associated with small decreases in AMND—
people with 13 to 18 hours had $26.88, and people with 19 to 35 hours had $30.48. That is,
AMND increased sharply as hours of general financial attendance increased from zero to 12,
after which it leveled off.15

14

The effect might be negative if knowledge transferred were incorrect or useless. The effect
might be zero if participants “are uninterested, unmotivated, unable to understand, or already
well-informed” (Bernheim and Garrett, 1996, p. 17). Furthermore, financial education might
seem to decrease saving if people inclined to save less also take more financial education. This
might happen if programs boost requirements to compensate for factors that they observe but that
are not recorded in the data.
15
People with missing hours saved $19.13; perhaps some of their hours were not recorded, or
perhaps they skipped or were excused from classes precisely because they did not need them.
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Table 10.4 Average Monthly Net Deposit
by Hours of General Financial Education
Hours

N

Missing
Zero
1 to 6
7 to 12
13 to 18
19 to 35

129
314
479
1,080
253
123

All ADD

2,378

Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($)
Max. ($)
19.13
7.62
0.00
250.00
8.01
0.00
0.00
85.71
20.38
12.04
-0.22
150.00
32.55
26.09
0.00
250.00
26.88
24.44
0.00
115.38
30.48
20.12
0.00
172.69
25.42

17.96

-0.22

250.00

According to Table 10.5, the percentage of months in which participants make a deposit
increased with the number of general-education hours until it peaks at 64 percent in the range of
7 to 12 hours. From this point onward, more hours were associated with a slight decline in
deposit frequency. This is the same pattern observed for financial education and AMND in
Table 10.4.
Table 10.5 Deposit Frequency by Hours of General Financial Education
(Months with a Deposit/Months of Participation)
Hours

N

Missing
Zero
1 to 6
7 to 12
13 to 18
19 to 35

129
314
479
1,080
253
123

All ADD

2,378

Mean (%) Median (%) Min. (%) Max. (%)
45
38
6
100
39
33
0
100
57
58
4
100
64
67
4
100
60
59
0
100
58
53
6
100
58

57

0

100

Table 10.6 shows that net deposits as a percentage of the pro-rated match cap increases as
general education increases. Participants in the group for whom the effect is largest—those with
19 to 35 hours—are on track to use 95 percent of their total lifetime match eligibility.
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Table 10.6 Net Deposits as a Percentage of the Pro-rated Match Cap
by Hours of General Financial Education
Hours

N

Missing
Zero
1 to 6
7 to 12
13 to 18
19 to 35

129
314
479
1,080
253
123

All ADD

2,378

Mean (%) Median (%) Min. (%) Max. (%)
59
25
0
600
27
0
0
343
41
22
0
300
85
72
0
600
84
80
0
378
95
100
0
509
67

49

0

600

The savings rate (net deposits as a percentage of income) increases rapidly as participants go
from zero to 12 hours, peaks at 2.9 percent, and then decreases (Table 10.7).
Table 10.7 Savings Rate
by Hours of General Financial Education
Hours

N

Missing
Zero
1 to 6
7 to 12
13 to 18
19 to 35

125
312
463
1,055
246
120

All ADD

2,321

Mean (%) Median (%) Min. (%) Max. (%)
1.7
0.7
0.0
36
0.7
0.0
0.0
11
1.8
0.9
0.0
71
2.9
1.9
0.0
107
2.3
1.7
0.0
13
2.5
1.6
0.0
15
2.2

1.3

0.0

107

In summary, savings outcomes appeared to improve as the number of hours recorded for general
financial education increased from zero to 12. Except for net deposits as a percentage of the prorated match cap, outcomes leveled off or diminished once the number of hours exceeded 12.
Effects in multivariate comparisons. Bivariate results are not conclusive because they do not
control for factors that might be correlated both with hours of general financial education and
with savings outcomes. This section describes results that control for other observed factors, in
particular, for exit status and for length of participation. This matters because new participants
or people who exit will have fewer hours. If these people also save differently for reasons
unrelated to financial education,16 then bivariate analyses confuse the effects of financial
education with the effects of the length of participation and/or with whatever causes exit without
a matched withdrawal. The results below are derived from the second step of the Heckman two-

16

Chapter 9 suggests that new participants have higher AMND. Of course, people who exit
without a matched withdrawal have AMND of zero.
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Figure 10.1 Effect of Hours of General Financial Education on AMND
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step regression on AMND that controls for exit, length of participation, and many other observed
factors (Chapter 9).17
Figure 10.1 shows the link between AMND and hours of general financial education.18 In the
range of 1 to 6 hours, each additional hour was associated with a $1.20 increase in AMND. This
implies that, all else constant, a participant with six hours of general financial education would
have $6 more AMND than a participant with one hour. From 7 to 12 hours, the increase for each
hour is $0.56, also a large effect. All else constant, a participant with 12 hours has $9.40 more
AMND than a participant with one hour. From 13 hours to 18 hours, each hour was associated
with a $0.70 decrease in AMND. Additional hours beyond 18 were linked with an increase in
AMND of $0.54.
Why would the effects peak at 12 hours? If education has diminishing returns, then its effects
might reach a plateau, but they need not turn negative. As discussed above, perhaps programs
require more hours from participants who would tend to save less anyway. If the additional

17

Although this regression is the best way to control for observed factors with the data at hand
that we know of, it is not perfect. In particular, it might be that education causes saving, but also
that saving causes education. The model here, however assumes one-way causation. If the
relationship is two-way, then the estimated effects of financial education on AMND here are
probably overstated.
18
Figure 10.1 is derived from regression coefficients in Table 9.1 in Chapter 9. The coefficients
have p-values between 0.08 and 0.14.
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Figure 10.2 Effect of Hours of Asset-specific Financial Education on AMND
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education does not completely compensate, then the peaked pattern of Figure 10.1 could appear.
The more prosaic data issues discussed in this chapter may also cause the peaked pattern.
Figure 10.2 shows the estimated association between hours of asset-specific education and
AMND. Given the possibility that these hours were underreported, we do not want to put too
much emphasis on these results. Each asset-specific hour in the range from 1 to 6 was associated
with an increase in AMND of $2.50. This is a large effect, and statistically significant with 99percent confidence. From 7 to 12 hours, each hour was associated with a decrease in AMND of
$1.80. This effect is also large and statistically significant. After a participant had 12 assetspecific hours, additional hours did not seem to have much effect.19 This plateau could be due to
diminishing returns, data issues, or mutual causation between hours required and unobserved
characteristics than affect saving. As with general financial education, some hours of assetspecific education increased AMND by large amounts but, after a point, the association became
negative. The asset-specific results, however, merit less trust than the general-financial results.
In summary, these results broadly suggest that, at least to some point between 7 and 12 hours,
financial education had large, positive effects on savings. After a point, the effects either leveled
off or became negative, although many factors besides additional financial education may
explain the apparent downturn.
Data issues. The analysis here is based on recorded hours of financial education as of June 30,
2000. Hours may be over-reported, under-reported, and/or misclassified between general19

Most people with more than 12 asset-specific hours plan to use their IDAs for microenterprise.
Given that some hours for some participants were completed outside of the IDA program and
perhaps even before enrollment, we do not place too much faith in these estimates.
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financial and asset-specific. Participants had not taken all hours that they will take, and the
analysis may not completely control for links between exit, financial education, and net deposits.
Just as importantly, the data include only hours of attendance, not quality of hours. The analysis
omits the type of educational materials, the form of instruction, the quality of content, the
cultural appropriateness of presentations, and the skill of instructors. It cannot control for the
financial knowledge of participants before they take classes, nor for possible links between hours
required and unobserved characteristics that influence saving. These weaknesses are unusual
only in their acknowledgement, but they do limit the strength of the results. If financial
education is to remain a central part of IDAs, more research and better data are needed.

Financial Education and Policy
A key difference between IDAs and other subsidized-savings programs is that IDAs require
financial education. Theory suggests that financial education should increase saving, and
program staff and participants say that they believe that financial education is crucial.
This chapter is the first quantitative look at the effects of financial education with IDAs. The
results seem to suggest that a few hours of general financial education increased saving a lot (in
the range of one dollar of AMND for each hour of financial education up to 12 hours), although
the effects may diminish or reverse as hours increase. Results for asset-specific education were
similar but subject to stronger caveats on the data.
Even if these results are affirmed in future research, we do not know whether the benefits of
financial education exceed the costs. The results merely suggest that there are benefits. Results
suggest that short courses—which cost less than long courses—may still have large effects.
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11. Income and Saving
This chapter looks at the relationships between income and savings and between income and the
savings rate. The savings rate—defined as average monthly net deposits divided by monthly
household income—shows how much participants save relative to current income.
For IDA participants in ADD, we find that savings did not increase with income and that the
savings rate decreased with income. Although the data do not reveal exactly what caused this,
we believe that institutional factors overwhelmed economic factors, and that institutional factors
mattered even more for the very poor than for the less-poor.
We first discuss some key questions and theory. We then look at the income of participants in
ADD and its distribution by source. Following this, we present tabulations of different savings
outcomes by income. Finally, we present and discuss results of regression analyses.

Issues and Theory
Discussions of IDAs in policy and practice often assume that very poor people cannot save
because their income is too low. Do theory and evidence support this assumption?
Economic theory. Economic theory predicts that the absolute amount of savings will increase
with income. This is because people with more income have more resources available to save.
Evidence suggests that income and savings are indeed positively correlated (Wolff, 1998).
Economic theory also predicts that savings relative to income (the savings rate) will increase
with income (Deaton, 1992b). This occurs because people with more income also tend to
consume more. As they consume more, the additional benefit from additional consumption
decreases. The current cost of saving (in terms of foregone benefits from consumption) is lower
for people who consume more, and this increases savings.
Like all theory, however, this one ignores some important issues. For example, the level and rate
of savings also depend on expected variation in income and subsistence requirements. The poor
face greater risks, and this tends to increase their saving, both absolutely and relative to their
income. The poor saved less in the past (if not, then they would not be poor), but they may or
may not have saved at higher rates (relative to resources available in excess of subsistence
requirements). Also, the poor may save at higher rates when they save but dissave at higher rates
when they dissave.
Institutional theory. Institutional theory suggests that factors other than income and
preferences may influence saving behavior and that low savings by poor people might be partly
explained by limited access to institutional saving opportunities (Sherraden, 1991). Relevant
institutional features may include incentives, information, access, and facilitation (Beverly and
Sherraden, 1999). For example, automatic deposit facilitates saving. In IDAs, the match cap and
program expectations may also play a role. All else constant, the institutional aspects of IDAs
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are expected to serve to increase savings (Chapter 1). Although much work looks at the
effectiveness of savings incentives (subsidies), few studies test the effects of other institutional
features. A central question of research is the relative importance of income and institutions for
savings in IDAs and for total savings in all forms. Unfortunately, the current data do not yield
answers, but we can shed some light on the questions.
Will the poor save too much in IDAs? By definition, saving postpones consumption. In the
short term, people who save consume less (and are worse off, all else constant) than non-savers.
Savers make the short-term sacrifice because they expect it to improve long-term well-being.
Of course, saving can be overdone. For very poor people close to subsistence, increased saving
might reduce consumption to the point of death. For poor people whose resources exceed
subsistence requirements by a wider margin, increased saving may be harmful even if not fatal.
For example, it would be harmful if a family saved so much that they could not buy enough food
for the healthy development of their children. Likewise, it would be harmful if a family saved
but did not go to the doctor to set a broken arm or to get antibiotics for a severe infection.
An important question (not addressed in this report) is whether saving in IDAs might reduce
short-term consumption so much that the poor suffer hardship. We have listened for this
possibility in talks with program staff and in surveys and in-depth interviews with participants.
We have heard at least one anecdotal account from program staff where someone might have
saved too much. For the most part, however, participants in IDAs do not report that their saving
causes hardship (Moore et al., 2001). Participation in IDAs and the level of savings are
voluntary; participants decide whether they want to save and how much to save. There is almost
no evidence that matches in IDAs entice participants to save to the point of harm.1

Measurement of Income and Savings
Savings data. Data on savings in ADD are accurate because they come from account statements
from financial institutions (Appendix B). They are likely the best data yet (and perhaps the only
data) on deposits and withdrawals by the poor in a matched-savings program.
Income data. Our empirical work is subject to several sources of possible bias, all of which
would tend to mask possible positive correlations between income and savings and between
income and the savings rate. Some of the issues deal with the income data. Income data in most
surveys are measured with error and are underreported, and data on income for ADD may have
more measurement error and be more underreported than usual. Even if income data were
perfect, however, several other sources of bias would remain, and are listed below.

1

As a policy principle, if the rich have subsidies to save, then it is a matter of fairness that the
poor also have them, and then all people can make their own choices.
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The question about income in MIS IDA asked for “monthly gross income of household by
source.”2 We do not know exactly how the participants interpreted “monthly.” For example,
some may have answered with their average monthly household income in the past calendar year
or with their average monthly income in the 12 months before enrollment. Others may have
given their income in the month of enrollment or in a typical or average month.
MIS IDA is an administrative tool, a management-information system, and MIS IDA data were
collected not by trained enumerators but by staff of the IDA programs in ADD. Furthermore,
IDAs are means-tested on income, and participants at enrollment may have believed that they
had incentives to understate their income.
At the largest program in ADD (19 percent of participants), income data were patched together
from several sources, and the questions used were not exactly the same as those in MIS IDA.
Social research often finds that very poor people understate their income more than less-poor
people. In ADD, the very poor cannot proportionately understate IDA savings because MIS IDA
tracks savings accurately. This tends to overstate savings rates for the poorest.
Income varies from month to month, but we measure monthly income only once. Thus, such
monthly data probably has more variation than would annual data.3 Variation in income may
also be especially large for the poor (Deaton, 1997). Beyond measurement error, variation
through time introduces a more subtle bias. Because people have more resources available to
save when income is higher, they are more likely to enroll in months when income is unusually
high. If their income then regresses to its long-term mean in subsequent months, people with
high reported monthly income at enrollment will appear to have lower savings rates. In the same
way, people who happened to enroll in months of low income will progress to the mean and have
higher apparent savings rates.
People may also be more likely to enroll if they expect their future income to increase (because
this reduces the expected cost of future saving). In other words, IDAs may catch some people on
their way up. If so, then income at enrollment is lower than in subsequent months, so the savings
rate in terms of income at enrollment is higher than the savings rate in terms of average income
in all months of participation. The economy has been good during the study period, so this effect
might matter for some people whose incomes unexpectedly increased.4
The match cap may hide links between income and savings (or savings rates) because it
constrains observed savings for high savers. For example, someone who wants to save 5 percent
($1,000) of an annual income of $20,000 will be constrained by a $300 annual match cap to save
1.5 percent of income. Someone with annual income of $10,000 who wants to save 3 percent of
income will save $300, exactly the desired amount. In this example, the observed correlation
2

An ideal measure of income would be net of subsistence requirements and net of taxes (for IDA
participants in particular, it would record EITC payments). This ideal data does not exist.
3
This measurement error would tend to drive statistical relationships toward zero. In this sense,
measurement error makes statistically significant findings all the more strong.
4
The regression analyses use income data as of enrollment to avoid issues of two-way causation.
Some programs later updated income data, and the descriptive statistics use this data if it exists.
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between income and savings rate is negative (and the observed correlation between income and
savings is zero), even though the true correlation in both cases is positive.
These biases will tend to mask a positive correlation between income and savings. Thus, a
positive estimated link between income and savings would be a very strong finding. A negative
(or zero) estimated link would be weaker because these biases might explain all or part of it.

Income of Participants in ADD
As of June 30, 2000, mean monthly household income of participants in ADD was $1,474
(median $1,340, Table 11.1).5 About 8 percent of participants had monthly income of $499 or
less (Figure 11.1). Most participants (68 percent) had monthly income between $500 and
$1,999, and 22 percent had income of $2,000 or more.
Recurrent Income
Recurrent income (wages, government benefits, pensions, and investments) was 83 percent of
total income and had a mean value of $1,229 (median $1,199, Table 11.1). About 78 percent of
participants received wages, and 26 percent received government benefits. In terms of value, 67
percent of income came from wages and 14 percent from government benefits.
Do IDAs work only for relatively advantaged, employed poor people? Although most
participants in ADD were employed, these data cannot address this question. Most programs in
ADD target the “working poor” and make employment a prerequisite for participation. Given
that the unemployed were usually ineligible, their low numbers in ADD say little about whether
IDAs appeal to employed people more than to unemployed people. For policy, it would be
useful to know who would enroll in IDAs if all poor people had access, but the data from ADD
cannot shed light on this question.
About 2 percent of participants in ADD had income from pensions, and 1 percent had income
from investments. These two sources together were less than 1 percent of the value of income.
These figures fit with the ideas that most of the elderly poor did not have jobs with pension
benefits6 and that the poor in general are unlikely to hold investments that generate income.
Intermittent Income
Intermittent income (self-employment, child support, gifts, and other sources) for participants in
ADD was 18 percent of total income and had a mean monthly value of $253.

5
6

This data comes from the most recent record in MIS IDA, not the at-enrollment record.
Of 16 people aged 65 or more in ADD, 5 reported income from pensions.
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Figure 11.1 Distribution of Income for Participants in ADD
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Table 11.1 Monthly Household Income of Participants by Source
Mean Median Min.
($)
($)
($)
1,078
1,034
0
133
0
0
11
0
0
4
0
0
1,229
1,199
0

Max.
($)
Missing
6,260
0
3,400
0
2,000
0
5,000
41
6,760
41

Participants
with an
Income
Source (%)
78
26
2
1
90

Distribution
of Total
Income by
Source (%)
67
14
1
0
82

Income Source
Wages
Government Benefits
Pensions
Investments
Recurrent Sources

N
2,378
2,378
2,378
2,337
2,337

Self-employment
Child Support
Gifts
Other Sources
Intermittent Sources

2,378
2,378
2,378
2,378
2,378

132
50
17
55
253

0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0

4,965
1,833
2,400
3,514
4,965

0
0
0
0
0

16
15
5
10
38

9
4
1
4
18

Total Income

2,337

1,474

1,340

0

6,760

41

99

100

Income/Poverty

2,337

1.13

1.04

0.00

7.09

41
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About 16 percent of participants reported self-employment income. This figure—much higher
than that of the overall population—probably results from two factors. First, many of the host
organizations in ADD also sponsor microenterprise programs and may refer people in these
programs to the IDA program. Second, IDAs probably attract entrepreneurial people, in part
because microenterprise is a matchable use.7 About 19 percent of participants in ADD reported
that they owned a business, and 18 percent reported that they planned a matched withdrawal for
microenterprise. Self-employment income was 9 percent of total income (for self-employed
people, it was half of total income). 8
About 15 percent of participants received child support (42 percent of all participants are single
females with children). About five percent received income from gifts, and 10 percent had
income from other sources. Together, these three sources were 9 percent of total income.
Distribution of Income
On average, income was 111 percent of the household-size-adjusted poverty line (Table 11.1).
Median income/poverty was 100 percent; the typical ADD participant was just above the poverty
line. About 21 percent of participants were below 50 percent of the poverty line (Figure 11.2).
Tabulations of Savings Outcomes by Income
This section looks at the relationship between income (for ten groups) and four savings
outcomes: average monthly net deposits (AMND), deposit frequency, net deposits as a
percentage of the pro-rated match cap, and the savings rate.
Average monthly net deposits (AMND). Average net deposits per month of participation in
ADD was $25.42, with a range from $16.37 for the lowest income group to $36.89 for the
highest (Table 11.2). In general, AMND increased with income. The increase in savings,
however, did not keep pace with the increase in income. If the lowest group and the highest
group are set aside, then income for the middle eight groups ranges from about $800 to about
$2,400 (an increase of 200 percent) but AMND ranges from $22.48 to $30.92 (an increase of less
than 50 percent). More income seems to increase savings but to decrease the savings rate. This
simple tabulation does not control, however, for factors that may be correlated with both AMND
and income. We discuss below the results of a test that includes many controls.

7
8

We cannot test this because referrals to IDA programs are disproportionately self-employed.
This income is “intermittent” because it is highly variable, even for the full-time self-employed.
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Figure 11.2 Distribution of Income/poverty for Participants in ADD
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Note: Income/poverty is measured with the most-recent data in MIS IDA. With the at-enrollment data, 8.5 percent
of participants had income at of above 200 percent of the poverty line.

Table 11.2 Average Monthly Net Deposit
and Savings Rate by Decile of Income
Income
Missing
$0 to $559
$560 to $799
$800 to $995
$996 to $1,199
$1,200 to $1,326
$1,327 to $1,515
$1,516 to $1,759
$1,760 to $1,999
$2,000 to $2,459
$2,460 to $6,628
All ADD

N
41
233
234
234
230
235
236
233
231
230
241
2,378

Mean ($) Median ($)
34.28
31.03
16.37
6.67
22.48
14.91
21.36
18.06
22.11
15.29
23.00
15.14
25.08
15.00
28.01
21.33
26.12
19.01
30.92
21.89
36.89
30.00
25.42

17.96
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Min. ($)
0.00
0.00
-0.22
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Max. ($)
150.00
122.74
250.00
125.56
125.50
187.50
174.55
143.90
142.86
213.33
250.00

-0.22

250.00
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Table 11.3 Deposit Frequency by Monthly Income
(Months with a Deposit/Months of Participation)
Income
Missing
$0 to $559
$560 to $799
$800 to $995
$996 to $1,199
$1,200 to $1,326
$1,327 to $1,515
$1,516 to $1,759
$1,760 to $1,999
$2,000 to $2,459
$2,460 to $6,628
All ADD

N
41
233
234
234
230
235
236
233
231
230
241
2,378

Mean (%) Median (%) Min. (%) Max. (%)
76
83
29
100
50
48
4
100
56
54
0
100
56
54
0
100
57
58
0
100
55
50
0
100
60
60
6
100
60
63
6
100
57
57
0
100
58
60
5
100
65
67
7
100
58

57

0

100

Deposit frequency. Deposit frequency is the share of months with a deposit. On average,
participants made deposits in 58 percent of months (7 months per year, Table 11.3). Means
ranged from 50 percent for the lowest group to 65 percent for the highest. For the middle eight
groups, deposit frequency does not have a clear trend, and its range is small (56 percent to 60
percent). In this simple table, income does not have a strong link with deposit frequency.
Net deposits as a percentage of the pro-rated match cap. This measure is the ratio of AMND
to the monthly savings target. The monthly savings target is the total match cap divided by the
time cap. If deposited each month and not removed as an unmatched withdrawal, this level of
savings would lead to net deposits equal to the lifetime match cap by the end of participation.
For ADD, mean net deposits as a percentage of the pro-rated match cap were 67 percent (median
49 percent, Table 11.4). At this pace, the average participant will have net deposits of 2 dollars
for every 3 dollars that could have be matched by the end of ADD; the typical participant will
have net deposits of 1 dollar for every 2 dollars that could be matched.
Across income groups (Table 11.4), the mean ranges from 53 percent for the lowest group to 85
percent for the highest group. Groups 2 through 6 have figures in a narrow range from 61 to 65
percent, but the measure jumps to 70 percent or more for the four highest groups. Roughly,
people with more income use a larger share of their match eligibility.
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Table 11.4 Net Deposits as a Percentage of Pro-Rated Match Cap by
Decile of Income
Income
Missing
$0 to $559
$560 to $799
$800 to $995
$996 to $1,199
$1,200 to $1,326
$1,327 to $1,515
$1,516 to $1,759
$1,760 to $1,999
$2,000 to $2,459
$2,460 to $6,628
All ADD

N
41
233
234
234
230
235
236
233
231
230
241
2,378

Mean (%) Median (%) Min. (%) Max. (%)
76
81
0
240
53
20
0
511
65
47
0
600
63
43
0
325
62
46
0
502
64
42
0
600
61
43
0
343
70
50
0
378
69
55
0
382
78
68
0
509
85
79
0
600
67

49

0

600

Savings rate. As income increases, the savings rate decreases (Table 11.5). Participants in the
lowest income group saved 5.6 percent of their income in IDAs, while participants in the highest
income group saved 1.2 percent. The trend holds for the middle eight income groups (from 3.4
percent for the second group to 1.4 percent for the ninth). This pattern reflects the small increase
in AMND associated with large changes in income (Table 11.2).
Table 11.5 Savings Rate (Average Monthly Net Deposits as a
Percentage of Monthly Income)
Income
Missing
$0 to $559
$560 to $799
$800 to $995
$996 to $1,199
$1,200 to $1,326
$1,327 to $1,515
$1,516 to $1,759
$1,760 to $1,999
$2,000 to $2,459
$2,460 to $6,628
All ADD

N
118
217
234
234
230
235
236
233
231
230
241
2,321

Mean (%) Median (%) Min. (%) Max. (%)
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
5.6
2.3
0.0
107
3.4
2.4
0.0
36
2.4
2.0
0.0
15
2.1
1.5
0.0
13
1.8
1.2
0.0
16
1.7
1.1
0.0
12
1.7
1.3
0.0
8
1.4
1.0
0.0
8
1.4
1.0
0.0
9
1.2
0.9
0.0
7
2.2

1.3

0.0

107

This simple tabulation ignores the possibility that the apparent patterns may be due to luck,
through sampling variation. To check this, Figure 11.3 shows the mean savings rate for the ten
income groups, with lines above and below to mark plus and minus one standard error. The
standard errors are large (because the savings rate varies a lot within each income group), so we
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cannot say with a high degree of confidence that mean rates differ across groups. That is, the
apparent downward trend is not statistically significant.9
These simple tabulations and graphs may mislead because they do not control for any factors
correlated both with income and savings outcomes. The regression analysis below offers better
tests because it does control for some other factors.

Figure 11.3 Mean Savings Rate by Group (Plus and Minus One Standard Error)
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Regression Analysis
Regression controls for many factors at once. Here, we estimate the association between income
and the savings rate, holding constant a wide range of program and participant characteristics.10
Factors in the model constant, income was not associated with the probability of exit.11
Whatever factors explain exit—whether hardship, loss of interest, lack of discipline, and being
kicked out for poor performance—they were not correlated with income. Less-poor participants
in ADD were just as likely to exit as very poor participants.

9

Appendix B discusses statistical significance.
To save space, the full results are not presented here. They are available on request. Like the
regression in Chapters 8 and 9, the one here uses the Heckman two-step, but the dependent
variable in the second step is the savings rate instead of AMND. The first step estimates the
likelihood of non-exit, and the second step estimates the predicted savings rate for non-exits.
11
The results are the same as those in Table 8.5.
10
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Among non-exits (84 percent of participants as of June 30, 2000), higher income was associated
with a lower savings rate. For example, each $100 of recurrent income in the range from $0 to
$799 was linked with a decrease in the savings rate of 0.01 percentage points (97-percent
confidence). The association is statistically significant, but it is very small.
Each $100 of recurrent income past $800 is associated with a decrease in the saving rate of 0.69
percentage points (99-percent confidence). Is this link small or large? If income increased from
$700 to $900, then the predicted decrease in the savings rate would be 0.70 percentage points.
This is a large effect, (32 percent of the mean savings rate in ADD of 2.2 percent, Table 11.5).
Each $100 of intermittent income was associated with a decrease in the savings rate of 0.12
percentage points (99-percent confidence). Thus, a change from $0 to $200 was linked with a
decrease in the savings rate of 0.24 percentage points. This is large (10 percent of the mean
savings rate in ADD).
We also looked (Chapter 9) at the association between income and AMND (in contrast to the
savings rate). Recurrent income had no statistically significant association with AMND. Each
$100 of intermittent income is associated with an increase in AMND of $0.32 (96-percent
confidence). This is a small effect; it implies a savings rate from increases in intermittent
income of 0.32 percent. This fits the pattern above where the savings rate decreases with
income.
In sum, increases in low levels of recurrent income were not associated with large changes in the
savings rate, but increases in higher levels of recurrent income (and increases in intermittent
income) were strongly associated with large decreases in the savings rate. This fits the pattern in
which increased income does not increase savings levels very much.
What could account for this? Economic theory cannot; it predicts that savings increase with
income. Two possible explanations remain.
As discussed above, issues with data and methods impart a downward bias on estimates of the
link between income and savings. The size of the bias is unknown, so we cannot rule out the
possibility that these biases—rather than a real relationship—drive the observed negative
correlation between income and the savings rate. We can partly address the censorship of
desired savings by the match cap. As of June 30, 2000, 10 percent of participants had saved up
to their match caps. Without these cases, the estimated associations between income and the
savings rate shrink (as expected) by 10 to 20 percent. Even without censored cases, the negative
association between income and savings rate is large and strong.12
12

This truncated regression is not a good way to control for censoring (Greene, 1993). Better
techniques would be overkill at this point, however, because censoring depends on the date of
measurement. As of June 30, 2000, only a handful of participants with lifetime match-cap
structures had reached their time caps and thus had had a full chance to save up to the match cap.
Likewise, most people with annual match-cap structures were not in the twelfth month of their
current participation year. They were unlikely to be at the match cap on June 30, 2000, even if
they will probably be at the match cap at the end of their participation year. We will control
properly for censoring after ADD ends and all participants have had a full chance to save.
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Institutional effects may drive the observed patterns. For example, the monthly savings target
may matter more for people with less income. All else constant, these people have fewer
resources to save, so they must make a greater effort if they want to save up to the match cap. If
participants make an effort to save the amount “expected” by the program—and many
participants say that they try to do this—then the “pull” of the match cap will be stronger for
people with less income. This would tend to make the savings rate decrease with income.
Matches in IDAs may also matter more as income decreases. Asset accumulation from a match
is a higher proportion of total resources for the very poor than for the less-poor. Because of
diminishing returns, participants with low income receive greater benefits from a given match.
This would tend to make the savings rate decrease with income.
Compared to the less-poor, the very poor may change their behavior more in response to
financial education or to social pressure from staff or peers. If the very poor have more to learn
about how and why to save, then a given level of education or attention will have a greater effect.
These institutional effects are partly economic (matches), partly psychological (program
expectations and monthly savings targets internalized by participants, and financial education),
and partly social (pressure from staff and peers). In general, if participants lived in a moredeprived institutional environment before IDAs, then the institution of IDAs may have a greater
effect on their savings than on others. This seems plausible, but for now it is only a conjecture.
The institutional structure of IDAs may cause people with less income to save a larger share of
their income. Even so, the institutional structure of IDAs is less complete than that of other
savings programs such as 401(k) plans. For example, IDA participants must repeatedly choose
to make deposits. In 401(k) plans, the deposit amount—once chosen—is made like clockwork
each month unless the participant actively does something to change it. In contrast, saving in
IDAs is rarely passive. Each deposit requires conscious choices and acts (such as not to spend
cash on-hand but rather to walk or drive to the bank).13

Discussion
The results here pertain to a particular population in an unusual context (a matched-savings
program). Participants are in the lower end of the income distribution; the typical participant is
just above the poverty line, and the rest are bunched near the poverty line. IDA programs target
certain people, mostly the “working poor,” and participants are self-selected. Our data on cash
flows in IDAs are very accurate, but the income data are self-reported and—although they have
been cleaned as well as possible—some measurement error and other issues surely remain.
Overall, conclusions must be tentative, but we can offer a few observations on income and
saving in ADD and on how the results here relate to larger issues in saving theory and policy.

13

About 5 percent of participants in ADD used direct deposit with their IDA (although we do not
know how many could have used direct deposit but chose not to).
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What kind of income leads to saving? The permanent-income hypothesis suggests that regular
income drives consumption and that transitory income drives saving. In ADD, recurrent income
had no link with the level of savings, and intermittent income had a very small link.
Furthermore, as income increases, the savings rate decreases, and this negative association is
large and strong. We cannot say much else about this. It seems likely that institutional
influences overshadow source-of-income influences, but the data from ADD cannot sort this out.
In particular, we have income data at only one point in time, and we have only a coarse proxy for
transitory income.
What is the relationship between income and savings in IDAs? All else constant, more income
did not increase savings for participants in ADD. Furthermore, more income was strongly
associated with large decreases in the savings rate.
What explains this? Economic models predict that more income increases savings (and savings
rates); institutional theory (and biases in data and methods) predict that it might not. It may very
well be that institutional features overpowered economic factors in ADD, but we do not have
much direct evidence. If institutions do explain at least part of the results, then the strongest
influences were likely the expectation embedded in a monthly savings target, the transformation
of the match cap into a goal, financial education, and reinforcement by staff and peers. The
factors are economic, psychological, and social, and their effects may be stronger for the very
poor than for the less-poor. All three factors probably are at work, but the data cannot
disentangle them.
The broad message is that less income need not imply less savings—all else constant—and that
more income may imply a lower savings rate. Existing evidence on non-IDA savings indicates
that very poor people save less (and save a smaller share of their income) than less-poor people.
This is not happening in IDAs in ADD.
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12. Race/Ethnicity and Saving
IDAs aim to narrow the gap between the non-poor and poor in access to institutions for saving.
If they succeed, then they may also narrow the gap in asset accumulation among racial/ethnic
groups and promote equality of both opportunity and outcomes.
On average, African Americans have less financial (and other) assets than Caucasians.1 Carney
and Gale (1999) find that 45 percent of African-American households (versus 14 percent for
Caucasians) did not have a passbook savings account or a checking account in 1993. The ratio
of median income for African Americans to median income for Caucasians was 0.64 in 1997, but
the ratio for net worth was 0.12 in 1995 (Gittleman and Wolff, 2000). The gap widened in the
1980s and 1990s (Wolff, 1998), and in 1995 about half of African-American households had
zero (or negative) net worth.2
Oliver and Shapiro (1995) and Sherraden (1991) argue that some of the advantages and
disadvantages linked with race/ethnicity are due to differential access to institutions for saving
and asset accumulation. For example, discrimination in markets for loans and homes (Ladd,
1998; Munnell et al., 1996) decreases access to the home-mortgage interest subsidy, to
mortgages as a device to commit to save, and to homeownership as a source of capital gains.
Labor-market discrimination—both in wage jobs (Darity and Mason, 1998) and in selfemployment (Branchflower, Levine, and Zimmerman, 1998; Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo, 1998;
Bates, 1997)—decreases access not only to higher income but also to 401(k) plans. Of course,
local-school finance distributes access to public schools—institutions that build human capital—
unequally. Finally, theft and murder by governments, firms, mobs, and individuals punctuate the
history of African Americans and disrupt mechanisms that would otherwise facilitate asset
accumulation (Feagan, 2000). Even if these shames were past, part of the “sedimentation of
racial inequality” (Oliver and Shapiro, 1995) is that low assets beget low assets, so past
inequality leads to current inequality.3 If class has come to matter more than race (Wilson, 1980)
and if assets are one way to reproduce class, then greater inclusion in institutions that facilitate
saving may promote racial/ethnic equality in many ways.
Although IDAs alone cannot reverse centuries of injustice or pervasive current social patterns,
they may be one way to help to level the field (Sherraden, 1999b and 1991). This chapter looks
at race/ethnicity and savings in IDAs in ADD.

1

Most research looks at only African Americans and Caucasians because sample sizes for other
groups are small. We also look at Asian Americans, Hispanics, Native Americans, and “Others.”
2
Work on savings (e.g., Deaton, 1992b; Blau and Graham, 1990; Friedman, 1957) often finds
that African Americans save a greater share of their income than Caucasians, perhaps to insure
against a greater risk of shocks (for example, from unemployment).
3
Blau and Graham (1990) and Gittleman and Wolff (2000) find that the persistent wealth gap
between African Americans and Caucasians is due not so much to differences in saving rates or
to differences in returns on savings as to differences in inheritances.
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Savings Outcomes by Race/Ethnicity
About 47 percent of participants in ADD were African-American, 37 percent were Caucasian, 9
percent Hispanic, 3 percent Native American, 3 percent “Other” and 2 percent Asian-American.
Compared to the general low-income population, ADD has a smaller share of Caucasians and a
greater share of African Americans, Hispanics, Asian Americans, Native Americans, and
“Others” (Chapter 4). This reflects the target groups of some programs in ADD, and it suggests
that some members of disadvantaged groups are both able and willing to participate in IDAs.
Bivariate Tabulations
For each group, Tables 12.1 through 12.4 report average monthly net deposits (AMND), deposit
frequency, net deposits as a percentage of the pro-rated match cap, and the savings rate. These
simple tables do not control for other characteristics—observed or unobserved—correlated both
with race/ethnicity and with savings outcomes.
Average Monthly Net Deposits. AMND was highest ($41.81) for Asian Americans (Table
12.1). Next were “Other” ($31.24), Hispanics ($30.19) and Caucasians ($29.04). AMND was
lowest for African Americans ($20.99) and for Native Americans ($19.51).
Table 12.1 Average Monthly Net Deposit by Race/Ethnicity
Race
African-American
Asian-American or Pacific-Islander
Caucasian
Hispanic
Native American
Other
All ADD

N
Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($)
Max. ($)
1,115
20.99
13.50
-0.22
250.00
45
41.81
45.45
0.00
93.02
877
29.04
23.57
0.00
200.00
211
30.19
26.09
0.00
250.00
63
19.51
10.51
0.00
68.96
67
31.24
30.11
0.00
107.14
2,378

25.42

17.96

-0.22

250.00

All groups had average AMND of at least $19.50, and the average member of the group that
saved the most saved $22.30 more per month than the average member of the group that saved
the least. (Differences in medians were larger.) Of course, these simple comparisons ignore all
differences between groups other than race/ethnicity; controls for characteristics recorded in MIS
IDA (Table 12.5) cut the gaps in half.
Deposit frequency. The average ratio of months with a deposit to months of participation was
highest for Caucasians (63 percent), Asian Americans (62 percent), and Native Americans and
“Other” (both 59 percent, Table 12.2). Average deposit frequency was 54 percent for both
African Americans and Hispanics. These differences among groups are smaller (and of different
relative magnitudes) than differences in AMND among groups.
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Table 12.2 Deposit Frequency by Race/Ethnicity
(Months with a Deposit/Months of Participation)
Race
African-American
Asian-American or Pacific-Islander
Caucasian
Hispanic
Native American
Other
All ADD

N
Mean (%) Median (%) Min. (%) Max. (%)
1,115
54
50
0
100
45
62
63
17
100
877
63
67
0
100
211
54
50
7
100
63
59
57
6
100
67
59
64
6
100
2,378

58

57

0

100

Net deposits as a percentage of the pro-rated match cap. Asian Americans in ADD saved, on
average, 125 percent of the pro-rated match cap (Table 12.3). “Other” saved 98 percent of the
pro-rated match cap, Hispanics 91 percent, Caucasians 70 percent, African Americans 58
percent, and Native Americans 40 percent. This is roughly the same pattern as for AMND.
Table 12.3 Net Deposits as a Percentage of the Pro-rated Match Cap
by Race/Ethnicity
Race
African-American
Asian-American or Pacific-Islander
Caucasian
Hispanic
Native American
Other
All ADD

N
Mean (%) Median (%) Min. (%) Max. (%)
1,115
58
35
0
600
45
125
120
0
311
877
70
59
0
509
211
91
72
0
600
63
40
18
0
179
67
98
87
0
378
2,378

67

49

0

600

Savings rate. Net deposits as a percentage of income were highest for Asian Americans (3.6
percent, Table 12.4). Next were “Other” (3.1 percent), Hispanics (2.8 percent), and Caucasians
(2.7 percent). The savings rate was lowest for African Americans (1.7 percent) and Native
Americans (1.2 percent). The pattern mimics Tables 12.1 and 12.3.4
In summary, Asian Americans saved the most in IDAs in ADD, followed by “Other,” Hispanics,
and Caucasians. African Americans and Native Americans saved the least.

4

The low savings rate for African Americans in ADD differs from most of the literature. Some
past work, however, looks at gross savings rather than net. Also, if African Americans save
more because they want to insure against shocks and if IDAs are illiquid, then they could save at
a lower rate in IDAs and yet save at a higher rate in all other forms.
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Table 12.4 Savings Rate by Race/Ethnicity
Race
African-American
Asian-American or Pacific-Islander
Caucasian
Hispanic
Native American
Other
All ADD

N
Mean (%) Median (%) Min. (%) Max. (%)
1,092
1.7
1.0
0.0
36
45
3.6
2.9
0.0
11
854
2.7
1.7
0.0
71
203
2.8
1.7
0.0
107
62
1.2
0.7
0.0
8
65
3.1
2.4
0.0
19
2,321

2.2

1.3

0.0

107

Race/ethnicity as a Proxy for Unobserved Factors
The social context produces differences in observed and unobserved factors that are correlated
with both race/ethnicity and savings. For example, discrimination tends to push people of color
into neighborhoods with weak public schools. All else constant, this leads to lower human
capital, lower income, and fewer resources available to save. Social patterns also lead to greater
risk for people of color (for example, they may be the last hired and the first fired). Given that
physically inherited characteristics play no role in saving in IDAs, any differences correlated
with race/ethnicity and not explained by observed factors are due to unobserved factors produced
in the social context. In a perfect model with controls for everything, race/ethnicity per se would
have no link with savings.
What unobserved characteristics correlated with race/ethnicity might affect savings? For
example, the collapse of the Freedman’s Bank may account for some distrust in banks on the part
of African Americans (Sherraden, 1991). The regression cannot include a variable for “bank
targeted to this racial/ethnic group collapsed one century ago.” The effects of discrimination
clearly are correlated with race and should affect savings (Squires and O’Conner, 1998). People
of color probably face greater risk of unemployment or other negative shocks to income or
expenses, and this affects the risk of dissaving. People of color may also face greater demands
for financial help from social networks (Chiteji and Hamilton, 2000; Caskey, 1997). Language
ability also matters, especially for recent immigrants.
The results reported here come from incomplete models that do not control for all factors
correlated with both race/ethnicity and savings. Thus, the estimates reflect not the effects of
race/ethnicity itself but rather unobserved, socially produced factors linked with race/ethnicity.
Unmatched withdrawals. With observed factors constant, the risk of an unmatched withdrawal
from matchable balances is statistically the same for African Americans, Native Americans, and
Caucasians (Chapter 5). Differences in the risk of unmatched withdrawals probably do not
explain differences in gross AMND among these three groups. Compared with these three
groups, Hispanics, “Other,” and Asian Americans are 11 to 16 percentage points less at-risk of
unmatched withdrawals, and the differences are statistically significant.
Exit. The risk of exit was statistically the same for African Americans, Asian Americans,
Caucasians, and Hispanics (Table 8.3). Compared to these groups, Native Americans were 2.5
percentage points more at-risk of exit, and “Other” were 4 percentage points less at-risk.
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Differences in the risk of exit probably do not explain differences in gross AMND among
African Americans, Asian Americans, Caucasians, and Hispanics.
AMND. Compared to Asian Americans, average monthly net deposit per participant was $10.58
less for “Other,” $11.62 less for Hispanics, $12.77 less for Caucasians, $20.82 less for African
Americans, and $22.30 less for Native Americans (Table 12.5).
Table 12.5 Decomposition of Average AMND by Race/Ethnicity
Race/ethnicity
Asian-American
Other
Hispanic
Caucasian
African-American
Native American

Average AMND
41.81
31.23
30.19
29.04
20.99
19.51

Difference vs
Asian Americans
0.00
10.58
11.62
12.77
20.82
22.30

Difference
Due to Unobserveds
0.00
6.65
4.39
7.30
10.67
12.23

Difference
Due to Observeds
0.00
3.94
7.24
5.47
10.15
10.07

Differences in AMND among groups that were associated with differences in unobserved factors
correlated with race/ethnicity are given by the differences in the regression estimates by group in
Table 8.3. These differences appear in Table 12.5 in the column “Difference Due to
Unobserveds”. The gross difference (“Difference versus Asian Americans” in Table 12.5) minus
the difference due to unobserveds is the “Difference Due to Observeds”. That is, differences in
observed factors accounted for $3.94 (37 percent) of the difference for “Other,” $7.24 (62
percent) of the difference for Hispanics, $5.47 (43 percent) for Caucasians, $10.15 (49 percent)
for African Americans, and $10.07 (45 percent) for Native Americans (Table 12.5). In rough
terms, differences in factors included in the regression accounted for about half of the differences
in average AMND among groups.

Discussion
Gross differences in average AMND among groups were large. Members of all racial/ethnic
groups in ADD saved, on average, at least $19.50 per month, but average AMND across groups
differed by as much as $22.30. We do not know whether IDAs shrunk or expanded this range;
the data here cannot test how impact varies by group.5
In rough terms, about half of the difference in gross AMND among groups was explained by
differences in observed factors. That is, if all groups had the same distribution of IDA structures,
demographics, education and employment, income, assets, and all other factors in the model,
then the savings gap would be cut in half. Even half the gap, however, is still large; unobserved
factors correlated with race/ethnicity were strongly associated with savings outcomes.

5

Data from the experimental design will be able to test this.
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Analyses of regressions on such outcomes as wages or receipt of loans commonly focus on the
links between the outcomes and unobserved factors correlated with race/ethnicity, noting that
differences in unobserved factors are likely due to discrimination. This is correct, but the
analyses often fail to also mention that differences in observed characteristics are also due to
discrimination (Loury, 1998). If a data set included more factors that were associated with an
outcome, then more factors would be observed and fewer unobserved, so the correlation between
the outcome and unobserved factors linked with race/ethnicity would shrink, not because
discrimination decreased but because the model improved. Thus, what matters is not whether
factors linked with differences in savings and asset accumulation are included or excluded from a
regression. What matters are improvements in long-term well-being. This requires smaller gaps
in observed and unobserved characteristics and smaller gaps in savings and asset accumulation.
How can IDAs narrow these gaps? We do not know whether IDAs increase savings and asset
accumulation more for disadvantaged groups than for others. In any case, it is virtually
impossible for IDAs to worsen the relative net worth gap. For example, mean net worth in ADD
was $1,050 for African Americans and $4,101 for Caucasians, for a relative gap of about 1:4. In
the worst-case scenario, all of the average AMND of $20.99 for African Americans would come
from shifted assets, and all of the average AMND of $29.04 for Caucasians would come from
new savings. If both groups had match rates of 2:1 and participated for 33 months, then average
net worth for African Americans after ADD would be $2,435, and average net worth for
Caucasians would be $6,976. The new relative gap would narrow to about 1:3.
Regardless of whether the effects of IDAs are large for disadvantaged groups relative to the
effects for other groups, IDAs might help to improve the absolute gains for disadvantaged
groups.6 This would necessarily involve targeted differences in institutional structures. For
example, some groups might get different match rates, higher match caps, greater staff support,
and/or more financial education. If widespread and funded by government, IDAs probably will
not be targeted explicitly by race. If targeted by net worth or by income, however, IDAs could
reach disadvantaged groups disproportionately (Conley, 1999). This argues in favor of a
progressive savings policy.

6

IDAs may, however, worsen absolute net worth gaps. For example, suppose all match rates are
2:1 and that all of the average AMND of $20.99 for African Americans comes from new savings
and that $10 of the average AMND of $29.04 for Caucasians comes from new savings. Then the
monthly impact of IDAs on the absolute level of net worth of African Americans is $62.97 but
the monthly impact on the average absolute level of net worth of Caucasians is $68.08.
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13. Match Rates and Saving
Matching is central to IDAs. The presence of the match sends a message that the poor can and
should save. The match attracts people to IDAs, offers them a reason to save more, and
encourages them to stay and to maintain their balances. The match turns a given amount of
savings into a greater amount of asset accumulation. Restrictions on matched uses serve to guide
saved resources into forms likely to improve long-term well-being.
This chapter discusses how matching is associated with savings outcomes in subsidized-savings
programs. It also describes match rates in ADD and reports regression results. We find that
higher match rates were linked with decreased risk of exit and decreased risk of an unmatched
withdrawal. Match rates did not have a strong link with average monthly net deposits (AMND).

The Role of Matching
Definitions. The match rate is defined as the number of dollars eligible to be disbursed to a
vendor by an IDA program for each dollar withdrawn by a participant and paid to the vendor in a
matchable purchase. The match is defined as the total amount of dollars disbursed to the vendor
by an IDA program. The match cap is defined as the limit on the number of dollars withdrawn
that may be matched.1 The maximum asset accumulation is defined as matches plus matched
withdrawals when matched withdrawals equal the match cap.
The concepts of match rates, matches, match caps, and maximum asset accumulations are linked
but distinct. Match rates are rates of return; matches are amounts of money; match caps are
limits on amounts of money that can earn a given return; and maximum asset accumulations are
limits on amounts of money from matched withdrawals and from matches.
Desired savings are defined as savings in the absence of a match cap. Observed savings are
defined as savings in the presence of a match cap. Resources put in IDAs may come from new
savings or from shifted assets (Chapter 14), so it would be more accurate to speak of “IDA
deposits” rather than “savings.”
Predicted economic effects. Economic theory predicts that match rates—but not match caps or
maximum asset accumulations—affect desired savings. There are two economic effects. First,
match rates are incentives to save, the bulk of the return for each dollar deposited. In a sense, the
match rate is the price of the use of resources in the present in terms of resources available for
use in the future. For example, with a 2:1 match rate, a dollar not deposited (or, equivalently,
removed in an unmatched withdrawal) costs $2 in terms of lost matched withdrawals. Thus,
higher match rates increase desired savings through what is known as the substitution effect.

1

The match is the smaller of the match cap or of the withdrawal multiplied by the match rate.
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Second, the match rate—given a match cap—determines the time and/or the rate of deposits
required to reach a given asset-accumulation goal.2 For example, suppose that a participant
wants to accumulate $4,000. With a match rate of 1:1, savings of $2,000 would lead to a match
of $2,000 and total asset accumulation of $4,000. Given average monthly net deposits of $50,
the participant must save for 40 months. With a match rate of 3:1, however, required savings
decrease to $1,000. The participant can now reach the goal either sooner ($50 per month for 20
months) or with a slower rate of deposits ($25 per month for 40 months). This decrease in the
required time and/or in the rate of deposits to reach a given goal is known as the income effect.
The substitution effect pushes desired savings up, and the income effect pulls it down. The net
effect on savings outcomes in a time frame may be positive, negative, or zero.
In a world without institutional effects, the match cap and the maximum asset accumulation
would not affect desired savings. Of course, if desired savings exceed the match cap, or if an
asset-accumulation goal exceeds the maximum asset accumulation, then observed savings is less
than desired savings. If estimates of the links between match rates and desired savings do not
control for this censoring of desired savings by the match cap, then the estimates will be biased
toward zero. For example, suppose the match cap was $1, and the match rate was 100:1.
Desired savings would be very high, but observed savings would probably be $1 for all
participants. If the match rate fell to 50:1, desired savings would decrease, but observed savings
would probably remain constant at $1. With censoring ignored and desired savings taken
incorrectly as observed savings, the estimated effect of the huge reduction in the match rate
would (incorrectly) be zero.
Is censoring likely to affect estimates of the association between match rates and desired savings
in ADD? As of June 30, 2000, 10 percent of all participants—whether with an annual match-cap
structure or a lifetime match-cap structure—were at the match cap. People with lifetime matchcap structures, however, still have time to get to the match cap, and evidence in Lazear (1999)
suggests that many of them will wait until just before the time cap and then make large deposits.
Furthermore, 30 percent of people with annual match-cap structures were at their annual match
cap in their 12th month of participation. Thus, it seems likely that a large share of participants
will be at the match cap by the end of ADD and that failure to control for censoring then will
bias estimates. Here, however, we do not control for censoring.
Two-way causation may also mask links between the match rate and desired savings. For
example, some programs in ADD likely set higher match rates if they expected their participants
to save less—regardless of the match rate—and lower match rates if they expected their
participants to save more.3 If so, then the match rate not only causes desired savings, but
expected desired savings also causes the match rate. This two-way causation may induce a
spurious negative correlation between match rates and observed savings. The ADD data do not
offer a way to control for this, although we believe that it takes place (Sherraden et al., 2000).

2

The goal could be a single purchase (such as college tuition) or a more general or diffuse goal.
Such programs saw the match rate less as an incentive to save and more as a way to turn a
given amount of savings into a usefully large amount of asset accumulation.
3
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Predicted institutional effects. In addition to economic effects, match rates, match caps, and
maximum asset accumulations may have institutional effects. For example, the presence of
matches (or higher match rates) sends a message to participants that they would be foolish not to
save. IDAs are bargain asset accumulation, and people will often take advantage of what are
generally perceived of as bargains even if they do not think about whether it really is worthwhile
in their own specific case. Matching may also increase saving because people feel that they get
something for free.4 These institutional effects of matching increase desired savings.
People may also think of match caps—which technically are limits—as goals.5 Rather than try
to figure out how much is optimal for them to save, they take the limit set by the program as the
Likewise, participants may change maximum asset
amount that they should save.6
accumulations from limits to targets. These institutional effects should increase desired savings.
Of course, increases in desired savings due to institutional features are censored at the match cap.
Censoring biases estimates of institutional effects toward zero.
In sum, desired savings may be affected by economic factors (substitution and income effects of
the match rate) and by institutional factors (match cap, monthly savings target, and maximum
asset accumulation). The substitution effect and all of the institutional effects increase desired
savings. The income effect decreases desired savings. The match cap can drive a wedge
between observed savings and desired savings, and failure to control for this may attenuate
estimates of the links between desired savings and matching. Likewise, two-way causation
attenuates estimates.
Evidence from 401(k) plans. Subsidies for saving —at least for the non-poor—are not new
(Orszag and Greenstein, 2000). Most research on the effects of match rates on saving behavior
looks at 401(k) plans. Like IDAs, 401(k) plans involve deposits in special accounts, and they
also often include matches (from employers) and financial education. The plans also differ from
IDAs in several ways. First, almost all deposits are deducted from paychecks. Second, savings

4

Some share of deposits in IRAs and 401(k) plans by the non-poor probably occur because
people like to feel that they have cheated the tax collector (Hubbard and Skinner, 1996).
5
Because programs in ADD often explicitly express match caps in terms of monthly goals, the
monthly pro-rated match cap (which we also call the monthly savings target) may also have an
institutional effect on participants. Because the monthly savings target depends not only on the
match cap but also on the time cap, it may have an effect distinct from that of the match cap.
6
In this case, people save at the match cap without censoring; desired savings is the same as
observed savings. Unfortunately, we have no way to distinguish these cases from those in which
desired savings exceeds observed savings for people at the match cap.
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are intended (and used) for retirement.7 Third, balances and earnings are tax-deferred.8 Fourth,
employees do not forfeit matches if they make withdrawals before retirement.9
Research on match rates in 401(k) plans focuses on effects on participation and savings.10 For
example, Borleis and Wedell (1994), Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1994), and Scott (1994) all find
that the presence of a match is correlated with higher participation rates. Papke and Poterba
(1995) and Papke (1995) find that participation rates increase with the match rate, and that
savings increase as match rates increase from very low rates (the substitution effect swamps the
income effect) but that savings decrease as match rates increase past 0.25:1 (the income effect
swamps the substitution effect).11 Kusko, Poterba, and Wilcox (1994) find that higher match
rates increase participation but not savings.12 Andrews (1992) and Bassett, Fleming, and
Rodrigues (1998) find these same broad patterns.13 Bayer, Bernheim, and Scholz (1996) is
probably the best work on this topic so far, although it has all the common weaknesses of the rest
of the literature except that they acknowledged the issue of two-way causation. They find that
higher match rates are linked with both higher participation and higher savings.
In summary, research on 401(k) plans suggests that higher match rates increase participation but
that, except at very low match rates, higher match rates do not increase savings and may even
decrease it. None of these studies, however, controls for censoring, two-way causation, the
match cap, or maximum asset accumulation. None uses data on individuals or looks at
institutional effects.
Below, we estimate the links between match rates and the risk of exit from IDAs, the risk of
unmatched withdrawals, and savings as measured by average monthly net deposits (AMND).
We use individual data and control for the savings target and for a wide range of other program

7

Hardship withdrawals for emergencies and loans are allowed. Pre-retirement distributions are
possible and common but are not subsidized.
8
Because the match from the employer is best thought of as part of the remuneration package for
the employee, subsidies in 401(k) plans come not from matches but from tax breaks.
9
Pre-retirement distributions that take place when employment ends do incur a penalty, and
matches are lost if the employee was not fully vested.
10
Our work on IDAs does not look at participation because we lack data on non-participants.
Whatever increases entrance in 401(k) plans, however, should decrease exit from IDAs.
11
These two papers share weaknesses common in this literature. First, they do not control for
censoring at the match cap. Second, they do not control for the match cap, for maximum asset
accumulation, or for more than a handful of other variables. Third, they measure match rates and
savings not for individuals but as averages across participants in a firm. Fourth, they do not
control for possible two-way causation. Fifth, they ignore the possibility of institutional effects.
Furthermore, Papke (1995) misreads IRS Form 5500 data.
12
Although the paper notes that 75 percent of the sample was at the match cap, it does not
control for censoring. Thus, the lack of a link between match rates and observed savings is not a
surprise. The paper also shares the other weaknesses common in this literature.
13
Bassett, Fleming, and Rodrigues (1998) do not control for censoring or two-way causation.
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and participant characteristics.14 We do not control for censoring or two-way causation, but we
discuss the biases that may result. We consider the possibility of institutional effects, but the
data do not allow us to disentangle them from economic effects.

Match Rates in ADD
This section looks at links between match rates and savings outcomes.15 The links result from
some unknown mix of economic effects, institutional effects, censoring, and two-way causation.
About 24 percent of participants in ADD had a match rate of 1:1. About 51 percent had a match
rate of 2:1, 14 percent had a match rate of 3:1, and 6 percent had match rates in the range from
4:1 to 7:1.16 The mean (and median) match rate was 2:1.
The match rate sometimes varies with the intended use, usually with a higher rate for home
purchase. Some programs or sites had one match rate for all participants, and some had different
match rates for different groups of participants. The estimated effects of the match rate on
savings outcomes are based on programs where the match rate varies among groups (Appendix
C). All match rates appear in several programs, and the regression controls for unobserved
factors correlated with specific programs or sites, so estimates here probably do not reflect
unobserved effects correlated with the program or site.17
Unmatched withdrawals. Unmatched withdrawals from matchable balances resemble negative
savings because they reduce net deposits dollar-for-dollar. Thus, savings theory applies in
reverse to unmatched withdrawals. For example, institutional theory predicts that higher match
rates will decrease the risk of unmatched withdrawals. The substitution effect also predicts this
because a higher match rate increases the opportunity cost of unmatched withdrawals. The
income effect, however, pushes the other way. Censoring is not an issue, but two-way causation
might cause higher match rates to appear to increase the risk of unmatched withdrawals.18
14

Because few people in ADD had reached their time caps as of June 30, 2000, we do not
control for the total match cap or maximum asset accumulation. Until the end of ADD, the
effects of these variables depend on the length of participation. Also, the amount of variation in
ADD among the related measures of match rates, savings targets, match caps, and maximum
asset accumulations may not permit the inclusion of all four at once.
15
Chapters 5, 8, and 9 discuss links between the monthly savings target and savings outcomes.
16
The match rate in force at the time of a matched withdrawal applies to all funds withdrawn,
even if a different match rate was in force when funds were deposited. Although the match rate
for some individuals in ADD has changed, this has been rare.
17
The rate of 2.5:1 appears only at the ADD/AFIA site of WSEP. Its effect is subsumed in the
site dummy.
18
Bias due to two-way causation might be severe. Match rates of 4:1 to 7:1 (or even 3:1) are
very high and are uncommon in ADD. They were likely assigned only to groups expected to
save little (and to make many unmatched withdrawals) regardless of the match rate. Indeed, the
bulk of people with match rates of 4:1 or more were at CAAB, Near Eastside, and MACED, the
programs with some of the poorest participants in ADD.
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If match rates have no estimated association with the risk of an unmatched withdrawal, then it
means that two-way causation masks the true association and/or that income effects cancel out
both substitution effects and institutional effects. If higher match rates are associated with
decreased risk, then it means that institutional effects and/or substitution effects dominate the
income effect and/or any bias from two-way causation. If higher match rates increase risk, then
it means that income effects and/or two-way causation dominate.

Figure 13.1 Association of Match Rate with the Risk of an Unmatched Withdrawal
14
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To test among these alternatives, we ran a probit regression on the presence of an unmatched
withdrawal for participants in ADD. A set of variables stood for the match rates, with 4:1 to 7:1
as the base for comparison. The model also controlled for the monthly savings target and for a
wide range of other program and participant characteristics (Chapter 5).
Higher match rates were linked with a lower risk of unmatched withdrawals (Figure 13.1).
Compared to someone with a match rate in the range of 4:1 to 7:1 and with other factors in the
model constant, someone with a match rate of 3:1 was 6.3 percentage points less likely to have
an unmatched withdrawal, although the effect was not statistically significant (p-value 0.37).
Someone with a 2:1 match rate was 11.3 percentage points more at-risk than someone with a
match rate of 4:1 or more (84-percent confidence). Participants with a 1:1 match rate were 12.3
percentage points more at-risk of an unmatched withdrawal (84-percent confidence).19

19

We did not test whether the differences between the estimated effects for 1:1 and 2:1 (or for
2:1 and 3:1 or for 1:1 and 3:1) were statistically significant.
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Figure 13.2 Association of Match Rate with Risk of Non-exit

0.0
Change in Risk (% pts.)

-0.5
-1.0
-1.5
-2.0
-2.5
-3.0
-3.5
-4.0
-4.5
-5.0
1:1

2:1

3:1

4:1 to 7:1

Match Rate

Although statistical significance was not very strong, the pattern suggests that institutional and/or
substitution effects dominate the income effects and bias from two-way causation. Higher match
rates encourage participants to eschew unmatched withdrawals and to maintain their balances.
Exit. People who leave an IDA program without having made an unmatched withdrawal
resemble people eligible for a 401(k) plan but who do not join. Both groups pass up subsidies
for saving, explicitly for exits from IDAs and implicitly for non-participants in 401(k) plans.
Because research on 401(k) plans suggests that higher match rates increase participation, we
expect higher match rates in IDAs to decrease exit (or to increase non-exit).
Censoring is absent because no exits are at the match cap. Furthermore, the income effect is
absent because zero savings do not meet any asset-accumulation goal. Substitution and
institutional effects should serve to decrease exit.
If higher match rates are linked with more risk of exit, then the cause of this correlation must be
bias from two-way causation. If higher match rates are linked with less risk of exit, then
institutional effects and/or substitution effects must swamp biases from two-way causation. If
match rates have no link with exit, then these three forces must cancel each other out.
To test, we ran a probit on non-exit (Chapter 8). The association between match rates and the
risk of non-exit was large, strong, and positive (Table 8.1 and Figure 13.2). That is, higher
match rates were linked with less exit. The risk of exit with match rates from 4:1 to 7:1 was 4.7
percentage points less than for a 1:1 match rate (99-percent confidence), 3.7 percentage points
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less than for a 2:1 match rate (99-percent confidence), and 1.6 percentage points less than for a
3:1 match rate (86-percent confidence).20
Institutional and/or substitution effects seem to swamp two-way causation; high match rates help
to keep people in the program. Of course, we do not know the relative weights of institutional
effects versus substitution effects, and measures of the strength of these effects are attenuated by
bias from two-way causation.
Average monthly net deposits. AMND is the key measure of savings outcomes in this report.
Most research on 401(k) plans finds that the match rate (once past 0.25:1 or so) does not affect
savings, although censoring and/or two-way causation have biased all estimates toward zero.
In IDAs, match rates are far higher than in any study of 401(k) plans. We acknowledge
censoring and two-way causation, but we cannot control for them. As always, institutional
theory predicts that higher match rates will increase savings. The substitution effect also predicts
an increase, but the income effect predicts a decrease.
If match rates have no estimated link with AMND, then two-way causation, censoring, and/or
income effects cancel substitution and/or institutional effects. If higher match rates are linked
with higher AMND, then institutional and/or substitution effects dominate income effects and/or
the bias from censoring and two-way causation. If higher match rates decrease AMND, then
income effects, two-way causation, and/or censoring dominate.
To test, we ran a two-step regression (Greene, 1993; Heckman, 1979). The first step was a
probit on non-exit (Chapter 8), and the second step was ordinary least-squares on AMND for
non-exits (Chapter 9). The match rate did not have a statistically significant association with
AMND (Table 9.1). Higher match rates did not elicit greater savings.
This is consistent with research on 401(k) plans. Like that literature, however, we cannot rule
out that the lack of an estimated link is due to failure to control for censoring and/or two-way
causation. The lack of a link may also stem to some unknown degree on income effects that
counter institutional and substitution effects. Our guess is that income effects are the most
important component, but that censoring and two-way causation also matter.

Discussion
Matching is central to IDAs. Our tests suggest that higher match rates in ADD were linked with
lower risk of unmatched withdrawals and lower risk of exit. Both links may be due to two-way
causation, but we believe that they are probably due mostly to institutional and substitution
effects. We find no link between match rates and AMND; this is due in some unknown degree

20

We did not test for statistical significance between pairs without the base case of 4:1 to 7:1.

Center for Social Development
Washington University in St. Louis

Match Rates and Saving 149

to opposing income and substitution effects and to the failure to control for data censoring and
two-way causation.21
Higher match rates seem to discourage exit and discourage unmatched withdrawals better than
they encourage savings. This may be due to psychological asymmetries in how people perceive
gains and losses (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). In particular, once people join an IDA
program (and see themselves as participants) and make deposits (and begin to plan for matched
withdrawals), they may feel the loss of potential matches (or the loss of identity as an IDA
participant) due to exit or due to unmatched withdrawals more strongly than they feel the loss of
potential matches caused by the failure to make deposits up to the match cap.22 This may
suggest that policy can increase savings if it can help people to imagine potential savings more
concretely. One way to do this would be to give everyone an IDA with a periodic account
statement, whether or not they make deposits or have a balance. Another strategy would be to
open an account for everyone (or for all newborns) and place an initial deposit in it (Goldberg
and Cohen, 2000), much like the Thrift Savings Plan for federal employees (Fisher, 2000).
Finally, financial education—perhaps started as early as grade school—might help people to
imagine the financial possibilities enabled by saving.

21

Once ADD is complete and participants are past their time caps, we will be able to control for
censoring and for all four variables related to matching (match rate, monthly savings target,
match cap, and maximum asset accumulation). Two-way causation may still confound clean
tests, and the data might lack sufficient variation for estimates on the four inter-related matching
variables.
22
For a purely rational viewpoint, explicit and implicit losses should be equivalent.
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14. Sources of IDA Deposits
Do IDAs increase savings? This is one of the most basic questions for asset-based policy. This
chapter presents a framework with two broad sources of deposits, new savings and shifted assets.
Most discussion of IDAs assumes that all deposits come from new savings. But some deposits
might come from shifted assets. Savings incentives work only if they spark new savings.
This chapter also describes assets and liabilities for participants in ADD and shows how the
framework can guide the measurement of new savings. Although the MIS IDA data do not
allow precise measurements, evidence from other components of the evaluation of ADD
suggests that IDA deposits come from both new savings and shifted assets.

New Savings versus Shifted Assets
Savings incentives aim to increase saving.1 If deposits into IDAs come from asset shifts,
however, then incentives subsidize saving but do not increase it. Also, with shifted assets,
subsidies go not to new savers but to ones who already saved.
Two groups have argued over this question in the context of IRAs and 401(k) plans (Bernheim,
1997). One camp uses tests biased against new saving and fails to reject the hypothesis that all
deposits come from asset shifts (Engen, Gale, and Scholz, 1996; Gale and Scholz, 1994). The
other camp uses tests biased against asset shifts and fails to reject the hypothesis that all deposits
come from new saving (Poterba, Venti, and Wise, 1996). The truth is somewhere in the middle
(Hubbard and Skinner, 1996; Bernheim, 1999).
Sherraden (1991) argues that new savings would be the bulk of deposits in IDAs because the
poor have few assets to shift. Some evidence from IRAs and 401(k) plans does suggest that the
poor are more likely to make deposits from new savings (Engen and Gale, 2000; Bernheim and
Scholz, 1993). Still, matches in IDAs are strong incentives to come up with deposits, whatever
their source, and it may be easier to shift than to save.
The poor do have some resources, even if they have few assets.2 Because resources are
convertible among forms, some IDA deposits may come from shifted assets. Even participants
with no financial assets at enrollment can shift.

1
2

Subsidies in IDAs also aim to increase asset accumulation from a given level of saving.
In particular, the poor have just as much time in a day as the non-poor.
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Sources and Forms of Resources
All resources come from Nature or human capital (time and effort combined with skill from
education and experience).3 For example, Nature endows us with air to breathe, and human
capital converted to wages endows us with what money can buy.
People acquire resources either as gifts from Nature, as gifts from other people, or as trades for
other resources acquired in the past (in particular, for human capital). People use resources to
produce things to exchange for what others produce in the market, to produce things for their
own use in the household, to enjoy leisure, and to give as gifts. People derive well-being from
consumption of resources, from time in leisure, from giving gifts, and from mental
contemplation of what resources allow them to do.4
Nature and society as a whole set the rules for the conversion of resources between forms and for
the use of resources by people. For example, society may impose a retirement age beyond which
human capital cannot be sold in the market, and Nature imposes subsistence requirements on the
physical body.5 Reductions in the producers of well-being are costs. For example, the cost of
leisure is time. Gifts reduce personal resources, and worry or ignorance impedes the
contemplation of the good possibilities in life.
People convert their fundamental endowment of time and other gifts from Nature and from
others into consumption, more time (life), and five broad types of assets: human capital, financial
balances, household durables, producer durables, and social capital. Human capital requires
continued life—and thus health via leisure and consumption—and skill (knowledge and habits).
Financial balances are formal, impersonal social claims on resources. They encompass cash,
bank accounts (for example, passbook savings, checking accounts, and IDAs), and other
financial investments such as stocks, bonds, IRAs, 401(k) plans, and cash-value life insurance.
Household durables are used to produce things for one’s own use: examples include houses, cars,
clothes, pots and pans, and computers. Producer durables are used to produce things to sell in
the market. They may include plant and equipment, cars, and computers. Social capital is made
up of informal, personal social claims. Examples include access to networks, deference based on
who one is rather than what one does, favors owed or accrued, and bonds of love.
Resources are convertible among forms. Transaction costs are defined as the costs of
conversion. Transaction costs—in terms of time, effort, and physical degradation—depend on
the starting form of resources and on the ending form.6

3

Life, which supplies time and capacity for effort, is a gift from Nature, so human capital
ultimately comes from Nature.
4
Freedom increases what one can do with given resources, and so freedom increases well-being
via contemplation even though many possible roads are not taken.
5
Nature also imposes death, beyond which there is no time and so no human capital.
6
More precisely, transaction costs are the resources—tradable and non-tradable—lost in the
conversion of resources. Transaction costs are like friction. Sherraden (1989) discusses
transaction costs and how they relate to poverty.
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People may also exchange resources through time; loans trade resources in the present for claims
on resources in the future. Debts may be financial, physical, or social.
As time passes, resources depreciate or appreciate. Depreciation encompasses transaction costs
in resource conversions and waste. Maintenance is defined as additions that replace
depreciation; investments are defined as non-maintenance additions.
Effort—with time and skill—drives the returns to human capital in the household and market.
Effort, time, and skill are substitutes to some extent. With enough time, a novice can do a job
without much stress; an expert works quickly and with less mental focus; and almost anyone can
work faster and/or better if they try more. More effort also increases the rate of growth of skill.
Thus, more effort now reduces the future effort required for a given job. Effort, however, is
costly; leisure is the absence of costly effort.7
This framework shows that resources are convertible among forms and that their fundamental
source is Nature and/or time, effort, and skill embodied in human capital.

Sources of IDA Deposits
Resources deposited in an IDA come from conversions of time, effort, and human capital (new
saving) or from conversions of resources in other forms (asset shifts).
Accounting Identities
Resource inflows come from income in the market, appreciation of assets, debt assumed, gifts
received, conversions from non-IDA assets, and IDA withdrawals. Resource outflows go to
consumption, maintenance of assets, depreciation of assets, dept repayments, gifts given,
conversions to non-IDA assets, and IDA deposits. Sources equal uses:8

+
+
+
+
+

Sources

=

Uses

Income
Appreciation
Debt Assumed
Gifts Received
Conversions from Non-IDA Assets
IDA Withdrawals

=

Consumption
Maintenance and Depreciation
Debt Repaid
Gifts Given
Conversions to Non-IDA Assets
IDA Deposits

+
+
+
+
+

7

Effort is also habit-forming; it costs less if past levels were high, more if they were low.
Time and effort do not last, so, in a time frame, their sources equal their uses. Debts and nonIDA assets include social debts and social assets.
8
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In a given time frame, net IDA saving—defined as IDA deposits minus IDA withdrawals—is the
difference between other types of inflows and outflows:9
Net IDA Saving

=

IDA Deposits – IDA Withdrawals

Net IDA Saving

=

Income
Net Appreciation
Change in Debt
Net Gifts
Consumption
Maintenance
Net Conversions of Non-IDA Assets

+
+
+
–
–
–

Net IDA saving depends on income, net appreciation, changes in debt, net gifts, consumption,
maintenance, and net conversions of non-IDA assets.
New Savings
IDA deposits are defined as new savings if they come from:
•
•
•
•

Increased income;
Increased net appreciation;
Increased net gifts; and/or
Decreased consumption.10

Increased income or decreased consumption come from:
•
•
•

Increased effort;
Increased time in production (household or market); and/or
Increased amounts, returns, and/or utilization of human capital.

Thus, new savings come from work (time and effort), from restraint in consumption, from lowerquality consumption, or from unconsumed resources from net appreciation or net gifts. New
savings convert fundamental, non-tradable resources from nature (time, effort, and human
capital) into tradable resources.
For example, work may increase income in five ways, all else constant. The first is a shift of
time away from leisure or household production toward market production. The second is an
increase in effort in market production. The third is an increase in the amount of human capital
(perhaps from post-secondary education or from experience in microenterprise) used in market
production. The fourth is an increase in the market return to human capital, perhaps from a

9

This equation is an accounting identity and does not imply that savings are what are left-over
after other choices are made.
10
Increases and decreases are considered relative to levels in the absence of IDAs.
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reduction in discrimination. The fifth is an increase in the utilization of a given amount of
human capital, perhaps from a job switch.
Decreased consumption also requires work. For example, restraint (or a cut in quality) requires
effort. Also, the replacement of purchases in the market with ones produced in the household—
all else constant—requires a shift of time from leisure to household production and/or more
effort and/or more, better, or better-used human capital. Likewise, the search for higher value
from market purchases uses work to maintain the quality and level of purchases but to reduce
outflows of tradable resources used in exchange, thus freeing up resources to be saved.
Asset Shifts
IDA deposits are defined as asset shifts if they come from conversions of non-fundamental
resources. In general, asset shifts come from resources saved in the past or from debt (resources
saved in the future). Asset shifts include:
•
•
•

Increases in debt;
Decreases in asset maintenance;
Increases in net conversions of non-IDA assets.

Asset shifts do not convert resources in non-tradable forms into tradable forms. Rather, they
convert already-tradable forms to other tradable forms, in this case, IDA deposits.11
Debt. A loan exchanges resources now for the promise of future resources. This does not
convert fundamental resources to tradable ones; it merely shifts control over tradable resources
through time.12 Participants are unlikely to take out a bank loan to finance IDA deposits, but they
might borrow from family and friends, pawnshops, or check-cashing outlets.
All else constant, delay in debt repayment is an asset shift, equivalent to an increase in debt. For
example, a participant may wait to pay a phone bill to free up funds for an IDA deposit. This
does not convert fundamental resources to non-tradable resources; it shifts tradable resources
from phone bill to an IDA deposit. As another example, suppose that someone has student debt
or credit-card debt and—before IDAs—repaid a given amount each month. If the rate of
repayment slows because some resources that would have repaid debt now go to IDAs, then
there is an asset shift.
IDAs may indirectly lead to greater debt in other ways. For example, if credit-card debt
increases because IDA deposits absorb some cash that otherwise would have covered purchases,
then, on the margin, the increase in debt finances IDA deposits.
People can fund IDAs with debt even if they do not take out a loan marked “For IDAs.”
11

Transaction costs in conversion do use up some fundamental, non-tradable resources.
In some cases, debt may act as a pre-commitment device to make future income exceed
consumption (Maital, 1986). If this future saving would not have taken place in the absence of
IDAs, then loans that finance IDAs (net of interest) may be new savings.
12
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Maintenance. All else constant, delays or cuts in asset maintenance are like slowed repayment
of debt; tradable resources that would otherwise counter depreciation instead finance IDAs. For
example, an IDA participant may put funds that would have been saved for home repairs in an
IDA (and later use matched withdrawals for home repair).
All types of assets require maintenance, so IDA deposits may be shifted from the neglected
maintenance of any asset. For example, resources for human-capital maintenance can shift to
IDA deposits if, to get cash for IDAs, participants skip medical check-ups or buy such lowquality food that they become malnourished. To finance IDAs, participants may delay repairs on
household durables (such as homes or cars) or purchases of new durables (such as clothes).
Owners of microenterprises may do the same for producer durables. Even social capital requires
maintenance through personal contact, time, and favors. If an IDA participant spends more time
in the market to earn more income and thus spends less time in social networks, then some
income may come at the expense of social capital. People may shift resources from maintenance
into IDAs in many small, subtle, diffuse, and often unconscious ways.
Conversions from non-IDA assets. Because resources are convertible between forms, any form
of asset may be converted to IDA deposits. Conversions from fundamental, non-tradable
resources—Nature and/or time, effort, and human capital—are new savings; conversions from
tradable assets are asset shifts.
The simplest way to convert non-IDA assets is to make IDA deposits from cash or financial
balances that are already on-hand or that would have been saved anyway. In the same way,
deposits of proceeds from the sale of consumer or producer durables are asset shifts. To free up
cash for IDAs, a participant may call in (or incur) social debts—for example, asking relatives to
care of children without pay—to substitute for goods or services that otherwise would have been
purchased in the market.
Conversions of non-IDA assets may also take the form of delayed purchases. For example,
Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1996) suggest that many people delay home purchase because funds
that otherwise would have gone for a down payment are locked up in 401(k) plans.13 In IDAs,
the match gives strong incentives to people who already saved for matchable uses (and/or who
would have saved anyway) to wait to make these purchases with a matched withdrawal.14
Participants may also delay purchases of household durables (such as clothes) or delay
investments in human capital (such as the replacement of current enrollment in college with a
dead-end job that earns cash for IDAs).
Implications. Compared with the non-poor, the poor have fewer assets to shift, but they still can
shift, albeit to a lesser extent. Even people with only illiquid assets can postpone maintenance,
and even people with no assets can borrow or delay purchases.

13

They may also shift assets if they buy smaller homes than in the absence of 401(k) plans, if
they finance 401(k) deposits with home-equity loans, or if they repay mortgages slower.
14
Even if matches speed up accumulation and purchase, the resources are asset shifts because
they would have been saved anyway.
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Do IDAs increase saving? The answer requires knowledge of new savings, that is, the difference
(due to IDAs) in the change in conversion of fundamental, non-tradable resources to tradable
resources. This requires knowledge of the values of all components of net worth (financial and
non-financial) through some time frame, both with and without IDAs. Many survey respondents,
however, cannot report accurately the value of bank balances and current debts, let alone the
value of consumer and producer durables and social capital. Human capital and time for leisure
are even more difficult to value. Furthermore, conversions of tradable resources often involve
subtle shifts through time that may escape even the participant. Even if all these issues were
resolved, we would know net worth only with IDAs; we would not know what net worth would
have been without IDAs. Thus, the measurement of new savings is extremely difficult.
Answers to whether IDAs cause new savings can take three approaches. The first is random
assignment of access to qualified participants or to eligible people; average differences in net
worth between people with and without access can then be seen as new savings. The
experimental-design component of ADD adopts this approach. The second approach is to ask
people what they did. The third approach is to make assumptions about all unmeasured aspects.
The experimental-design component of ADD is still in progress; the rest of this chapter explores
the other two approaches.

New Savings and Asset Shifts in ADD
Surveys of Participants
A straightforward way to estimate the difference in the change in net worth due to IDAs is to ask
participants.15 This section discusses savings strategies found in a survey and case studies of
participants in ADD (Moore et al., 2001 and 2000).16 The analysis here suggests that some IDA
deposits came from a mix of new savings and shifted assets.
New savings. ADD participants use some new-savings strategies that convert fundamental, nontradable resources into tradable forms to be saved in IDAs. Other strategies produce new savings
through restrained or low-quality consumption.
Some participants attempted to increase income through shifts of time to market production.
About 29 percent of those surveyed said that, because of IDAs, they worked longer hours, and 41
percent said that they were more likely to work more. About 59 percent said that they were more

15

This approach is not perfect. People may not know whether or not they shifted assets. Even if
they know, they might not tell the truth.
16
The survey was not designed to measure new savings versus shifted assets; it asked about the
presence of savings strategies, not how much was saved due to each strategy. Furthermore,
topics did not encompass all the ways to come up with new savings or to shift assets. For
example, the survey did not ask whether participants raided a bank account to make IDA
deposits. The analysis simply looked for broad clues about how ADD participants financed
IDAs.
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likely to work or to stay employed. Some case subjects said that, because of IDAs, they bartered
services or did odd jobs.
About 61 percent of surveyed participants said that IDAs made them more likely to increase
income in ways other than working more hours. For human capital, this might mean increases in
levels, in market returns, or in utilization. For example, some case subjects said that they put
more effort into budgeting and money management.
In several ways, participants spent more time, effort, and human capital in household production
so as to free up cash for IDAs without concomitant cuts in consumption. For example, 70
percent of survey respondents said that, because of IDAs, they shopped more carefully for food;
this used greater time, effort, and skill in household production to get greater value from market
purchases. Some case subjects said that, because of IDAs, they used coupons and searched for
bargains. Of surveyed participants, 68 percent said that they ate out less, a straight substitution
of household production for market purchases.
The most common strategies (but not necessarily the most important or most effective) involved
less consumption, either in amount or quality. For example, some case subjects said that they
conserved energy, cooked inexpensive meals, and cut back on treats. About 34 percent of those
surveyed said that they spent less on alcohol and tobacco.17
Participants also generated new savings through reduced quality of leisure. Among survey
respondents, 64 percent said that they spent less on leisure, and 30 percent said that they had less
money for leisure than they would have liked. Some case subjects said that they took fewer
vacation trips.
Asset shifts. In addition to new savings, participants in ADD shifted assets. For example, 35
percent of those surveyed said that, because of IDAs, they were less likely to save in other forms.
Even if they did not explicitly move cash or balances from other accounts into IDAs, this
response suggests that they still reduced additions to other accounts, and this is equivalent to an
explicit asset shift.
Debt financed some IDA deposits.18 Of those surveyed, 7 percent borrowed from family or
friends, 3 percent took on debt from another source, and 16 percent postponed bill payment.
Others—such as the 9 percent who reported that IDAs made it more difficult to pay bills—
probably made implicit shifts from debt to IDA deposits.
Household durables were also converted to IDA deposits. Of those surveyed, 12 percent said
that they had sold household or personal items to get cash for IDA deposits. Likewise, the 55
percent who said that they wore or bought used clothes (or postponed the purchase of new
clothes) shifted resources from household durables to IDAs.

17

The share of participants who used alcohol or tobacco in the first place is unknown.
The incidence of this strategy may be underreported because the question was asked by
program staff, and they had instructed participants not to finance IDAs with debt.
18
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Some participants postponed maintenance of other assets to finance IDAs. Of those surveyed, 17
percent said that, because of IDAs, they postponed visits to the doctor or dentist, and 8 percent
said that they gave up food or other necessities. One case subject cancelled membership in a
health club.19
In sum, the analysis here of data from Moore et al. (2001 and 2000) suggests that participants in
ADD financed deposits with a mix of new savings and shifted assets.
Models with Assumptions
Impact is defined as the difference in the change in an outcome with versus without a treatment.
(Moffitt, 1991). For new savings in IDAs, impact is the change in net worth for participants with
IDAs minus the change in net worth that would occur for participants without IDAs.
Three factors make this simple measurement scheme difficult to implement. First, we do not
observe all components of net worth. Second, we do not observe net worth for participants
without IDAs because participants—by definition—have IDAs. Third, participants are selfselected and program-selected, so they probably differ from non-participants in ways that make it
difficult to use the change in the net worth of non-participants as a proxy for the change in the
net worth of participants (if they did not have IDAs).
Thus, all attempts to measure new savings must make assumptions.20 These measurements must
assume some pattern of change (usually no change) for unmeasured components of net worth.
They must assume or estimate (usually based on non-participants) the change in measured
components of net worth for participants in the absence of IDAs. If the observed net worth of
non-participants is used to estimate the unobserved net worth of participants in the absence of
IDAs, then the analysis must control for (and/or assume away) non-IDA differences between the
two groups that may affect net worth.
Randomized experiments produce the most credible estimates of impact (Manski, 1995), but
even experiments suffer from many threats to validity (Heckman and Smith, 1995; Kramer and
Shapiro, 1984). For example, an experiment may fail to measure all components of net worth.
In the end, the key is to be careful and to make explicit the assumptions required to derive results
(Schreiner, 1999b).

19

All the examples here deal with human capital, but that does not mean that this type of neglect
was common nor that other types of maintenance were not also postponed.
20
What matters is not that there are assumptions but rather that they are made explicit.
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Figure 14.1 Distribution of Total Assets of Participants
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The evaluation of ADD includes an experimental design, but it is not yet complete. The
approach here is to make assumptions about what we do not know until new savings can be
measured from data in MIS IDA. As a prelude, we discuss the two broad components of net
worth, what participants in ADD own and what they owe.
Assets and Liabilities of Participants in ADD
Assets. At enrollment, most people in ADD (57 percent) had total assets below $5,000 (Figure
14.1). Exactly one-third of the 15 percent with assets in excess of $12,500 were homeowners.
Median total assets for participants in ADD were $1,710 (Table 14.1). A few people had very
high assets (one reported $290,435), so the mean ($11,718) exceeded the median.21
Asset shifts are easier if transaction costs are low. Transaction costs are lower for liquid assets
(cash, passbook savings accounts, and checking accounts) than for illiquid assets (homes, cars,
businesses, land or property, and investments).
Median liquid assets in ADD at enrollment were $125 (mean $490, Table 14.1).22 About 50
percent of participants had a passbook savings account (in addition to an IDA), and 63 percent
had a checking account.23 Liquid assets were 32 percent of the value of total assets.
21

In most programs in ADD, eligibility was income-tested but not asset-tested.
For the 76 percent of participants who reported non-zero liquid assets, the mean was $647 and
the median was $270.
23
MIS IDA did not record the value of cash on-hand.
22
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Table 14.1 Distribution of Assets of Participants by Type
Distribution
of Total
Asset Value
by Type
(%)
15
17
32

0
0
0

Max.
($)
15,480
10,000
15,480

Missing
134
202
262

Participants
with an
Asset Type
(%)
50
63
76

0
0
0
0
0
0

290,000
34,000
100,000
100,000
50,000
290,415

55
163
24
37
29
222

13
61
6
2
13
66

13
46
3
1
5
68

1,710
0
1,335
0
100 -99,350

290,435
281,000
258,150

413
136
495

84

100

Mean Median
($)
($)
250
0
231
50
490
125

Asset Type
Passbook Account
Checking Account
Total Liquid Assets

N
2,244
2,176
2,116

Home
Car
Business
Land or Property
Investments
Total Illiquid Assets

2,323
2,215
2,354
2,341
2,349
2,156

7,327
2,681
536
328
435
11,222

0
850
0
0
0
1,200

Total Assets
Total Liabilities
Net Worth

1,965
2,242
1,883

11,718
8,940
2,588

Min.
($)

For all participants, mean home value was $7,327 (Table 14.1). For the 13 percent of
participants who owned a home (and did not have missing values), the mean home value was
$54,725. For the 61 percent who owned a car, mean car value was $4,416. Median assets in
businesses, land or property, or investments were zero.
In terms of assets in MIS IDA, the typical participant in ADD had a car, about $100, and little
else. Not only were there few assets to shift into IDAs, but the low level of asset accumulation
before ADD suggests that there was little scope to shift through the reduction of the rate of
savings in non-IDA forms. Of course, some participants did have substantial assets, and they
may have shifted at least something. Unfortunately, we cannot say much more with the data
from MIS IDA unless we make strong assumptions (see below).
Liabilities. Most people in ADD (62 percent) had total liabilities of less than $5,000 (Figure
14.2). About 29 percent had no debt at all. Of the 17 percent with debt in excess of $12,500,
about half had home mortgages, and about one-third had student debt.
Median total liabilities in ADD were $1,335 (Table 14.2). A few people had very high debts
(one reported $281,000), so the mean ($8,940) exceeded the median.
The average participant had home-mortgage debt of $4,062. For the 10 percent of participants
who had a home mortgage, average mortgage debt was $40,928. The 21 percent of participants
with a car loan owed an average of $6,457.
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Figure 14.2 Distribution of Total Liabilities of Participants
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Table 14.2 Distribution of Liabilities of Participants by Type

Liability Type
Home Mortgage
Car Loan
Business Loan
Land or Property
Family and Friends Debt
Household Bills
Medical Bills
Credit-card
Student Loans
Total Liabilities

N
2,378
2,376
2,378
2,378
2,345
2,333
2,292
2,349
2,307
2,242

Mean Median
($)
($)
4,062
0
1,329
0
168
0
179
0
416
0
179
0
282
0
909
0
1,377
0
8,940
1,335

Total Assets
Net Worth

1,965
1,883

11,718
2,588

Min.
($)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1,710
0
100 -99,350

Max.
($)
Missing
250,000
0
28,000
2
90,000
0
100,000
0
120,000
33
23,000
45
42,000
86
60,000
29
90,000
71
281,000
136
290,435
258,150

413
495

Participants
with a
Liability
Type (%)
10
21
2
1
18
28
16
32
16
69

Distribution
of Total
Liability
Value by
Type (%)
12
19
1
1
10
14
8
21
14
100

84

The presence of debt suggests that many participants, if they wanted, could have shifted
resources from loans (or from loan repayments) into IDAs. For example, the 32 percent of
participants with credit-card debt owed an average of $2,812. The 18 percent who had borrowed
from family and friends owed an average of $2,338, the 28 percent with household bills owed an
average of $646, the 16 percent with medical bills owed an average of $1,774, and the 16 percent
with student debt owed an average of $8,656.
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Did participants fund IDAs with debt? The data in MIS IDA suggest that it was possible.
Participants could borrow, and they had debts on which they could have slowed repayment.
Net worth. Net worth is defined as the difference between assets and liabilities. In ADD,
median net worth was $100 (mean $2,588, Table 14.2).
Estimates of new savings. Very strong assumptions are required to use the general framework
in the first part of this chapter with data from MIS IDA to estimate the share of IDA deposits
from new savings. The exercise mostly shows the difficulty of the measurement of new savings.
First, we must measure all components of net worth. But MIS IDA, like all other data sources,
omits social assets and debts and does not record a financial value for human capital. We
assume that IDAs do not affect any part of net worth not recorded in MIS IDA.
Second, we must measure net worth for participants in the absence of IDAs. Of course, this is
unobservable. Also, we do not have a control group whose net worth might serve as a proxy.
We assume that net worth without an IDA is the same as it was at enrollment.
Third, we must measure changes in net worth through time. In fact, we only measure net worth
at a single point in time. To come up with changes, we assume that IDA balances are financed
by new savings and/or by asset shifts from liquid assets. We further assume that all liquid assets
up to the observed IDA balance are shifted.
Given these very strong assumptions, an estimate of new savings is the non-negative difference
between IDA balances and liquid assets at enrollment.
As of June 30, 2000, mean net deposits in ADD were $353 ($420 for non-exits). Median liquid
assets were $125. How much of IDA deposits could have been shifted from liquid assets?
Many people held no (or very little) liquid assets. For passbook savings, 48 percent had no
balances, and 29 percent had $1 to $249 (Figure 14.3). For checking accounts, 34 percent had no
balances, and 34 percent had $1 to $249 (Figure 14.4).
Asset shifts were assumed impossible for the 24 percent of participants with no liquid assets, and
most people had too few liquid assets at enrollment to fund all of their IDA deposits. Thus, some
people could not have funded their IDA deposits entirely with asset shifts.
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Figure 14.3 Distribution of Balances in Passbook Savings Accounts
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Figure 14.4 Distribution of Balances in Checking Accounts
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The per-participant mean of the maximum share of IDA balances in ADD that could come from
shifts of liquid assets is 53 percent (median 44 percent).24 If the heroic assumptions in this
exercise were correct (and they are not), then we would conclude that about half of IDA deposits
in ADD came from asset shifts and that about half came from new savings.
Of course, not all IDA deposits that could have come from liquid assets did so. On the other
hand, participants may have shifted from other components of net worth. The true share of IDA
deposits that came from new savings could be more or less than 50 percent. This exercise shows
how to narrow the general framework so that data from MIS IDA can provide an estimate of new
savings. It does not, however, provide a good estimate of new savings in ADD.

Summary
Do IDA deposits come from new savings or shifted assets? The framework here shows how
resources are converted among forms and how new savings comes from increased conversions of
fundamental, non-tradable forms to tradable forms. Anyone can shift assets into IDA deposits.
A survey and case studies from the evaluation of ADD suggest that IDA deposits come from
both new savings and shifted assets, but we do not know the importance of each in the mix.
If IDA are to promote both savings and asset accumulation, then they must do more than just
provide matches for asset accumulation; they must also spark new savings. The data in MIS
IDA do not permit a credible measurement of the magnitude of new savings in ADD; this must
wait for the data from the experimental-design.

24

This excludes exits because exits had zero net deposits and so asset shifts were irrelevant.
With exits included, the mean maximum share shifted is 44 percent (median 26 percent).
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15. Summary and Conclusions
In this final chapter, we summarize and comment on key findings from the American Dream
Demonstration (ADD). We also offer observations on IDA programs, policy, and research.
Savings and Asset Accumulation in IDAs in ADD
The Management Information System for Individual Development Accounts (MIS IDA) records
the following savings outcomes for ADD participants as of June 30, 2000:
•

2,378 participants opened IDA accounts in 14 programs.

•

The average participant (exits and non-exits) had average monthly net deposits (AMND) of
$25.42 ($30.30 for non-exits). The median was $17.96 ($23.35 for non-exits).

•

The average length of participation was 13.3 months.

•

The average participant had total net deposits of $353 ($420 for non-exits).

•

Given the average match rate of 2:1, the average participant accumulated assets in IDAs at a
rate of about $75 per month ($900 per year).

•

On average, participants made deposits in 7 of 12 months.

•

At the rate observed so far, participants will use 67 percent of their match eligibility.

•

Aggregate net deposits in ADD were $838,443. Aggregate asset accumulation (net deposits
plus match) was $2,482,951.

Can the poor save in IDAs? The ADD data show that they can. The possibility of saving by the
poor cannot be dismissed. IDAs may have great potential to boost savings and asset
accumulation for at least some poor people.
Saving Performance
How was saving performance in ADD? The glass can be viewed as half-empty or half-full. If
half-empty, we can ask why participants—at the current pace—would not take full advantage of
their match eligibility but rather would leave one-third of potential match dollars “on the table.”
If half-full, we can say that two-thirds is a high rate. As a comparison, about three-fourths of
IRA contributors take full advantage of that program, and only one-third reach the contribution
limit in each of three straight years (Bernheim, 1997). Thus, many non-poor participants in
subsidized-savings programs also leave tax benefits “on the table.”
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Amount of Accumulation
Are the assets accumulated in IDAs enough to make a difference? To give perspective, median
liquid assets (non-IDA bank accounts) for participants in ADD at enrollment were $125. Median
illiquid assets (mostly homes and cars) were $1,200, debt was $1,335, and net worth was $100.
At the median savings level ($17.96 per month) and with the median match rate (2:1), three years
in an IDA program would yield $1,940 in asset accumulation. If all IDA deposits were new
savings, then IDAs would increase the net worth of the typical participant by about 1,800
percent. Even if all IDA deposits were asset shifts, IDAs would increase median net worth by
about 1,200 percent.
For the non-poor, a few hundred dollars—or even a few thousand dollars—may not seem like
enough to make a difference. Data on matched withdrawals in ADD, however, suggest that
participants do use IDAs to purchase assets expected to have high returns and that mark key
steps in the life course. Perhaps more important, participants in qualitative components of the
evaluation of ADD say that their asset accumulations have changed their outlooks for the better.
Perhaps what matters is not only the amount of accumulation but also the process (and simple
existence) of accumulation. IDAs aim not only to spark savings but also to develop savers.
New Savings versus Asset Shifts
Did participants in ADD shift assets into IDAs? The data from MIS IDA cannot give a
definitive answer, but we do know that some people shifted assets and that some deposited new
savings. Data from Moore et al. (2001 and 2000) suggest that most participants worked more in
the household (for example, they ate out less often or shopped more carefully for food) to come
up with new savings. Also, about a third said that they worked more hours in the labor market.
The data also suggest that many participants shifted assets: one-third said that IDAs made them
less likely to save in other forms, 20 percent used debt to fund IDAs, and 17 percent decreased
maintenance of non-IDA assets. Most IDA deposits probably came from both new savings and
shifted assets, but the importance of each in the mix is unknown.
Matched Withdrawals
MIS IDA recorded the following results on matched withdrawals in ADD through June 30, 2000:
•

About 13 percent of participants had taken a matched withdrawal.

•

As participants accumulated larger balances through time, the incidence of matched
withdrawals increased. About 9 percent of participants had a matched withdrawal by their
12th month, and 27 percent had one by their 24th month.

•

Most participants used matched withdrawals for home purchase (24 percent), microenterprise
(24 percent), or post-secondary education (21 percent). All programs in ADD match these
three uses, and some also match other uses.
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•

Among those who had not made a matched withdrawal, most planned for home purchase (57
percent), microenterprise (18 percent), or post-secondary education (15 percent).

At least some participants in ADD saved and built assets through matched withdrawals. It is too
soon to know how many will eventually make a matched withdrawal, but probably most will.
Matched Uses
What uses of IDAs are best? Beyond the three central uses of home purchase, post-secondary
education, and microenterprise, possible uses include retirement, job training, home repair,
computer purchase (for access to information) and car purchase (for access to employment).
There are strong ideological and political positions for and against certain uses. As researchers,
our view is that the range of uses should be based on empirical evidence. Which uses lead to the
greatest improvements in well-being? Data from MIS IDA cannot tell us, but the experimentaldesign component of the evaluation of ADD should reveal something about the relative effects of
matched withdrawals for the three central uses.
For policy, the choice of uses for IDAs is more problematic. It might be better to allow just a
few types of uses at first and then to add new ones slowly and carefully. In policy matters, it is
easier to give than to take away; once a use is allowed, it will be difficult to disallow.
Deadlines. Unlike subsidized-savings programs for the non-poor, ADD imposes deadlines for
matched withdrawals, beyond which participants will lose access to matches. If the goal is to
improve the well-being of the poor in the long term, however, then these time limits are not
optimal. Some participants might be content just to save without a specific purchase in mind,
and it is not clear how they would benefit if forced to make a matchable purchase in a narrow
time frame. Limits on funds dictate time limits on ADD, but a better design would allow
accumulation for as long as participants wish.
Some people—and some IDA staff—see IDAs as short-term savings instruments. But this was
never the intent; it is merely an artifact of the nature of a policy demonstration. The policy goal
should be to allow people to save in IDAs until they decide that they are ready to make a
matched withdrawal. The transformation of IDAs into a short-term savings program seems
unfair and paternalistic; for example, public policy for 401(k) plans does not state that people
lose access if they miss an enrollment deadline or if they suspend contributions for long periods.
Exit
Data from ADD through June 30, 2000, suggest that saving is sometimes difficult for at least
some of the poor, even in the context of the supportive institutional structure of IDAs:
•

About 16 percent of participants (383) exited the program without a matched withdrawal.

•

Given exit patterns in ADD so far, 11 percent of participants will exit by their 12th month,
and 16 percent will exit by their 24th month.
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Saving will never be easy for poor people, and some exits are inevitable, but better policy and
program design may help to reduce exits. Recommendations include:
•

A policy of universal access to IDAs. The poor relocate more than the non-poor, and
widespread access would ensure that the poor do not leave IDAs behind when they move.

•

Program designs that do not kick out participants who save low amounts or who make
infrequent deposits. If the goal of IDAs is long-term improvement in well-being, then it
makes little sense to cut off access precisely to those for whom saving is most difficult. Not
all people can save the same amount in the same length of time, but this does not mean that
low savers would not benefit from greater access to institutionalized savings mechanisms.

Unmatched Withdrawals
The frequency and amount of unmatched withdrawals, coupled with their high cost in terms of
lost matches, suggests that saving is difficult for at least some participants:
•

About 37 percent of participants made an unmatched withdrawal from matchable balances.

•

About 25 percent of matchable balances were removed in unmatched withdrawals.

Changes in policy and program design might help to reduce unmatched withdrawals:
•

Staff involvement to help participants to solve problems that lead to unmatched withdrawals.

•

A savings account, labeled for emergencies, provided alongside the IDA. Even if
participants do not save more in the two accounts together than they would in an IDA alone,
the mere existence of the second account (and its label) may help to preserve (and increase)
IDA balances if it encourages participants to see IDAs as long-term savings.

Of course, these strategies would affect program costs. Different support structures should be
studied to assess both costs and benefits.
Costs
Data from MIS IDA on program costs are imperfect and probably overstated (and costs will
likely fall through time as programs grow in size and experience, and as programs incur less
costs for start-up, evaluation, policy involvement, and technical assistance to other IDA
programs), but the following figures are likely “in the ballpark” for ADD through June 30, 2000:
•

With matches excluded, program expenses were $70.38 per participant-month.

•

Seen another way, program costs were $2.77 per $1 of net deposits.

•

Costs in ADD decreased with time, from $117.58 per participant-month through June 30,
1999, to $43.66 per participant-month from July 1, 1999 to June 30, 2000.
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Is this cheap or expensive? We do not yet know. If benefits are large, then the costs of IDAs
could be a good investment. However, it seems likely that, regardless of potential benefits, these
program costs are too high to take IDAs “to scale” with millions of participants.
This presents a dilemma: most costs in IDA programs are for staff salaries, and participants in
the qualitative components of the evaluation of ADD say that the service-intensive features of
IDA programs (for example, financial education and contact with staff) improve outcomes. The
challenge is to identify which aspects of program design have benefits in excess of costs and to
set aside the others.
As for going to scale, it seems likely that if IDAs are someday to reach millions or tens of
millions of people, then they will run as a simple, minimum-service, minimum-cost system. As
a complement to this large and simple IDA system, states, local governments, foundations,
community organizations, corporations, and private citizens may provide additional IDA-related
services and funding through many different strategies, sometimes operating very intensively.
These complementary IDA programs would be integrated into the larger IDA system in that they
would work with the same set of financial institutions and IDA instruments, but the more
service-intensive tier would provide additional financial education, encouragement, and/or other
services. Competition in local “social markets” would determine the level of funds for more
service-intensive IDA programs in particular communities and with particular populations.
Despite higher costs, if intensive IDA programs prove worthwhile, they could become
widespread. Thus, a likely outcome is a “mixed system” of simple public IDA policy and more
intensive, community-based programs, funded from multiple sources (Sherraden, 2000).
The ADD Population
Are participants in ADD like others at or below 200 percent of the poverty line? The answer
matters because the outcomes from ADD may hold only for a small, program-selected, and selfselected segment of the low-income population.
Compared to the U.S. low-income population, ADD participants are better educated, more likely
to be employed, and more likely to have a bank account. This pattern reflects the explicit
targeting of programs in ADD to the “working poor.” Participants in ADD are also more likely
to be female, African-American, and never-married. This pattern reflects the populations served
by the community-development, social-service, and housing organizations in ADD.
Participants in ADD are both program-selected and self-selected. We believe that programselection dominates and that even very poor people can save in IDAs. An important policy
question is who would enroll in IDAs if all low-income people were eligible. Unfortunately, the
data from ADD cannot answer this question.
Program Characteristics and Savings Outcomes
How were the institutional characteristics of programs associated with savings outcomes? The
links matter because policy can affect institutional structure. The regression results discussed
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below control for a wide range of program and participant characteristics. We look at three
factors that, according to institutional theory, should affect saving performance:
•

Match rates in ADD range from 1:1 to 7:1. Higher match rates have large, strong links with
lower risk of unmatched withdrawals and with lower risk of exit. Match rates, however, are
not associated with the level of savings (AMND). We believe that these estimated
associations are due mostly to institutional factors, but economic factors, two-way causation,
and censored data also matter to some unknown extent.

•

The monthly savings target averaged $43 in ADD, and AMND was 67 percent of the target.
Higher targets were strongly linked with large reductions in the risk of unmatched
withdrawals and in the risk of exit. Higher targets were also strongly linked with higher
AMND. Three factors may explain this. First, institutional theory predicts that participants
may change match caps into goals and thus save more when presented with a higher cap.
Second, AMND is censored at the match cap. Third, programs may have assigned higher
targets to groups expected to be high savers. Censoring and two-way causation may induce a
positive correlation between the savings target and savings, even if the target per se has no
effect. We do not know the relative importance of these three factors.

•

Financial education is required of all participants in ADD. On average, participants had
attended 10.5 hours of general financial education. Each hour up to 12 was associated with
large increases in AMND, but hours after that had little effect. The data on financial
education are far from perfect (for example, we do not observe content or quality of classes).
If the results here are replicated in future research, however, then they have a simple, clear,
and important policy implication: financial education improves saving performance, and
shorter courses may be just as effective as longer courses.

Unobserved characteristics (both of programs and of participants) at a given program are
strongly correlated with savings outcomes. For example, AMND is $51 higher at the
ADD/AFIA site at CAAB than at the ADD/AFIA site at CVCAC, observed factors constant. We
believe that this reflects differences in programs more than differences in participants.
In sum, many signs suggest that the institutional structure of IDAs matters for saving, perhaps
particularly among the poorest. We have taken some first steps to identify these institutional
paths in theory (Beverly and Sherraden, 1999; Chapter 1), and we present empirical evidence
from ADD in this report. Both theoretically and empirically, however, we have only scratched
the surface of an area of knowledge that requires greater development. ADD may serve to
spotlight the effects of institutions on saving, particularly among the poor, but more thought and
research is required if this knowledge is to inform public policy and program design. Do the
poor use IDAs because of the high rate of return (through the match), because of the social and
psychological incentives and opportunities (through staff and peer support and through the
message that assets matter even for the poor), and/or because of the opportunities to constrain
choices (through regular savings goals and implicit penalties for unmatched withdrawals)?
Probably all of these institutional aspects matter, but we do not know the importance of each one.
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Participant Characteristics and Savings Outcomes
How were participant characteristics linked with savings outcomes in IDAs? We ask whether
IDAs are better suited to some people because IDAs might be targeted or universal. The
estimates below control for a wide range of program and participant characteristics and pertain
not to people eligible to enroll but rather only to people who did enroll. The descriptive data
below come from the most recent record in MIS IDA; to avoid issues of two-way causation, the
regression results use the at-enrollment record.
•

Gender. About 80 percent of participants in ADD were female. Gender was not associated
with any savings outcomes.

•

Race/ethnicity. About 47 percent of participants in ADD were African-American, 37 percent
Caucasian, 9 percent Hispanic, 3 percent Native American, 2 percent Asian-American, and 3
percent “Other.” Average AMND for all groups was at least $19.50, but differences between
groups were large. For example, compared with Asian Americans, average AMND was
$10.58 less for “Other,” $11.62 less for Hispanics, $12.77 less for Caucasians, $20.82 less
for African Americans, and $22.30 less for Native Americans. Thus, although IDAs do
increase inclusion in access to institutionalized savings mechanisms, and although IDAs do
decrease relative racial/ethnic gaps in wealth, they are not a panacea for absolute racial/ethnic
gaps in wealth.

•

Employment. Because many programs in ADD target the “working poor,” most participants
are employed; 78 percent worked full-time or part-time. Employment status was not
significantly associated with any measure of savings outcomes.

•

Education. Compared to the general low-income population, participants in ADD had more
education. About 85 percent completed high school, and 24 percent had some type of
college degree. This reflects how programs in ADD target the “working poor.” Education
was not linked with exit, but AMND was highest for people with 4-year college degrees.

•

Receipt of public assistance. About 50 percent of participants received some type of public
assistance at or before enrollment. Receipt at enrollment did not affect savings outcomes.

•

Income. On average, the income of participants in ADD was 111 percent of the poverty line
(median 100 percent). About 88 percent were below 200 percent of poverty. Income was
not strongly linked with any savings outcomes. The very poor, however, saved a larger share
of their income than the less-poor. The permanent-income hypothesis of economic theory
would not predict this. Possible explanations include institutional factors, censored data, and
measurement error. We believe that institutional factors matter most and that they may be
strongest for the poorest.

•

Insurance coverage. About 51 percent of participants in ADD had health insurance, and 31
percent had life insurance. Health insurance did not have a significant link with any savings
outcomes. Life insurance was not linked with AMND, but it was correlated with a reduced
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risk of exit and of unmatched withdrawals. Perhaps unobserved factors that affect savings—
such as long-range plans or financial sophistication—are also linked with life insurance.
•

Asset ownership. Participants who owned assets at enrollment (checking accounts, homes, or
cars) had greater savings, less risk of exit, and less risk of unmatched withdrawals. They
may have had unobserved characteristics correlated both with past savings and with future
savings, and/or they may have had more assets to shift.

The “Working Poor”
Some people may worry that access to IDAs would harm the poorest because, with few
resources, saving would cause hardship. Should IDAs be offered only to the “working poor”?
Indeed, most of the IDA programs in ADD chose to target the “working poor.” Was this a good
choice? Perhaps. The “working poor” did save in IDAs. Current receipt of public assistance,
however, was not linked with savings outcomes. Likewise, income was not strongly related with
savings outcomes. The poorest saved less than others, but not because of their low income; in
fact, the very poor saved a larger share of their income than the less-poor. ADD suggests that, at
a minimum, inclusion of the very poor in access to IDAs may make sense. As far as we know,
IDAs are effective even for people below the poverty line. Of course, evidence from ADD
pertains only to people who enrolled and not to people eligible to enroll, but the ability of the
poorest to save in IDAs deserves a better test than it has yet received.
Race/ethnicity
Results by race/ethnicity are important. Foremost, enrollees in ADD from all groups saved in
IDAs. The large gaps for African Americans and Native Americans, however, are troubling. On
average, people in these groups hold little wealth relative to Caucasians. IDAs in ADD did not
make this profound inequality worse. Indeed, if all low-income African Americans and
Caucasians were to save in IDAs as they did in ADD, then the ratio of net worth between the
groups would improve a lot. Nonetheless, unequal savings outcomes for different groups
represent lost potential for asset building, particularly for African Americans and Native
Americans. This pattern is unacceptable. IDA research should ask diligently why it occurs and,
more important, what might be done to narrow the gaps.
Toward the Future
Although the MIS IDA data for ADD are suggestive in a number of areas, they are not definitive.
We do not yet know much about how or why the poor save in IDAs, although data from the
qualitative components of ADD have begun to shed light on these questions. Also, these
quantitative data do not say whether the poor save more with IDAs than they would otherwise.
The evaluation of ADD includes multiple methods to address questions which data from MIS
IDA cannot answer. For example, in-depth interviews with participants aim to learn how they
perceive IDAs and their advantages and disadvantages. The goal is to learn how and why the
poor save in IDAs, in their own words, and to tease out qualitative social and psychological
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effects. Often, the interviews seek to understand, confirm, or disprove the preliminary results
from MIS IDA data.
The experimental-design component of ADD will test the impact of IDAs on savings, asset
accumulation, and a wide range of social and economic outcomes through a longitudinal survey
of people with access to IDAs and of people without access. This social experiment is
innovative in its focus on saving by the poor and in its use of a survey instrument crafted to
measure “asset effects” on world views and on behaviors that go beyond financial outcomes.
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Appendix A
The Evaluation of ADD: Purpose, Methods, and Progress
The American Dream Demonstration (ADD) is the first systematic evaluation of IDAs. Its
purpose is to find out whether IDAs are successful, in what ways, and for whom. Because IDAs
are new and because there is much to learn, evaluation is central to the purpose of ADD.
The ADD evaluation is multi-faceted; indeed, it may be one of the most thorough and
comprehensive evaluations of a social or economic policy demonstration. CSD has designed the
evaluation with the advice of an expert Evaluation Advisory Committee. The evaluation uses
multiple methods (Sherraden, et al., 1995), each with a different purpose, and the evaluation will
take place over the course of seven years (1997-2003). These multiple methods are designed to
look at ADD from as many perspectives as possible and to gather timely data as the
demonstration progresses in order to inform the development of IDA policy and of programs
outside of ADD (Table A.1).
Purposes of the Evaluation
The ADD evaluation is intended to yield information in the following areas:
• An answer to the question: Do IDAs work?
• Lessons about the effectiveness of different designs and practices for IDA programs.
• Models to guide state and federal IDA policy.
• Knowledge about saving and asset accumulation by the poor.
Features of the Evaluation
Elements of the design of the evaluation include:
• Guidance from an expert Evaluation Advisory Committee.
• Research designs that follow as much as possible from theoretical statements and that
explicitly seek alternative explanations.
• Multiple methods of evaluation, each designed for different purposes.
• Analyses that are based insofar as possible on tests of hypotheses but that also allow for the
emergence of unanticipated findings.
Research Questions
The ADD evaluation seeks answers to the following questions (Sherraden, 1999a):
• What impedes or facilitates the start-up and implementation of a successful IDA program?
• What are useful design features for an IDA program?
• What is the pattern of saving by participants in an IDA program?
• What affects saving behavior by participants in an IDA program?
• What do participants use IDA savings for?
• What are the impacts of IDAs for participants on asset accumulation and life goals (for
example, education, home ownership, and self-employment)?
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•
•
•

What are the social, psychological, and economic effects of asset-holding for IDA
participants and their families?
What is the net financial return of an IDA program to participants and to society?
What are the community-level effects of an IDA program?

Research Methods
The ADD evaluation uses eight research methods:
• Assessment of program start-up and implementation.
• Monitoring of on-going program and participant data through MIS IDA.
• Case studies of participants.
• Cross-sectional survey of participants.
• In-depth interviews with participants.
• Longitudinal survey of participants and of a control group within an experimental design.
• Assessment of effects at the community level.
• Financial benefit-cost analysis.
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Research Type
Assessment of
Program
Implementation

Purpose
To describe IDA programs-asimplemented so that different
designs can be usefully compared
and communicated as lessons.
To track program-level data and to
collect individual-level data on
savings and personal
characteristics for all participants.
To provide biographical context.
To assess saving behavior and
outcomes for participants at a
point in time.
To add detail, examples, and
understanding to quantitative
results from fixed-format surveys.

Monitoring Ongoing Program
and Participant
Data in MIS IDA
Case Studies of
Participants
Cross-sectional
Survey of
Participants
In-depth
Interviews with
Participants
To compare savings and outcomes
for people with and without access
to IDAs.

To assess community impacts
such as improved neighborhood
conditions and civic engagement.

Longitudinal
Survey of
Participants and of
a Control Group
within an
Experimental
Design

Assessment of
Effects at the
Community Level

Financial Benefitcost Analysis

To estimate the financial effects of
an IDA program from the
perspectives of different groups of
stakeholders.

Statistical analysis.

Qualitative-analysis
program.

Statistical analysis for
ADD as a whole and each
program.

Analysis
Pattern matching and
time-series comparisons.

CSD

CSD

CSD

CSD

Evaluator
CSD

Year 3 data collection
completed.

Report completed.

Comments
Two-year study;
completed data
collection in March
1999.
Collect data annually
across four years of
demonstration, and
perhaps beyond.
Report completed.
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Qualitative-analysis
program.

Abt Associates will
analyze and report on
basic impacts.

CSD

Research
consortium in
Atlanta

Assessment in Atlanta.

CSD

CSD will analyze survey
results.
Baseline program-cost
study for first 14 months
completed. Further
estimates will be done
through the fifth year of
the experimental design.

CSD will analyze and
report on questions
regarding saving
behavior and the effects
of asset accumulation.

Abt
Associates

Method one: Preprogram and postprogram differences with
a comparison community.
Method two: Statistical
analysis.
Financial benefit-cost
analysis.

Statistical analysis within
a randomized
treatment/control
framework.

Table A.1 Research Methods in ADD
Method
Case studies during years 1 and 2 using
program records, guided narratives,
interviews, and focus groups of staff
and participants.
ADD programs use MIS IDA to collect
data on participants at enrollment, on
monthly account statements, and on
monthly program inputs and outputs.
Multiple interviews in the course of
two days in the homes of 16
participants.
Fixed-format survey with 298 current
participants and 26 former participants.
Purposeful, guided, open-ended
interviews with 62 members of the
treatment group in the experimental
design and with 26 members of the
control group.
Of 1,103 qualified applicants at one
ADD program, 537 were randomly
assigned to a treatment group with
access to IDAs and 566 were assigned
to a control group. All were surveyed
just before assignment. Follow-up
surveys will take place 18 months and
42 months after assignment. CSD
designed and pre-tested the
questionnaire; Abt Associates revised
the questionnaire and collects the data.
Method one: Assess changes in social
indicators and visual appearances.
Method two: Evaluate community
engagement through surveys of
individuals.
Identify cash flows linked with IDAs
for participants and society with data
from program administrators, funders,
MIS IDA, and the longitudinal survey.
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Progress of the ADD Evaluation
Assessment of program start-up and implementation. Every six months for the first two
years, IDA programs completed an open-ended “guided narrative” that assessed many aspects of
program implementation and administration. After reviewing this information, CSD conducted
face-to-face interviews with representatives from each of the 13 host organizations. The four
rounds of guided narratives and interviews were completed in September 1997, March 1998,
October 1998, and March 1999. Deborah Page-Adams of the University of Kansas, a CSD
faculty associate, led the assessment team. Ed Scanlon of the University of Washington in
Seattle and a CSD faculty associate, and Freda Bady and Lissa Johnson of CSD helped to
conduct the interviews. A report on the first year of implementation is part of the Start-Up
Evaluation Report (Sherraden et al., 1999). A final implementation report is forthcoming.
Monitoring on-going program data through the Management Information System for
Individual Development Accounts (MIS IDA). The Start-Up Evaluation Report (Sherraden, et
al., 1999) reflects data collected from Version 1.0 of MIS IDA through June 30, 1998. Saving
Patterns in IDA Programs (Sherraden, et al., 2000) reflects savings data and personal
characteristics from Version 2.0 through June 30, 1999. This report reflects data from Version
3.0 through June 30, 2000. The next monitoring report will use data through December 31,
2001.
Case studies of participants. Case studies are like in-depth interviews, but they are more
extensive. They sought richer biographies of participants and of the ways in which IDAs have
affected their lives. Furthermore, cases can be followed through time via multiple interviews.
Both successful and unsuccessful IDA participants were interviewed. The purposes of the case
studies were to inform the in-depth interview process as well as to bring detail and life to the
quantitative data. Margaret Sherraden of the University of Missouri and a CSD faculty associate,
Karen Edwards and Freda Bady of CSD, and Courtney Everson and Philip Hong conducted
multiple interviews with each of 16 participants in ADD programs in rural Vermont,
Washington, D.C., Chicago, Kansas City, and San Francisco.
Cross-sectional survey of participants. Because the evaluation of ADD seeks to inform the
design of programs and policies even before ADD ends and because experimental-design data
that could show IDA impacts will not be available until Fall 2001, CSD conducted a crosssectional survey of participants in some of the non-experimental programs. This brief, snap-shot
survey asked participants about IDAs, saving behavior, and the effects of asset accumulation.
Esther Cho of CSD, Sandy Beverly of the University of Kansas and a CSD faculty associate, and
Michael Sherraden of CSD prepared and revised the survey instrument; it was pre-tested in May
1999 at one IDA program, and administered at seven other IDA programs in July-September
1999 by Amanda Moore and Margaret Lombe of CSD. The research report has been completed
(Moore et al., 2001).
In-depth interviews with participants. The instrument for the in-depth interviews was
designed by Margaret Sherraden of the University of Missouri and a CSD faculty associate, and
it was tested with IDA participants at a non-ADD IDA program. CSD consulted with Kathy
Edin of the Evaluation Advisory Committee in the design. A first round of in-depth interviews

Center for Social Development
Washington University in St. Louis

Appendix A 189

with 62 members of the treatment group and with 26 members of the control group were
completed by a team led by Amanda Moore of CSD in July and November of 2000.
Longitudinal survey of participants and of a control group within an experimental design.
The experimental design has been implemented at CAPTC Large-scale, with survey data from
537 participants in the treatment group and 566 people in the control group collected by Abt
Associates with a questionnaire initially developed by CSD and then revised by Abt. Baseline
data (Wave 1) were collected just before the random assignment of qualified applicants from
October 1998 through Fall 1999. In Wave 2, members of the treatment and control groups are
interviewed 18 months after assignment. Wave 2 began in May 2000 and will continue through
June 2001. In Wave 3, treatments and controls will be interviewed 42 months after assignment.
Assessment of effects at the community level. No program in ADD concentrates a large
number of IDAs in a limited, identified geographic area. Without a high concentration of IDAs,
community-level effects might be too small to measure, so CSD has reached an agreement with
the Atlanta United Way to have a community-level assessment conducted in a place where IDAs
for homeownership are being concentrated as a neighborhood-revitalization strategy. James
Emshoff, a researcher at Georgia State University, leads an evaluation team that includes other
researchers with experience in community-level evaluation from Emory University and from The
Atlanta Project. Support for costs comes from CSD, from the Atlanta United Way, and from
Annie E. Casey Foundation neighborhood-research funds.
Financial benefit-cost analysis. Mark Schreiner (2000b) has completed a benefit-cost
framework to guide data collection and analysis on costs and impacts from the experimental
design. Data will be collected throughout the demonstration, and final analysis and reporting
will take in the fifth year of ADD. An analysis of costs for the first 14 months for IDAs in the
experimental design has been completed (Schreiner, 2000a).
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Appendix B
Data, MIS IDA, and Methods
This chapter discusses the data and methods used to analyze saving behavior in ADD. The goal
is to help readers to make informed judgements about how best to use the results.

Data
MIS IDA
Program staff collect data for the evaluation of ADD with the Management Information System
for Individual Development Accounts (MIS IDA). MIS IDA also helps programs to manage the
logistics of IDAs. CSD anticipated the need for MIS IDA, designed and wrote the software, and
now distributes and supports it.1
MIS IDA provides management tools such as account statements, mailings, and more than 30
reports. It also generates a comprehensive data base on program characteristics, participant
characteristics, and enrollments, deposits, and withdrawals. Moreover, with MIS IDA in place,
an IDA program can track its own performance, and the data base facilitates external evaluation.
MIS IDA is used in 40 states and in the District of Columbia.
CSD identified the need for a management-information system in 1995. In 1996, we put
together a national team to identify the types of data that such a system should collect. Version
1.0 of MIS IDA was released in mid-1997, and Version 2.0 was released in 1998. Version 3.0,
released in January 2000, was used to collect the data in this report. Table B.1 lists selected
fields collected in MIS IDA Version 3.0.
Data Quality
CSD also developed a complementary software program—MIS IDA QC—as a quality-control
tool for researchers and IDA programs to check the accuracy of data in MIS IDA. Programs in
ADD received reports from MIS IDA QC in January 2000, and they received the software in
May 2000. To ensure clean data, CSD and the programs spent several person-months doing
cross-checks for data-entry errors, missing values, and accounting inconsistencies. Programs
were asked to correct missing or inconsistent data. This extensive process significantly
improved the quality of data from ADD.
IDA staff record five types of data in MIS IDA: account-structure parameters at the start of the
program, socio-economic data on participants at enrollment, monthly cash-flow data from
account statements, monthly inputs and expenses, and intermittent events such as class
attendance and exit.

1

Hinterlong and Johnson, 2000.
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Table B.1 Selected Data Collected in MIS IDA Version 3.0
Characteristics of Programs
• Age of host organization
• Type of financial institution(s)

Demographics of Participants continued
• Number of children in household
• Race/Ethnicity
• Education status
• Employment status

Funding Partners of Programs
• Type of organization
• Matchable uses
• Starting and ending dates of partnership
• Amount and type of contribution
Account Structure for Programs
• Frequency of account statements
• Number of signatures required for withdrawals
• Penalties for unmatched withdrawals
• Matchable uses
• Wait period(s)
Inputs and Costs of Programs
• Types of marketing activities
• Salary expenses (includes benefits)
• Non-salary expenses (consultants, rent or mortgage,
equipment, utilities, supplies, travel, and other)
• Hours of salaried staff of the IDA program
• Hours of volunteer staff
• Hours of staff of partner organizations
Financial Education
• Hours of general financial education offered and required
by a program
• Hours of asset-specific education required by a program
• Hours of general financial education attended by a
participant
• Hours and types of asset-specific education attended by a
participant
Enrollment of Participants
• Social Security number
• Name and address
• Name and address of relative
• Enrollment date
• Date of exit
• Reason for exit
• Previous relationship with host organization
• Referral from partner organization
Demographics of Participants
• Gender
• Year of birth
• Urban/rural residence
• Marital status
• Number of adults in household

Income and Public Assistance of Participants
• Monthly gross income (wages, government benefits,
pensions, investments, self-employment, child support,
gifts, and other)
• Former TANF or AFDC status
• Current TANF status
• Current food-stamp status
• Current SSI/SSDI status
Assets, Liabilities, and Insurance of Participants
• Assets (passbook savings, checking, home, car, business,
land or property, investments)
• Liabilities (home, car, business, land or property, family
or friends, household bills, medical bills, credit cards,
student loans)
• Insurance (health, life)
Account Data for Participants
• Number of bank account
• Name of financial institution
• Date account opened and date closed
• Funding partner(s)
• Use of direct deposit
• Type of match-cap structure
• Annual match cap
• Lifetime match cap
• Match rate
• Time cap
Periodic Deposits and Withdrawals by Participants
• Starting and ending balance
• Number and amount of deposits
• Number and amount of withdrawals
• Amount of service fees
• Amount of interest
Matched Withdrawals by Participants
• Use of withdrawal
• Vendor name and address
• Withdrawal date
• Amount withdrawn
• Amount of match
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The cash-flow data from MIS IDA are probably the best data (and perhaps the only data) that
exist on high-frequency saving behavior by the poor in any subsidized-savings program. This
report centers on this data. We know that the cash flows are accurate and complete because they
come from records from depository institutions and satisfy accounting identities.
Data Caveats
The staff members of IDA programs are not full-time researchers, and, despite their consistent
commitment to accurate data and their strong support for the evaluation as a whole, quality
varies among programs and among types of data. Most time-constant demographic variables are
accurate. After ADD started, however, some questions were added to MIS IDA. Programs went
back and asked most participants the new questions, but they did not ask for the data as of
enrollment.2 Also, answers were difficult to obtain from people who had already left ADD.
As in all surveys, data on income, assets, and liabilities are measured with error. Participants
often do not know these values, especially for non-financial assets such as homes or cars. MIS
IDA asked for income at the household level but for assets at the individual level, and we do not
know how participants reported jointly owned assets. Some people may have understated
income or assets in the belief that this would increase their chances of acceptance into the meanstested program.
Account-structure parameters in MIS IDA may not always match the rules used in the field.
This might result from staff turnover, because programs did not think much about some aspects
of account structure (such as the time cap) until after they started, and/or because programs
changed the structure of accounts but did not record the change in MIS IDA.
We cannot check whether program staff recorded all intermittent events. Furthermore, data on
inputs and costs are measured with error. Most IDA programs in ADD are not distinct cost
centers within their host organizations, and few explicitly track the hours spent on IDAs by
employees, volunteers, or partners. Most programs have no formal system to allocate expenses
(for example, rent, overhead, and salaries and fringe benefits) between the IDA program and
other programs run by the host.3 Cross-checks on this data are difficult.
Summary
On the whole, the ADD data are probably the best on high-frequency savings by the poor in a
subsidized-savings program. Like all data, however, they are imperfect.4 We would be remiss to
allow the reader to believe otherwise. Of course, most data sets have similar imperfections. This
report is perhaps unusual only in that it discusses these issues and how they might affect the
results.
2

Even if the questions had been asked retrospectively, it would have been difficult for
participants after enrollment to give answers based on their remembered at-enrollment state.
3
Because the two collaboratives work with several member organizations that all incur costs
without a central system of accounting, their data on inputs and expenses are omitted.
4
Schreiner (2000c) and other chapters in this report discuss other data issues.
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Methods
Population. Participants are defined as enrollees in ADD with at least one account statement in
MIS IDA as of June 30, 2000.5 The report looks at participants, not at people eligible to be
participants. The results pertain to saving behavior of people who choose to enroll in an IDA
program. These people probably expect greater net benefits from IDAs than people who do not
choose to enroll. Because of this self-selection, the average participant probably saves more and
has more positive outcomes than would the average person eligible to participate. The
evaluation of ADD looks at behavior and impacts for participants, not for eligibles, although we
would like to understand behavior and impacts for both groups. We hope that future research
will be able to ask about eligibles.
Time frame. One policy-relevant research question is how the poor would save if they had
permanent access to IDAs. We cannot address this question because ADD has time limits.
Another useful question is how the poor would save if they had access to IDAs for the full length
of ADD. We cannot address this question yet because ADD has not ended. This report can
address only questions about programs with designs similar to ADD and at similar points in the
project life cycle. Such limitations are the norm in policy demonstrations. The questions that we
are able to ask are still useful.
This report asks about saving behavior only while participants are active. It does not look at
months after the start of ADD but before enrollment, nor at months after exit or after graduation
but before the end of ADD. For some purposes, we would like to know about behavior in all
months of eligibility. This would capture the effects of the timing of enrollment, of the timing of
breaks and restarts in saving, and of the timing of matched and unmatched withdrawals.
Two-way causation. A key goal of this report is to look at how saving behavior varies with
aspects of institutional design (for example, the match rate or the match cap). For practical
reasons, ADD did not randomly assign design attributes to participants. Instead, each IDA
program designed its own rules and account structures.6 In some cases, programs may have
shaped institutional structures in response to their expectations for saving behavior by members
of their intended target groups. This means that rules affected saving behavior, and anticipated
saving behavior may have affected rules, even though rules were set before enrollment.7 This
two-way causation biases estimates of links between institutional design and saving behavior.8

5

ADD had 2,378 participants, excluding five people with IDAs in both Shorebank and WSEP.
ADD encouraged programs to revise designs as they learned what worked. This facilitated
qualitative evaluation of the effects of program design but impeded quantitative evaluation.
7
Some programs changed rules (or want to change rules) in response to observed behavior.
8
For example, suppose that, to equalize asset accumulation across groups, programs assign
lower match rates to groups likely to save more—regardless of the match rate—and higher match
rates to groups likely to save less. If expectations are correct, then higher match rates may be
linked with lower savings (or have no estimated link), even if—all else constant— higher match
rates increase savings. Sherraden et al. (2000) and Chapter 13 argue that this may have
happened in ADD.
6
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Statistical significance. This report discusses the precision of estimates of links between
savings outcomes and the characteristics of participants and programs in terms of statistical
significance. Results are statistically significant if they are not likely due to sampling variation.
Larger sample sizes boost statistical significance, the confidence that an estimated relationship is
“real” and does not merely reflect an unusual sample due to chance.
For example, suppose that we want to test a coin for fairness (a fair coin lands on “heads” half
the time). For 100 tosses of a fair coin, we would expect about 50 “heads.” Even for a fair coin,
however, we would not be surprised if, because of luck, we got 60 or more “heads.” But luck
should even out with more tosses. If we tossed the coin 1,000 times and had 600 or more
“heads,” then we might wonder whether the coin is really fair. If 1,000,000 tosses produce
600,000 or more “heads,” then we would strongly suspect a rigged coin.
The result of 60 or more “heads” in 100 tosses may not be statistically significant; it could
happen even with a fair coin. The result of 600 or more “heads” in 1,000 tosses is more
statistically significant; it is unlikely with a fair coin. The result of 600,000 or more “heads” in
1,000,000 tosses is highly statistically significant; it would almost never happen with a fair coin.
Statistical significance is expressed as a degree of confidence. For example, suppose that many
people toss fair coins 100 times and that 75 percent of them get 59 or fewer “heads.” If we then
toss a coin of unknown fairness 100 times and get 60 “heads,” we can have 75-percent
confidence that it is not a fair coin.
The p-value is the complement of the confidence level, expressed as a probability rather than as a
percentage. For example, 75-percent confidence implies a p-value of 0.25. If the confidence
level is x percent, then the p-value is (100–x)÷100. The higher the confidence, the lower the pvalue.
Most research calls results “statistically significant” only if the confidence level exceeds 95
percent (or, equivalently, if the p-value is less than 0.05). This is a mechanical use of statistical
significance that does not substitute for thought and argument (McCloskey, 1985; Cowger,
1984). For some purposes, lower levels of confidence might suffice. For example, Chapter 8
suggests that, compared to a match rate of 3:1, a match rate of 4:1 to 7:1 is associated with a
decrease in the risk of exit, with 86-percent confidence. Because the confidence level is less than
95 percent, the typical approach would label the result “statistically insignificant” and proceed as
if the match rate did not affect exit. But it may make more sense to assume that match rates do
not affect exit unless there is very strong evidence to the contrary. In fact, if the net benefit of a
correct choice based on the assumption that match rates do affect exit is not much less than the
net benefit of a correct choice based on the opposite assumption, then it is wasteful to ignore the
85-percent chance that higher matches rates decrease exit in favor of a focus on the 15-percent
chance that higher match rates do not affect exit.
Statistical significance depends on both the real relationship and the sample size. With small
samples, statistical significance is rare, even if the real relationship is strong. With large
samples, statistical significance is common, even if the real relationship is weak. Policy should
look at both statistical significance and at the size of the estimated association.
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Of course, statistical significance implies only association, not causality. Furthermore, statistical
significance does not imply policy significance, and statistical insignificance does not imply
policy insignificance. For example, a statistically insignificant link between the match rate and
exit might usefully imply that low matches are just as good as high ones.
Finally, statistical significance measures imprecision due to sampling variation; it ignores all
other sources of imprecision (such as measurement error). For example, a model may assume
that AMND depends only on gender, even though it really depends on a host of other factors but
not on gender. If gender is correlated with the other factors, however, then the model might find
a large, statistically significant (but incorrect) link between AMND and gender.9

9

Some argue that this means that “statistical significance” should be reserved only for very high
levels of confidence to compensate somehow for the lack of knowledge of other sources of
imprecision. Imprecision from sampling variation, however, has no set relationship with
imprecision from other sources. Rather than use statistical significance as a crutch, a better
approach is to describe sources of imprecision and their effects as well as possible.
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Appendix C
Host Organizations and Account Structures in ADD
ADVOCAP, Inc.,
Fond Du Lac, Wisconsin
Program Information
ADVOCAP, founded in 1966, is a community-action agency whose mission is to create
opportunities for people and communities to reduce poverty. Operating revenues of $8.1 million
support 180 staff positions and the operation of agency services across 12 departments that serve
primarily rural areas in three counties. ADVOCAP provides emergency services as well as
permanent solutions based on asset-development approaches. Its asset-development models
include a business-development program (established 1985), a first-time home-ownership
program (established 1991), and one of the first IDA programs anywhere (established 1995).
ADVOCAP runs four IDA sites. This report includes data only from the two sites in ADD, the
original site and a new ADD site that runs under AFIA rules.
The IDA program at ADVOCAP targets people at or below 150 percent of the poverty line. As
of June 30, 2000, the 82 participants had income that averaged 123 percent of the poverty line.
Program Design and Account Structure
ADVOCAP requires participants to take 10 hours of general financial education before they can
make a matched withdrawal. Asset-specific education is offered but not required.
ADVOCAP offers a match rate of 2:1 on deposits of up to $1,000 in a 24-month lifetime matchcap structure. Thus, maximum asset accumulation is $3,000. Participants have 24 months after
the 24-month time cap expires to make matched withdrawals. Matchable uses are home
purchase, post-secondary education, microenterprise, home repair, and job training.

Alternatives Federal Credit Union
Ithaca, New York
Program Information
Alternatives FCU, founded in 1979, is a community-development credit union whose mission is
to provide a full range of banking services and financial resources for small businesses,
non-profit organizations, and under-served segments of the local community. Alternatives FCU
stresses customer service and provides alternative financial options including flexible mortgages,
community-lending partnerships, and a youth credit union. Alternatives FCU partnered with the
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Ithaca Housing Authority’s Family Self-Sufficiency Program to develop and implement its IDA
program. The IDA program began in 1997, and the first account was opened in February 1998.
The IDA program at Alternatives FCU targets single parents and youth. As of June 30, 2000, the
93 participants in ADD had income that averaged 97 percent of the poverty line.
Program Design and Account Structure
Alternatives FCU requires that participants take 10 hours of general financial education before
they make a matched withdrawal. Asset-specific education is required for matched withdrawals
for home purchase (10 hours) or microenterprise (33 hours).
Alternatives FCU offers a 3:1 match rate, an annual match-cap structure, and a $500 annual
match cap. The time cap for all ADD participants is December 31, 2001. Matchable uses are
home purchase, post-secondary education, microenterprise, and home repair.

Bay Area IDA Collaborative
Oakland, California
Program Information
The Bay Area IDA Collaborative comprises 28 community-based organizations which
collectively serve a significant portion of the low-income population in the San Francisco Bay
area. The East Bay Asian Local Development Corporation (EBALDC), founded in 1975, is a
Community Development Corporation and is the lead organization for the Bay Area IDA
Collaborative. EBALDC has expanded its mission from serving the Asian-American and
Pacific-Islander community to building strong communities among diverse low-income
populations. Services include affordable housing, community organizing and planning, and
economic development.
EBALDC runs four IDA sites; this report includes only the original site and a new ADD site that
runs under AFIA rules. The non-ADD IDA sites work with Welfare-to-Work individuals in
Alameda and San Francisco Counties, the Davis Street Community Center Program, and a
program for home buyers through Affordable Housing Affiliation in Solano County. The two
ADD sites serve low-income people of color referred by member organizations. As of June 30,
2000, the 245 participants in ADD had income that averaged 109 percent of the poverty line.
Program Design and Account Structure
EBALDC requires participants to take 10 hours of general financial education before they make
a matched withdrawal. Asset-specific education is also required for home purchase (14 hours)
and microenterprise (30 hours).
EBALDC offers a match rate of 2:1 in a lifetime match-cap structure with a time cap of
December 31, 2001. Participants who plan matched withdrawals for post-secondary education,
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microenterprise, or job training have a match cap of $600 (maximum asset accumulation of
$1,800). Due to the high cost of homes in the Bay Area, the match cap is $1,920 for participants
who plan matched withdrawals for home purchase (maximum asset accumulation of $5,760).

Capital Area Asset Building Corporation (CAAB)
Washington, D.C.
Program Information
CAAB is a non-profit corporation comprised of 11 community-based organizations whose goal
is to bring an asset-based economic-development system to scale in the disadvantaged
neighborhoods of the District of Columbia. The collaborative was created in 1997 with a
mission to build capacity through a centralized, systemic approach to the implementation of
IDAs in the District, to craft a collaborative fundraising strategy to minimize competition among
community-based organizations, and to join forces in advocacy activities to help pass legislation
for asset accumulation for low-income residents. Member organizations run IDA programs and
provide services to clients.
CAAB runs two IDA sites, one an original ADD site and one a new ADD site that runs under
AFIA rules. The IDA programs serve an urban population of youth and adults. As of June 30,
2000, the 153 participants had income that averaged 139 percent of the poverty line.
Program Design and Account Structure
Requirements for financial education vary among the member organizations in CAAB.
Requirements average about 20 hours. Some members require completion of general financial
education before an IDA account is opened, while others require only that classes be completed
before matched withdrawals. On average, asset-specific requirements are 32 hours for home
purchase, 20 hours for post-secondary education, and 22 hours for microenterprise.
CAAB offers match rates that vary from 2:1 to 7:1, depending on the member organization and
on the planned use. Match caps also vary across member organizations, but all participants have
a lifetime match-cap structure. Time caps are 24 months for most participants and up to 48
months for youth. Matchable uses for CAAB as a whole include home purchase, post-secondary
education, microenterprise, and job training.
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Central Texas Mutual Housing Association (CTMHA)
Austin, Texas
Program Information
CTMHA is a community-based non-profit organization whose mission is to provide affordable
housing to help families to improve their lives and to pursue their dreams. Founded in 1986,
CTMHA has developed 1,655 units of affordable housing in ten Central and North Texas urbanrental communities. With a staff of 27, CTMHA has created several resident-service programs
for low-income tenants, including after-school and summer-youth programs, classes in
computers and English-as-a-Second-Language, and the IDA program. Counseling and training
are offered in both English and Spanish.
Of the four IDA sites run by CTMHA, this report includes only the two ADD sites: the original
ADD site, and the new ADD site that runs under AFIA rules. As of June 30, 2000, the 128 ADD
participants had income that averaged 139 percent of the poverty line.
Program Design and Account Structure
CTMHA requires that participants complete 10 hours of general financial education before they
make a matched withdrawal. Participants who plan matched withdrawals for home purchase or
microenterprise must also take 12 hours of asset-specific education.
CTMHA offers a match rate of 2:1 and an annual match cap of $500 within an annual match-cap
structure. ADD participants have time caps of three years (a few who enrolled in December
1999 have two-year time caps). Thus, participants with three-year time caps have a maximum
asset accumulation of $4,500. Deposits made after December 31, 2001, will not be matched.
Matchable uses are home purchase, post-secondary education, microenterprise, and job training.
CTMHA allows participants to have more than one IDA account. These additional accounts are
in the names of children or other family members. In effect, the multiple accounts increase the
annual match cap for individuals. Thus, some participants have maximum asset accumulations
of $9,000, $13,500, $18,000, or $22,500.

Central Vermont Community Action Council, Inc. (CVCAC)
Barre, Vermont
Program Information
CVCAC, a community-action agency founded in 1965, focuses on community-economic
development and developmental family services. CVCAC provides advocacy and programmatic
services for economically disadvantaged families and individuals in 56 towns in rural northcentral Vermont. The 130-member professional staff provides services to about 6,000 persons
annually. CVCAC has partnered with several community agencies to implement its IDA
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program. The IDA program serves clients of CVCAC, clients of the Department of Prevention,
Assistance, Transition, and Health Access (TANF recipients), and young adults 16-24 years old.
CVCAC runs two IDA sites, both of them in ADD, the original site and a new site that runs
under AFIA rules. This report includes both sites. As of June 30, 2000, the 159 ADD
participants had income that averaged 76 percent of the poverty line.
Program Design and Account Structure
CVCAC requires participants to take 16 hours of general financial education before they make a
matched withdrawal. Asset-specific education is also required for home purchase (8 hours),
post-secondary education (2 hours), or microenterprise (2 hours).
In the original ADD site, CVCAC offers a 1:1 match rate. If a participant receives TANF at any
time during participation, then the match rate becomes 2:1. In the new ADD site, CVCAC offers
a 2:1 match rate. If a participant receives TANF at any time during participation, then the match
rate becomes 3:1. All participants have a time cap of December 31, 2001; deposits made after
that will not be matched. The original ADD site has an annual match-cap structure with a match
cap of $500. The new ADD site has an annual match-cap structure, a 24-month time cap, and
lifetime match caps that range from $500 to $2,000. Matchable uses are home purchase, postsecondary education, microenterprise, and home repair.

Community Action Project of Tulsa County (CAPTC)
Tulsa, Oklahoma
Program Information
CAPTC, founded in 1973, is a community-based, comprehensive anti-poverty agency whose
mission is to “help individuals and families in economic need to achieve self-sufficiency through
emergency aid, medical care, housing, community development, education, and advocacy in an
atmosphere of respect.” Recent examples of new programs that have grown significantly in
response to client demand include an affordable-housing program and an Earned Income Tax
Credit program. The IDA program focuses on those who are making the effort to achieve selfsufficiency but who are not yet able to escape poverty. The IDA program targets working-poor
households with children who qualify for the maximum EITC refund. Many of the IDA
participants are clients of other CAPTC services.
CAPTC has two IDA programs in ADD. The first program—CAPTC Small-scale—enrolled its
first participant in February 1998. The Small-scale program targets people at or below 200
percent of the poverty line. As of June 30, 2000, its 161 participants had income that averaged
128 percent of the poverty line.
The second program—CAPTC Large-scale—has an experimental design. Of 1,103 qualified
applicants, 537 were randomly assigned to a treatment group with access to IDAs, and 566 were
assigned to a control group without access to IDAs. (Of the 537 in the treatment group, 459 have
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opened accounts.) All 1,103 qualified applicants were surveyed just before assignment, and
follow-up surveys are scheduled for 18 months and 42 months after assignment. The Largescale program targets people at or below 150 percent of the poverty line. As of June 30, 2000,
the 459 participants had incomes that averaged 129 percent of the poverty line.
Program Design and Account Structure
Small-scale. The CAPTC Small-scale program requires participants to take six hours of
financial education—general or asset-specific—each year. Asset-specific education is required
for matched withdrawals: 5 hours for home purchase, 2 hours for post-secondary education, 16
hours for microenterprise, and two hours for retirement.
CAPTC Small-scale offers a match rate of 1:1 (2:1 for those who plan to make a home
purchase). Within an annual match-cap structure, the annual match cap is $750. The time cap
for all participants is December 31, 2001. Matchable uses are home purchase, post-secondary
education, microenterprise, home repair, and retirement.
Large-scale. The CAPTC Large-scale (experimental-design) program requires participants to
take 12 hours of general financial education, four hours of which are required prior to opening an
account. Asset-specific education is also required prior to matched withdrawals: 5 hours for
home purchase, 2 hours for post-secondary education, 16 hours for microenterprise start-up, and
2 hours for retirement. No asset-specific education is required for matched withdrawals used for
existing microenterprises, but participants with this type of matched withdrawal must present a
business plan.
CAPTC Large-scale offers a match rate of 1:1 (2:1 for those who plan to make a home
purchase). The time cap is 36 months from the date of account opening, and the annual match
cap is $750 within an annual match-cap structure. Thus, participants who do not plan to make a
home purchase have a maximum asset accumulation of $4,500, and participants who plan to
make a home purchase have a maximum asset accumulation of $6,750. Matchable uses are
home purchase, post-secondary education, microenterprise, home repair, and retirement.

Heart of America Family Services (HAFS), Family Focus Center
Kansas City, Missouri
Program Information
HAFS is a 120-year-old non-profit organization dedicated to support and to strengthen families
in need through information, education, and intervention. Its programs serve 60,000 people
annually at more than 14 locations. The Family Focus Center is one of HAFS’ community-based
programs that provides neighborhood-based family support to a primarily Hispanic population in
Kansas City’s Westside. The Family Focus Center has partnered with other neighborhood
organizations and with the University of Kansas School of Social Welfare to implement the IDA
program. Counseling and training are offered in both English and Spanish. The IDA program
serves the neighborhood area and clients at the Family Focus Center.
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The Family Focus Center has one IDA site that serves 91 participants. As of June 30, 2000, they
had income that averaged 107 percent of the poverty line.
Program Design and Account Structure
HAFS requires participants to take 45 hours of general financial education before they make a
matched withdrawal. All types of matched withdrawals require asset-specific education: 12 hours
for home purchase, six hours for post-secondary education, 12 hours for microenterprise, and 15
hours for retirement.
HAFS offers a match rate of 2:1 in a lifetime match-cap structure. The time cap is December 31,
2001. The match cap is $30 multiplied by the number of months between account opening and
December 31, 2001, with an additional $45 for each year of participation. For example,
someone who opened an account in December 1999 would participate for 25 months in three
distinct participation-years with a match cap of $30·25 + $45·3 = $885. Matchable uses are
home purchase, post-secondary education, microenterprise, home repair, job training, and
retirement.

Human Solutions, Inc.
Portland, Oregon
Program Information
Human Solutions, founded in 1988, is a non-profit community housing organization whose focus
is to provide housing and related services to homeless and low-income families in East Portland
and East Multnomah County. Since 1992, the organization has purchased and developed more
than 222 units of low-income housing, and it manages market-rate housing owned by others for
homeless families. The IDA program serves residents of Multnomah County.
The IDA program has 122 participants. As of June 30, 2000, they had income that averaged 117
percent of the poverty line.
Program Design and Account Structure
Human Solutions requires that participants complete 8 hours of general financial education
within six months after they open an account. Asset-specific education is required for all IDA
uses: eight hours for home purchase, three hours for post-secondary education or job training,
and 12 hours for microenterprise.
Human Solutions offers a match rate of 1:1. The annual match cap in their annual match-cap
structure is $500. The time cap is December 31, 2001; deposits after that are not matchable.
Matchable uses are home purchase, post-secondary education, microenterprise, and job training.
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Mountain Association for Community Economic Development (MACED)
Berea, Kentucky
Program Information
In 1976, MACED was created by ten community-development organizations in Central
Appalachia to provide technical assistance to community-based groups. Its core programs are
business development, sustainable communities, and land and resources. The “Pathways to
Prosperity” IDA program targets low-income residents of Owsley County, the poorest county in
Kentucky. Several local community organizations partnered with MACED to implement the
IDA program, including the Owsley County Action Team, a citizen group that participates in
MACED’s Sustainable Communities Initiative, and the Central Appalachian Peoples Federal
Credit Union.
MACED has three IDA sites, all of which are in ADD. As of June 30, 2000, the 58 participants
had income that averaged 80 percent of the poverty line.
Program Design and Account Structure
MACED requires participants to complete 12 hours of general financial (one hour of financial
education each month) before they make a matched withdrawal. MACED does not require any
asset-specific education. Matched withdrawals are not allowed unless net deposits equal the
lifetime match cap of $360.
MACED has a lifetime match-cap structure. The time cap is 24 months. Deposits of the first
group of participants to enroll are matched at the rate of 6:1; they have a maximum asset
accumulation of $2,520. A second group of participants who enrolled later are matched at a rate
of 1:1 for a maximum asset accumulation of $720. Matchable uses are home purchase, postsecondary education, microenterprise, home repair, and job training.

Near Eastside IDA Program
Indianapolis, Indiana
Program Information
The Near Eastside Community Federal Credit Union (NECFCU) and the John H. Boner
Community Center together created the Near Eastside IDA Program. The NECFCU, founded in
1981, holds IDA accounts and is the only community-development credit union in Indiana. The
Boner Center is a neighborhood community center that has provided a broad spectrum of social
services since 1972. The Near Eastside IDA Program serves youth and adults who live in the
Near Eastside of Indianapolis and who are in programs of the Boner Center or of NECFCU.
Near Eastside runs four IDA sites, two of which are in ADD and are included in this report. One
is the original ADD site, and the second is a new ADD site that runs under AFIA rules.
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As of June 30, 2000, the 191 ADD participants had income that averaged 86 percent of the
poverty line.
Program Design and Account Structure
Near Eastside requires participants to complete nine hours of general financial education before
they make a matched withdrawal. Asset-specific education is offered but not required.
In the original ADD site, Near Eastside offers most participants a match rate of 3:1, although
some have a match rate of 1:1, 2:1, or 6:1. Within the annual match-cap structure, the annual
match cap is $250, $300 or $500, depending on the funding source. The time cap is April 30,
2001; deposits made after that are not matchable. Matchable uses are home purchase, postsecondary education, microenterprise, and job training.
In the new ADD site, Near Eastside offers a match rate of 3:1. In its lifetime match-cap
structure, the lifetime match cap is $500, and the time cap is December 31, 2001. Thus,
maximum asset accumulation is $2,000.

Shorebank
Chicago, Illinois
Program Information
Shorebank, created in 1978, is a community-development financial institution whose mission is
to increase opportunities in underserved communities by identifying and supporting investment
in local assets. The IDA program is a joint effort between South Shore Bank and Shorebank
Neighborhood Institute (SNI), Shorebank’s non-profit affiliate. SNI’s primary focus is on
human and social-capital development, as well as targeted enterprise development. The program
targets African Americans who live in the South and West sides of Chicago, including families
who live in subsidized rental properties owned by Shorebank.
Shorebank runs three IDA sites; this report includes the two in ADD. As of June 30, 2000, the
205 ADD participants had income that averaged 118 percent of the poverty line.
Program Design and Account Structure
For both the original and new ADD sites, Shorebank requires 8 hours of general financial
education before a matched withdrawal. No asset-specific education is required.
In the original site, Shorebank offers a match rate of 2:1 in a lifetime match-cap structure with a
lifetime match cap of $600 (a few participants have a cap of $500). The time cap is 36 months.
Thus, maximum asset accumulation is $1,800. Matchable uses are home purchase, postsecondary education, microenterprise, home repair, and job training.
In the other site, Shorebank offers a match rate of 1:1 in an annual match-cap structure with an
annual match cap of $500. The time cap is 24 months. Thus, maximum asset accumulation is
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$2,000. Matchable uses are home purchase, post-secondary education, microenterprise, home
repair, and job training.

Women’s Self-Employment Project (WSEP)
Chicago, Illinois
Program Information
WSEP, started in 1986, is a microenterprise-development organization that provides
entrepreneurial training, business-development services, and financial services to low- and
moderate-income women. The mission of WSEP is to increase the income and degree of
economic self-sufficiency of women through a strategy of self-employment and to serve as a
catalyst for the development of viable options to alleviate poverty. In 1995, WSEP started an
IDA program targeted to welfare recipients; it was one of the first IDA programs. The program
serves participants from the Center for New Horizons, graduates of WSEP programs, and
employees of the businesses of WSEP participants.
WSEP runs three IDA sites: this report includes data only from the original ADD site and from
the new ADD site that runs under AFIA rules. As of June 30, 2000, the 235 ADD participants
had income that averaged 100 percent of the poverty line.
Program Design and Account Structure
WSEP requires participants to take 16 hours of general financial education before they open an
IDA account. Some types of matched withdrawals also require asset-specific education: eight
hours for home purchase, six hours for post-secondary education, and from 8 to 35 hours for
microenterprise, depending on the experience of the participant in microenterprise.
In the original ADD site, participants at WSEP have match rates of 2:1, and a few have match
rates of 5:1 or 6:1. In the new ADD site, the match rate is 2.5:1. Both ADD sites have lifetime
match-cap structures. Participants in the original ADD site have lifetime match caps of $500 or
$600, and participants in the new ADD site have lifetime match caps of $600. At both ADD
sites, the time cap is 24 months. Matchable uses are home purchase, post-secondary education,
and microenterprise.
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ADD Evaluation Advisory Committee
Ms. Margaret Clark, Director of the Economic Opportunity Project at the Aspen Institute and
of the Self-employment Learning Project, award-winning study of microenterprise programs.
Dr. Claudia Coulton, Director of the Center on Urban Poverty and Social Change at Case
Western Reserve University, investigator of urban poverty and community development.
Dr. Kathryn Edin, Institute for Policy Research, Northwestern University, specialist in
qualitative methods in studying low-income households, author of There’s a Whole Lot of Month
Left at the End of the Money.
Dr. John Else, Founder, Chair of the board, and Director for Consulting for the Institute for
Social and Economic Development (ISED), experienced in evaluation and monitoring of
microenterprise and other economic-development strategies.
Mr. Robert Friedman (liaison from ADD), Founder and Chair of the board of the Corporation
for Enterprise Development, director of ADD, author of The Safety Net as Ladder.
Dr. Irving Garfinkel, School of Social Work, Columbia University, researcher in poverty and
inequality, policy innovator, and evaluator of child-support policy.
Dr. Karen Holden, La Follette Institute of Public Affairs, University of Wisconsin, author of
numerous studies on household economics and gender.
Dr. Laurence Kotlikoff, Department of Economics, Boston University, expert on
intergenerational transfers, savings, and public policy, author of What Determines Savings?
Dr. Robert Plotnick, Daniel J. Evans School of Public Affairs, University of Washington,
author of several important studies on poverty and inequality.
Dr. Salome Raheim, Director of the School of Social Work, University of Iowa, researcher on
the Self-Employment Learning Project, and author of numerous papers on microenterprise.
Dr. Marguerite Robinson, Retired from Harvard Institute for International Development, expert
on design and evaluation of development-finance institutions and savings in poor households.
Dr. Clemente Ruíz Durán, Director of the Post-Graduate Program in Political Economy, expert
in small-scale saving and asset-based policy in Latin America and East Asia, author of more than
a dozen books on economic development and social policy.
Dr. Thomas Shapiro, Department of Sociology, Northeastern University, expert on assets and
race, co-author of Black Wealth/White Wealth.
Dr. Michael Sherraden (convenor), Director of the Center for Social Development,
Washington University in St. Louis, author of Assets and the Poor, director of the evaluation of
ADD.
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